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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Michael Anthony Jenner for the Master of Arts in 
History presented March 4, 2004. 
Title: The Origin of Portland, Oregon's Waterfront Park: A Paradigm Shift 
in City Planning (1967-1978) 
The present thesis chronicles the decision to replace Portland, Oregon's 
Harbor Drive, a downtown highway located between Front A venue and the 
Willamette River, with Tom McCall Waterfront Park, a thirty-seven acre linear 
greenway, in the late 1960s and 1970s. These events provide an example of the 
battle against the ascendancy of the automobile and the ability of concerned 
citizen groups to affect city planning decisions. 
This thesis briefly outlines the history of Portland's waterfront and the 
differing strategies the city employed to attempt to rehabilitate the area in the 
first half of the twentieth century. It then examines the debate over the 
proposed Ash Street ramp in 1961. The cancellation of the overpass project 
marked the first time in Portland's history that waterfront beautification 
advocates had influenced plans for the area. From there, the study focuses on 
the events of 1969 in which the Portland City Club not only caused the 
cancellation of Commissioner Frank Ivancie and State Highway Commission 
Chair Glenn Jackson's unilateral plan to widen Harbor Drive but also 
lambasted the secrecy of public officials. A few months later, the Riverfront for 
People Committee, an organization made up mainly of young architects and 
their spouses, galvanized professional planners and their allies and forced a 
reevaluation of the function of the waterfront. These actions initiated a 
paradigm shift in riverfront development planning from exclusivity to a more 
inclusive process. 
The thesis then examines the decision to close Harbor Drive in 1970 and 
the complex conversion of the area from a highway to a park, placing these 
developments within the context of transformations at Portland City Hall and 
in urban planning in the United States. The study then describes the creation 
and development of Waterfront Park in the mid 1970s and 1980s with an 
emphasis on the role citizen participation and the input of professionals 
played in the development of the park's "Final Report." Finally, the thesis 
examines unforeseen problems that later developed in the park and the city's 
response and explores the complex relationship between professional elites 
and public participation. 
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PREFACE 
The present thesis describes the decision to replace Portland, Oregon's 
Harbor Drive, a downtown highway located between Front A venue and the 
Willamette River, with Tom McCall Waterfront Park, a thirty-seven acre linear 
greenway, in the late 1960s and 1970s. Portland historian Jewel Lansing has 
argued that this transformation was not only a "stunning achievement'' but 
was also one of the most important events in Portland's twentieth century 
existence. In its twenty-five year history, Tom McCall Waterfront Park has 
become Portland's most popular park and also a source of the city's civic 
pride.1 
Previously, Portland historians had not explored this subject in-depth. 
This, the first in-depth examination of the events that led to the decision to 
eliminate Harbor Drive and the process of creating Waterfront Park, grew out 
of the work of urban historian Carl Abbott. In Portland: Planning, Politics, and 
Growth in a Twentieth-Century City (1983), Abbott described the general 
political and city planning transitions that were taking place in Portland 
during this period. In Greater Portland: Urban Life and Landscape in the Pacific 
Northwest (2001), Abbott introduced the Riverfront for People Committee and 
its 1969 campaign to transform the city's waterfront area. 
1 "Future leaders do well to study past, author says," The Oregonian, 24 October 2003, p. Bl. 
This thesis expands upon Abbott's work by examining the controversy 
over the proposed Ash Street ramp in 1961, which pitted beautification 
advocates, including the Oregon chapter of the American Institute of 
Architects, against city officials. It chronicles in more detail the formation of 
the City Club of Portland's Committee on the Journal Building Site and 
Willamette Riverfront Development and analyzes their 1969 report, which 
challenged the secrecy of planning for the area and offered a new philosophy 
for the riverfront and downtown. This thesis, furthermore, expands upon how 
the Riverfront for People Committee galvanized planning-oriented segments 
of the community and forced a reevaluation of the function of the waterfront. 
It also chronicles the complex conversion of the area from a highway to a park 
in the 1970s and examines the unforeseen problems of Waterfront Park that 
emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The thesis addresses the question of why there was a transition from 
exclusivity in city planning for the waterfront in the late 1960s and 1970s to 
increased emphasis on broader community interests and values. This change 
in urban planning was simultaneously occurring in other areas of Portland as 
well as in other American cities. This thesis utilizes the general city planning 
changes in Portland as well as those in Richmond, Virginia and Omaha, 
Nebraska in an interpretive framework. The creation of Waterfront Park 
provides an example of how a grassroots movement not only questioned the 
prevailing planning philosophy of the ascendancy of the automobile but also 
initiated a transformation in the city's attitude towards the riverfront and the 
process of citizen participation. Information for the thesis came from city, 
county, and state documents, the City Club of Portland's meeting minutes and 
reports, the correspondence of the Riverfront for People Committee, 
newspaper articles, and personal interviews. 
The first chapter of this work briefly outlines the history of the 
waterfront and the differing strategies the city employed to attempt to 
rehabilitate the area in the first half of the twentieth century. The second 
chapter chronicles the debate between city officials and beautification 
advocates over the Ash Street ramp project in 1961. Portland's purchase of the 
old Journal building as well as preliminary planning for the riverfront, 
including the formation of Governor Tom McCall's Intergovernmental Task 
Force for Waterfront Development in the late 1960s, is also discussed. The 
third chapter describes the events of 1969 in which the City Club challenged a 
plan by Commissioner Frank Ivancie and corporate leader and State Highway 
Commission Chair Glenn Jackson to create a ten-lane freeway system in the 
area. It also chronicles the formation of the Riverfront for People Committee 
and its organizational drive demanding a more inclusive decision-making 
process as well as the removal of Harbor Drive. The public hearing in October 
1969 is also discussed. 
The fourth chapter covers the decision to remove Harbor Drive and the 
planning for the waterfront in the early 1970s. It chronicles the "Downtown 
Plan," the cancellation of the proposed Mt. Hood Freeway project, and the 
dramatic transition that took place in city hall. A discussion of city planning 
changes that took place in Richmond, Virginia and Omaha, Nebraska during 
this period is also included. The fifth chapter describes the creation and 
development of Waterfront Park in the mid 1970s and 1980s. The Conclusion 
briefly details problematic aspects of the park and the city's re-development 
plan of 2003 and raises consideration of the complex relationship between 
professional elites and public participation. 
CHAPTER I 
SETTING THE ST AGE: THE DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT AS A 
PLANNING PROBLEM 
Portland sits on the Willamette River, twelve miles south of the 
Columbia River. Since the city's founding in 1843 and throughout the 
nineteenth century, the riverfront area on the west bank provided a space for 
Portland businesspeople to trade with the rest of the United States and the 
world. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Portland had emerged as 
the center of power in the Northwest. Because of the city's commercial 
activity, its population grew steadily from just over a thousand at 
incorporation in 1851, to 149,000 in 1905. By the early 1910s, however, the 
downtown area had moved west away from the river, the shipping area was 
increasingly moving into northern Portland, and the downtown west side 
riverfront had become decrepit. Most of the wharves and docks lining the 
waterfront had been abandoned and were lying in a state of disrepair.1 
1 Carl Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City (University of 
Nebraska Press: Lincoln and London 1983), 11, 14-17, 19; E. Kimbark MacColl and Harry H. 
Stein, Merchants, Money, and Power: the Portland Establishment 1843-1913 (The Georgian Press: 
1988), 336-7, 390; Portland Parks and Recreation, City of Portland, Oregon, "Waterfront Park: 
An Assessment of Conditions and Issues," April 2001, 16; idem, "Waterfront Park Master 
Plan, Portland, Oregon," 2003, Multnomah County Library, 13-14; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul 
Frasca Partnership, Portland, Oregon & Royston, Hanamoto, Beck & Abey, San Francisco, 
California, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park, City of Portland, Oregon," August 
1975, Multnomah County Library, 20-21. 
development of Waterfront Park in the mid 1970s and 1980s. The Conclusion 
briefly details problematic aspects of the park and the city's re-development 
plan of 2003 and raises consideration of the complex relationship between 
professional elites and public participation. 
CHAPTER I 
SETTING THE ST AGE: THE DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT AS A 
PLANNING PROBLEM 
Portland sits on the Willamette River, twelve miles south of the 
Columbia River. Since the city's founding in 1843 and throughout the 
nineteenth century, the riverfront area on the west bank provided a space for 
Portland businesspeople to trade with the rest of the United States and the 
world. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Portland had emerged as 
the center of power in the Northwest. Because of the city's commercial 
activity, its population grew steadily from just over a thousand at 
incorporation in 1851, to 149,000 in 1905. By the early 1910s, however, the 
downtown area had moved west away from the river, the shipping area was 
increasingly moving into northern Portland, and the downtown west side 
riverfront had become decrepit. Most of the wharves and docks lining the 
waterfront had been abandoned and were lying in a state of disrepair.1 
1 Carl Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City (University of 
Nebraska Press: Lincoln and London 1983), 11, 14-17, 19; E. Kimbark MacColl and Harry H. 
Stein, Merchants, Money, and Power: the Portland Establishment 1843-1913 (The Georgian Press: 
1988), 336-7, 390; Portland Parks and Recreation, City of Portland, Oregon, "Waterfront Park: 
An Assessment of Conditions and Issues," April 2001, 16; idem, "Waterfront Park Master 
Plan, Portland, Oregon," 2003, Multnomah County Library, 13-14; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul 
Frasca Partnership, Portland, Oregon & Royston, Hanamoto, Beck & Abey, San Francisco, 
California, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park, City of Portland, Oregon," August 
1975, Multnomah County Library, 20-21. 
• 
Throughout the twentieth century, various city planning strategies for 
Portland were drawn up. Each of these plans had specific suggestions for how 
the riverfront should be utilized. The first of these was the Olmstead Plan of 
1904, authored by the nationally renowned Olmstead Brothers of 
Massachusetts, who were paid $10,000 to survey Portland's park potential and 
suggest future park plans. The Olmsteads recommended the creation of a park 
along the west side riverfront as a remedy for the dilapidated area. Even 
though the Olmstead Plan resulted in the creation of a comprehensive park 
system in Portland, including Sellwood Park and Mt. Tabor, no steps were 
made towards the beautification of the riverfront. To some Portlanders, fresh 
from the success of the Lewis and Clark Exhibition in 1905 promoting the 
lifestyle of Portland and Oregon in general, the decayed, ugly waterfront was 
a source of embarrassment.2 
As "Stumptown' s" population surpassed two hundred thousand in 
1910, Edward Bennett, a colleague of Chicago's Daniel H. Burnham, who in 
his 1909 comprehensive plans for his hometown had called for the 
beautification of the lakefront, offered Portland's first far-reaching city plan 
for the twentieth century. His "Greater Portland Plan" (1912) sought to 
transform Portland into a city that one day would be a metropolis of two 
million people. Bennett recommended not only a reinvigoration of the central 
west side riverfront through the creation of a waterfront park, but also 
2 Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 41, 59-60; Jewel Lansing, Portland: People, 
Politics, and Power 1851-2001 (Oregon State University Press, Corvallis: 2003), 249, 252, 256, 
394; E. Kirnbark MacColl, The Shaping of a City: Business and Politics in Portland, Oregon 1885-
1915 (The Georgian Press Company, Portland, Oregon: 1976), 270-1. 
2 
I 
suggested the restoration of public ownership of the area. Even though the 
voters of Portland overwhelmingly approved the concept of the Bennett Plan 
in 1912, little resulted from these plans. This was due to the adamant 
opposition from real estate and business interests as well as an economic 
downturn that began in 1914. By the time the economy recovered in 1918, the 
age of the automobile had made Edward Bennett's plans irrelevant.3 
It was not until the Laurgaard Plan of 1923 that concrete plans for 
remedying the downtown waterfront took shape. In his 1920 report, city 
engineer Olaf Laurgaard had detailed the deplorable condition of the 
riverfront:" ... approximately seventy percent of the frontage ... between 
Jefferson Street and the Steel Bridge has already been condemned, 
recommended for condemnation or tom down." Laurgaard added that the 
blighted area was becoming increasingly dangerous to traffic, a serious fire 
hazard, and was causing high insurance rates for the downtown district. He 
now proposed a comprehensive plan for the riverfront. Responding to the 
periodic flooding of the waterfront area, including the catastrophic flood of 
1894 in which high waters covered 250 square blocks, reaching to N.W. 10th 
and Glisan and S.W. 61h and Washington, Laurgaard recommended the 
building of a seawall between the Hawthorne and Steel bridges. The 
3 Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 59, 62-68; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, 
and Power, 276, 284-85, 288, 301, 394; MacColl, The Shaping of a City, 423-31, 448-9; Portland 
Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 17; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca 
Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," 40. 
3 
Laurgaard plan, furthermore, called for a new Front A venue interceptor sewer 
and pumping plant located along the new concrete seawall.4 
In an attempt to increase property values in the waterfront area and 
downtown, Laurgaard proposed widening Front Avenue to one hundred feet 
and building a public market on the riverfront between the Hawthorne and 
Morrison bridges. He recommended, in addition, the creation of a tunneled 
belt line railway with interurban terminals along a lighted esplanade. The City 
Club objected to the Laurgaard Plan, however, on the grounds that the 
improvements would not properly conserve the aesthetic values of the river 
for the people of the city and would merely replace one blighted area with 
another. The City Club of Portland, which was founded in 1916 by nine well-
educated "forward-looking" men, sought to educate and inform the 
community in public matters and encouraged people to get involved in local 
issues. They also wanted to challenge the power structure of city hall. In 
January 1917, in fact, the original members sponsored legislation that 
strengthened the initiative and referendum process.5 
Even with the City Club's objections, Portland went forward with 
implementing portions of the Laurgaard Plan. Because of the scarcity of 
4 Portland City Planning Commission, "Major Traffic Street Plan Boulevard and Park System 
for Portland Oregon" (Bulletin No. 7: 1921), Portland State University Library, 25 (first quote); 
Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 97; E. Kimbark MacColl, The Growth of a City: 
Power and Politics in Portland, Oregon 1915-1950 (The Georgian Press: 1979), 501-3; Portland 
Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park Master Plan," 14; idem, "Waterfront Park: An 
Assessment," 18. 
5 Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 104; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and 
Power, 300 (first quote); Ellis Lucia, The Conscience of a City: Fifty Years of City Club Service 
(Portland, Oregon: The City Club of Portland, 1966), 10-14; Portland Parks and Recreation, 
"Waterfront Park Master Plan," 14. 
4 
available financing, however, city officials chose to build the sewer plant and 
seawall, at a cost of two million dollars, but not the public market or the rail-
line. These improvements, which were completed in 1929, led to the ripping 
out of the rotted and decayed wharves and docks along the downtown 
riverfront. Although the improvements assuaged Portland's sewage problem 
and protected the downtown area against the high floodwaters of 1932, they 
did not improve Front Avenue property values, which declined by an average 
of 38 percent in the decade between 1926 and 1936.6 
Planning for Laurgaard' s Public Market Building began in 1926 at the 
initiative of a Seattle developer. The building was to replace the farmers' 
market along S.W. Yamhill Street. Although the old market had been 
financially successful, it lacked parking as well as sufficient street access. Due 
to a series of financing complications, however, the planned public market on 
the waterfront was stalled until 1931, when the Portland Chamber of 
Commerce board of directors unanimously approved the construction of the 
building. Later that year, despite the adamant opposition of Commissioner 
Ralph Clyde, who was the leading liberal in city hall, Mayor George Baker, 
along with commissioners John Mann and Earl Riley, voted to assume 
ownership of the project and to issue utility certificates to finance it. The 
council even attached an emergency clause to the ordinance that enabled it to 
6 Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 316-17; MacColl, The Growth of a City, 501-3; 
Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park Master Plan," 14; idem, "Waterfront Park: 
An Assessment," 18; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown 
Waterfront Park," 21. 
5 
go into effect within one month, thus eliminating the possibility of a popular 
referendum halting the project.7 
Indeed, opinion in Portland was deeply divided over the location of the 
planned building. Importantly, the market businesspeople as well as the 
petitions of 18,000 market customers were opposed to the move, arguing that 
the proposed building along the waterfront was too far away from the retail 
core. Despite serious opposition to the scheme, the city council took-out a 
$775,000 Reconstruction Finance Loan for the Market Building in 1932. Later 
that year, however, Baker, who was the first four-term mayor in Portland's 
history, commissioners Mann and Riley, Olaf Laurgaard, and contractor C. 
Lee Wilson were investigated for their involvement in the project. The officials 
were accused of taking bribes and paying $200,000 too much for the riverfront 
site. Even though the charges against the men were later dismissed, 
Portlanders recalled Mann and almost recalled Baker.8 
When it opened in 1933, the two-square block Public Market Building 
was advertised as the largest municipal market structure in the world and 
included one hundred shops and three hundred stalls with some two miles of 
counters. Ironically, approximately two hundred produce vendors protested 
against the new building by forming an alternative cooperative market on 
7 Commissioner Ralph Clyde, who had called the Public Market Building project a "White 
Elephant in the making," served on the city council for sixteen years until his death in 1943. In 
1931, the council passed a resolution sponsored by Clyde to study the possibility of creating a 
municipally owned electric power system in Portland. Even though the resolution had much 
support, the council in 1933, by a three to two vote, refused to refer the matter to the voters. 
Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 319, 322-23, 325, 526n131 (first quote, 526n131); 
Maccoll, The Growth of a City, 421-23, 488-99. 
8 Ibid. 
6 
S.W. Yamhill Street. The financial rewards from the white elephant never 
materialized and in 1934, city officials refused to buy the structure from the 
privately held Public Market Company on the grounds that the firm had 
mismanaged the project so badly that the city would not be able to sell the 
municipal bonds to finance the project. The Public Market Company then 
sued Portland and the RFC for not making good on the contract. In 1942, the 
Oregon Supreme Court ruled the city liable for damages plus interest; 
Portland appealed the decision.9 
On January 1, 1943, the Public Market Company closed the building. 
After that, the U.S. Navy leased the Public Market during World War II to 
store shipbuilding materials. In 1946, with the Second World War over, the 
property was sold to the Oregon Journal for $750,000 and was converted into a 
printing plant. That same year, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that although 
the city was not the owner of the property, it was liable for damages for failure 
to carry out the conditions of the original contract. In 1947, the lawsuit over 
the waterfront building was finally settled as the U.S. Supreme Court refused 
to hear an appeal from the city, forcing Portland to pay over a million dollars 
to the RFC and the Public Market Company .10 
By the early 1930s, Portland faced the dilemma of what to do with the 
land between Front Avenue and the seawall. The Bartholomew Plan of 1932, 
prepared by Harland Bartholomew and Associates, recognized as one of the 
9 Ibid.; Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 108; Portland Parks and Recreation, 
"Waterfront Park Master Plan," 15; idem, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 19. 
lOJbid. 
7 
leading planning consultant firms in the nation, attempted to appease groups 
like the City Club that demanded a waterfront park to revitalize the riverfront 
area and increase property values in lower downtown and interests desiring 
construction of a rail-line. Bartholomew suggested the widening of Front 
Avenue, the building of a tunneled rail-line, and the creation of an 
underground parking garage for 2,500 cars. The report also recommended the 
creation of a park with mixed uses in the two hundred foot wide space 
between Front A venue and the Willamette River seawall. Both the city council 
and Portland Planning Commission ignored Bartholomew's call for a 
waterfront park, despite having paid $24,000 for the study.11 
Proceeding on its own accord in 1935, city officials made concrete plans 
for improving Front Avenue and the downtown waterfront. It now approved 
construction of a highway along the harbor wall with underpasses at the 
bridges. Harbor Drive would be an express six-lane highway with connections 
to Barbur Boulevard to the south, and to the three bridges lining the 
waterfront. At the Public Market Building, however, the width of the white 
elephant cut Harbor Drive down to four lanes. Front A venue, which was to be 
widened by twenty feet, would be utilized as a service street. A narrow strip 
of park would be built between Front Avenue and Harbor Drive and an 
esplanade would be erected on top of the seawall. Not surprisingly, the City 
Club objected to the proposed plan in their 1937 report, "The Development of 
11 Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 104-08; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and 
Power, 322, 394; MacColl, The Growth of a City, 499-501, 521-2; Portland Parks and Recreation, 
"Waterfront Park Master Plan," 14; idem, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 17. 
8 
Front Avenue," which recommended utilizing the waterfront area between 
the Morrison and Burnside bridges as a park. Furthermore, it suggested 
expanding Front Avenue to facilitate the movement of traffic to the west side 
business district. The City Club Committee, however, was uncertain about 
how to finance such a plan. Ultimately, the City Club proposal would tum out 
to be similar to the plan enacted in the 1970s that resulted in the creation of 
Waterfront Park and the Front Avenue artery.12 
By 1940, however, both Portland and the State Highway Commission 
were moving forward with the plans from 1935 for the ten-lane highway 
system. The total cost of the project was estimated at just over four million 
dollars, with the highway commission providing nearly three million dollars. 
To pay for the remaining $1.25 million, city officials put forth an initiative in 
May 1940 calling for the voters to pay the balance. It was believed by city 
officials that the Front A venue Bond Issue would rehabilitate the waterfront 
area, stabilize property values in the downtown area, and relieve traffic 
congestion. On May 17, 1940, Portland voters approved the bond issue with 65 
percent voting in favor. The dream of a west side waterfront park appeared 
dead. The construction of Harbor Drive, which opened in 1942, resulted in the 
demolition of seventy-nine houses and other buildings. Furthermore, the 
widening of Front A venue caused the razing of numerous buildings from 
Portland's pioneer days. Harbor Drive allowed only a 16-foot sidewalk next to 
12 "The Development of Front Avenue," Portland City Club Bulletin 17 (Portland: City Club of 
Portland, 12 March 1937), 143-146. 
9 
the river with a row of trees. The esplanade was not only dangerous to access 
but was noisy as well.13 
By the beginning of World War II, Portland's population had grown to 
305,000. During the Second World War, however, the city's size exploded as 
approximately 72,000 workers and their families flooded the area in search of 
war-related jobs, particularly in the Kaiser shipyards. Kaiser was responsible 
for hiring nearly 70 percent of Portland's total war labor force. This great 
influx of people caused an enormous strain on both housing and traffic. Yet 
during World War II, the War Production Board prohibited all highway and 
street construction unrelated to the war effort. In a 1944 survey of Kaiser's 
91,000 Portland workers, approximately 52 percent wanted to remain in the 
area after the war. City leaders were concerned that when the war ended 
Portland would suffer from massive unemployment. To combat this situation, 
City Commissioner of Public Works William A. Bowes appointed the Portland 
Area Postwar Development Committee (P APDC) to help plan for the post-war 
period.14 
In 1943, the PAPDC hired nationally renowned city planner Robert 
Moses, who was the New York City Park Commissioner, to plan for public 
works projects in the years following the war. Later that year, Moses 
published Portland Improvement, which proposed a $60 million construction 
program to employ approximately 20,000 workers in the first two years after 
13 Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 216; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and 
Power, 335; MacColl, The Growth of a City, 507-18; Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront 
Park Master Plan," 15; idem, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 18. 
14 Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 125-30, 131-38; Lansing, Portland: People, 
Politics, and Power, 339, 342, 347; MacColl, The Growth of a City, 571-84. 
10 
the war. At its core, Portland Improvement was a traffic engineer's solution to a 
complex urban problem. With reference to the downtown waterfront, Robert 
Moses recommended that the riverfront be developed into an attractive park. 
This included the planting of trees, beds for roses and other flowers, and 
landscaped malls. Moses' plan kept the existing ten-lane highway system, 
however. The total construction and land cost of Moses' proposal was $2.5 
million. Moses also proposed a twenty block civic center along Front Avenue, 
between S.W. Salmon and Columbia streets. Nevertheless, neither of Robert 
Moses' proposals for the west side riverfront became reality as Portland voters 
defeated bond measures to pay for the plans.15 
In 1949, the State Highway Commission, despite the opposition of the 
city council, eliminated the numerous parking strips and other undeveloped 
areas located between the harbor wall and Front A venue and replaced them 
with landscaped parks. The council had argued that they did not have the 
funds to maintain the park areas. In the 1950s, the highway commission 
fought to convert Harbor Drive from an expressway to a limited-access 
freeway with as few impediments to traffic flow as possible. The commission 
fought intersections across Harbor Drive and made plans to eliminate signals 
and crossings. In the mid-1950s, the highway commission began building a 
series of overhead ramps to better facilitate traffic flow between the highway 
and the west side business district. Although the $960,000 project linked 
15 Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 138-40; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and 
Power, 334-35, 394; Maccoll, The Growth of a City, 587-91; Robert Moses, Portland Improvement 
(New York City: 1943), 7, 11, 22, 26, 38, 40; Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park 
Master Plan," 15. 
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Harbor Drive with S.W. Market, Clay, Columbia, and Jefferson streets, it 
further obscured the esplanade and the Willamette River. In 1957, the Front 
Avenue Project was finally completed. Barbur Boulevard was now linked to 
Interstate A venue via Front A venue and the Steel Bridge. The project had 
taken seventeen years, with a five-year hiatus during World War II, to 
complete.16 
By the late 1950s, the inability of pedestrians to safely cross the ten-lane 
riverfront highway to access the esplanade was increasingly becoming a 
concern. For most of the year, the waterfront esplanade was scarcely utilized. 
During the Rose Festival, however, thousands of Portlanders flooded the area, 
particularly the section between the Burnside and Morrison bridges. A major 
attraction of the festival was the numerous U.S. Navy and Royal Canadian 
Navy ships moored along the seawall that annually visited the Rose City. In 
1959, it was estimated that 160,000 people boarded these ships for tours while 
an additional 500,000 people visited the esplanade to see the ships.17 
In the fall of 1959, Mayor Terry Schrunk argued that in order to better 
handle the Rose Festival crowds two pedestrian bridges linking downtown 
with the esplanade be built: one between the Burnside and Morrison bridges 
and another between the Morrison and Hawthorne bridges. Shrunk stated, 
"The full enjoyment of [the riverfront area] can only be accomplished in safety 
through the use of overpasses .... " It was estimated that each of the pedestrian 
bridges would cost $15,000. Some city officials, however, objected to Shrunk's 
16 MacColl, The Growth of a City, 513-18. 
17 Terry Schrunk to Milo Mciver, 16 June 1959, Ernest Bonner, personal files. 
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plan. City Traffic Engineer W.J. Weller, in a letter to the Highway Engineering 
Coordinator Fred Fowler, argued that the bridges would be a waste of money 
because not only would they not be able to handle the volume of pedestrians 
during the Rose Festival, but also, unless a fence were installed along Harbor 
Drive, indiscriminate pedestrian crossing of the highway would continue. In 
the end, however, Mayor Schrunk was able to get one pedestrian overpass 
built in 1960, the Bailey Bridge, at the foot of Morrison Street.18 
Between 1900 and 1959, Portland struggled in its attempts to plan for 
the utilization of the west side downtown riverfront. Furthermore, despite 
numerous recommendations from outside planners to build a park along the 
waterfront, including the Olmstead Plan of 1904, Bennett's "Greater Portland 
Plan" (1912), the Bartholomew Plan of 1932, and Moses' Portland Improvement 
(1943), city officials instead moved forward with improved infrastructure 
projects, the building of the white elephant, and the construction of a six-lane 
highway. When Harbor Drive was completed in 1942, a sixteen-foot esplanade 
precariously hugged the river's edge. By the 1950s, it was increasingly 
apparent that the public space allocated for the annual Rose Festival was 
inadequate. 
18 Ibid. (first quote); W.J. Weller to Fred T. Fowler, October 21, 1959, Bonner, personal files; 
Portland City Council, Minutes, May 31, 1961, Portland City Archives, 177. 
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CHAPTER II 
GOVERNOR TOM McCALL AND PRELIMINARY PLANNING FOR A 
RIVERFRONT PARK 
As the 1960s began, Portland officials moved forward with plans to 
build another vehicle ramp linking Harbor Drive with the downtown core. 
Even though the proposed four-block long, thirty-foot high Ash Street ramp, 
situated between the Morrison and Burnside bridges, would have also been 
utilized as a pedestrian bridge to better accommodate the Rose Festival 
crowds, the project threatened to further obscure the downtown west side 
waterfront. The push to build the overpass was heavily influenced by a 1959 
study by the Portland Traffic Engineering Department, which showed that the 
intersection at Oak Street, two blocks south of Ash Street, where northbound 
S.W. Harbor Drive traffic turned into the downtown area, "involved very 
hazardous traffic movement." On January 25, 1961, the State Highway 
Department held a public hearing at the Portland City Council Chambers 
regarding the Ash Street overpass where there were no serious objections to 
the project. On May 3, the city council passed Ordinance 113497, which 
authorized an agreement between the highway commission and the city to 
build the overpass.1 
1 Portland City Planning Commission, "Ash Street Ramp Report and Recommendations," 24 
July 1961, Portland City Archives, 4-6. 
When the city attempted in mid-May to contract out the work to build 
the Ash Street ramp, however, a ground swell of opposition emerged. The 
fight against the overpass was endorsed and highly publicized in both the 
Oregonian and the Oregon Journal starting on May 19 and continuing into June. 
Both daily newspapers urged the highway commission and city council to 
consider alternative plans, such as an Ash Street underpass. Opponents of the 
ramp wanted to save the last unobstructed section along the esplanade of the 
downtown waterfront, one that was utilized as an integral feature of the Rose 
Festival week as thousands of Portlanders visited the navy ships moored 
along the riverfront. Opponents of the project argued, furthermore, that the 
overpass would obscure the soon to be completed renewal of Skidmore 
Fountain park, begun in 1959, as well as historic riverfront property along 
Front Avenue. In its May 26 editorial "Save a Stretch of River Front," the 
Oregon Journal argued that, "an elevated highway structure would be a cruel 
companion for these features." The editorial ended with a call to arms to 
pressure city officials to reconsider the plan.2 
On May 31, the city council held a hearing to listen to protests against 
the Ash Street ramp. Proponents of the overpass were led by Portland 
Highway Coordinator Fred Fowler, who argued that alternate plans for an 
Ash Street underpass had been deemed unfeasible due to it being too steep, 
too susceptible to flooding, and too close to an intercepting sewer. 
Furthermore, he stated that with the soon to be opened I-5, connecting Salem 
2 "Save a Stretch of River Front," The Oregon Journal, 26 May 1961, 6; Dan & Mary Lou 
McGoodwin, interview by Michael Jenner, typed transcript, Portland, Or., 20 October 2003. 
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and Portland, an additional 7,000 vehicles per day would utilize the Oak 
Street interchange. If the Ash Street ramp were not built, Fowler argued, an 
impossible traffic situation would ensue. Opposing any delay of the project, 
he insisted that other than during the Rose Festival, there had not been a 
"corporal's guard" utilizing the esplanade area. "We must decide between our 
desire to live in the past and our desire to improve conditions and go forward 
for a greater Portland," concluded Fowler, "In this decision lies the answer to 
whether downtown Portland will survive."3 
Opponents of the Ash Street ramp were led by Dan McGoodwin and 
Lewis Crutcher of the Civic Design Committee of the Oregon Chapter of the 
American Institute of Architects (AIA). The AIA's Oregon chapter was 
founded in Portland in 1911, reflecting the large number of architects drawn to 
the rapidly growing area, especially following the Lewis and Clark Exposition 
of 1905. An exodus of architects from the area, however, occurred during the 
building slump of the 1910s and particularly during the Great Depression of 
the 1930s. As the Northwest's economy rebounded after the Second World 
War, architects were once again drawn to the area. AIA member Dan 
McGoodwin, who had moved to Portland after serving in the U.S. Navy 
during World War II, had refurbished a building at S.W. Ash Street and 10th in 
the late 1950s, which he believed would have been adversely effected by the 
proposed overpass. "I believed it was my civic duty as an architect to fight for 
the beautification of the city," recalled McGoodwin. Lewis Crutcher, who had 
3 Portland City Council, Minutes, 31May1961, Portland City Archives, 173. 
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moved to Portland from his hometown of Seattle in 1951, was widely 
respected as a "crusader" for the rehabilitation of aging cities. He had also 
assisted in redesigning the Skidmore Fountain area. In 1966, Portland 
architects presented Crutcher with an Award of Commendation for "his 
courageous dedication combating civic ugliness .... "4 
Both McGoodwin and Crutcher insisted that not only must an 
acceptable alternative be found to avoid "defacement of a great asset," but 
that the idea for an underpass, contrary to Fred Fowler's opinion, was in fact 
feasible. Portland had bungled chance after chance to take advantage of the 
beauty of the Willamette River, McGoodwin stated, and the Ash Street 
overpass, if built, would be another sad chapter in this history. Crutcher stated 
that this was a battle between people and machines and that contrary to the 
beliefs of many in city hall, "that is our waterfront." He summed up his 
argument by advocating mass transit over "giving priority to automobiles and 
sewage." After loud applause from the audience, Mayor Terry Shrunk 
admonished that, "[d]emonstrations are not appropriate in the Council. This is 
not a popularity contest or anything of that nature."5 
Terry Shrunk, who served as mayor for sixteen years (1957-72), was a 
Multnomah County sheriff for eight years and before that was a Portland fire 
captain. In April 1956, the Oregonian launched an expose accusing the 
4 Dan & Mary Lou McGoodwin, interview by Michael Jenner, 20 October 2003 (first quote); 
Roger Shiels, interview by Michael Jenner, typed transcript, Portland, Or., 22 January 2004; 
Richard Ellison Ritz, Architects of Oregon (Lair Hill Publishing, 2002), pp. v-x, 91-3 (second and 
third quotes, 93). 
5 Portland City Council, Minutes, 31May1961, Portland City Archives, 174-76; Dan & Mary 
Lou McGoodwin, interview by Michael Jenner, 20 October 2003. 
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Teamsters union, who were supporting Democrat Schrunk against incumbent 
Republican Mayor Fred Peterson, of attempting to take over law enforcement 
and government in Multnomah County, and eventually in Oregon. That 
summer, Schrunk was accused of taking a bribe from the Teamsters while he 
was sheriff in 1955. Even with these accusations, he trounced Peterson in the 
fall election, becoming only the fourth Democratic mayor in the city's first 
eighty-five years. In March 1957, shortly after Schrunk took office, a state 
grand jury indicted him for bribery and perjury. At the perjury trial in June, 
however, he was found not guilty. Portland historian Jewel Lansing has 
suggested that the "negative publicity [and] humiliation ... of the trial" 
changed Schrunk from an "'open, easy-going liberal' to a 'much more 
suspicious, cautious, and conservative' person." 6 
Veteran Commissioner Ormond Bean, who was not only an architect 
but also had been president of the AIA's Oregon chapter during the mid-
1920s, agreed with McGoodwin and Crutcher and moved to postpone a 
decision on the project for thirty days for further study. During his long career 
in city politics, Bean was often the leading liberal on councils that were 
dominated by conservatives. During the 1930s, for example, Mayor Joseph 
Carson, Jr., along with commissioners Earl Riley and the "Red-baiting" Jake 
6 Jewel Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power 1851-2001 (Oregon State University Press, 
Corvallis: 2003), 356, 367-74, 387 (first and second quotes, 374); Carl Abbott, Portland: Planning, 
Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City (University of Nebraska Press: Lincoln and 
London 1983), 168-69; E. Kimbark MacColl, The Growth of a City: Power and Politics in Portland, 
Oregon 1915-1950 (The Georgian Press: 1979), 653; "Mayor Schrunk Refuses Fifth Term Bid," 
The Oregon Journal, 28 February 1972, l; "Controversy Marks Schrunk's Reign," The Oregon 
Journal, 28 February 1972, 4; "Ex-Portland mayor Terry Schrunk, dies," The Oregonian, 5 March 
1975, l; "Ex-Mayor Terry Schrunk Dies," The Oregon Journal, 4 March 1975, 1; "Farm Boy To 
Fireman To Mayor Of Portland," The Oregon Journal, 4 March 1975, 2. 
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Bennett often outvoted Bean and fellow progressive Ralph Clyde to "keep the 
New Deal out of Portland." Commissioner Mark "Buck" Grayson, who had 
served as Bean's administrative assistant for ten years before being elected to 
the council in 1959, joined his former boss in approving the postponement.7 
Commissioner William Bowes, a staunch conservative who served on 
the council for thirty years (1939-69), the longest tenure in Portland's history, 
and who modeled himself after Robert Moses in proposing engineering 
solutions to city problems, such as the Ash Street ramp, responded angrily to 
Bean and Grayson's motion. "Autocrat" Bowes, whom city historian Carl 
Abbott described as suffering from an "arrogance of success," referred to the 
Oregonian as an "ivory tower" institution and to the opponents of the project 
as "Sidewalk Superintendents" and "long-hairs." He argued that if the city 
did not go forward with the ramp construction, the highway commission 
would abandon the project and send the money elsewhere. Fred Fowler 
responded that the proposed motion was a useless delay. Bowes along with 
"longtime ally" Stanley Earl (1953-70), as well as Mayor Shrunk agreed, voting 
7 Jewel Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 324, 328, 332-34, 352, 353, 357-59, 362, 365-
66, 379-80, 382, 383, 390-91 (first quote, 328); Carl Abbott, Portland: Gateway to the Northwest 
(American Historical Press: Tarzana, California: 1997), 110-11 (second quote, 110); Portland 
City Council, Minutes, 31May1961, Portland City Archives, 181-82; "Bean Once 100 Pound 
Quarterback," The Oregon Journal, 26 June 1960, 2; Ex-city official Bean, 89, dies," The 
Oregonian, 15 February 1975, 1; "Ormond Bean leaves long civic record," The Oregonian, 15 
February 1975, 18; "Bid Shunned By Grayson," The Oregonian, 16 January 1970, l; "Grayson 
Favors 'Wide Open' Contest," The Oregonian, 16 January 1970, 14; "Mark Grayson dead at 73," 
The Oregon Journal, 25 July 1981, 2; Carl Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 111-12, 
117, 157, 159; E. Kimbark MacColl, The Growth of a City, 494, 532, 534, 536, 589. 
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down the motion, thus moving forward with construction of the Ash Street 
ramp.8 
The reaction to the city council's vote was swift and aggressive. In its 
editorial on June 2 entitled "Beauty Be Damned," the Oregonian argued that 
the protesters received "short shift" by the council's refusal to grant a thirty-
day reprieve. Furthermore, the newspaper pointed out that, contrary to Fred 
Fowler's statements, an idea for an underpass at Ash Street was actually quite 
feasible: not only had the Portland City Planning Commission proposed two 
underpasses beneath Harbor Drive in 1952, but the grading problem could be 
solved by simply raising the grade of Front A venue a few feet to provide the 
necessary clearance for the underpass. The newspaper also called for the 
public to get involved and stop the project. If not, they declared," ... this will 
be the last Rose Festival when Navy ships will stand out bravely against the 
seawall. Next Rose Festival they will be blotted out by a concrete 
8 Roger Shiels, interview by Michael Jenner, 22 January 2004 (first quote); Carl Abbott, 
Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 141-42, 159-60, 172-73, 207 (second quote, 159); 
Portland City Council, Minutes, 31May1961, Portland City Archives, 182-84 (third, fourth, & 
fifth quotes, 183); "Earl's Death Creates Big Gap In Old Guard," The Oregonian, 5 March 1970, 
sec. III, p. 8 (sixth quote); Jewel Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 334-35, 338, 348-
50, 352-53, 362, 365, 368-69, 373-7 4, 380, 383, 389-90, 396;. E. Kimbark MacColl, The Growth of a 
City, 584, 589, 592, 594, 602, 644; "OK Given Harbor Car Ramp," The Oregonian, 1June1961, 1; 
"City Commissioner Blasts Opponents Of Waterfront Ramp," The Oregonian, 1June1961, 22; 
"Seizure Takes Life Of William Bowes," The Oregonian, 19 October 1969, l; "Wm. Bowes Dies 
At Home," The Oregonian, 19October1969, 31; "Commissioner Earl Succumbs To Seizure," 
The Oregonian, 5 March 1970, 1; "Attack Kills City Official Stanley Earl," The Oregon Journal, 5 
March 1970, 1; "Councilman Earl Rose Through Ranks Of Portland Labor," The Oregon Journal, 
5 March 1970, 4. Commissioner Bowes took particular offense to the Oregonian's May 29 
editorial "Mr. Fowler's charge," which stated, "Like the brave horsemen in the Charge of the 
Light Brigade, [Fowler and Bowes] press on, covering more and more ground with pavement 
and ramps and viaducts and cloverleafs, undismayed by the certain knowledge their fate will 
be the same as that of the gallant Six Hundred." Alfred Lord Tennyson, in his poem "The 
Charge of the Light Brigade," (1864) memorialized a suicidal charge by British forces in the 
Crimean War. "Mr. Fowler's 'Charge'," The Oregonian, 29 May 1961, 10; "The Charge Of The 
Light Brigade by Alfred, Lord Tennyson," 
www.nationalcenter.org/ ChargeoftheLightBrigade.htrnl [accessed January 27, 2003]. 
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monstrosity." The Oregonian also printed Commissioner Bowes' council 
statement in its entirety.9 
Opposition to the Ash Street ramp project continued to mount in the 
first half of June; in fact, a large group of protesters visited the highway 
department and Bowes' office to object to the city council's decision to go 
forward with the project. On June 13, Bowes was forced to authorize the 
planning commission to review the studies of the highway department and 
Highway Coordinator Fred Fowler regarding the ramp as well as examine 
Dan McGoodwin and Lewis Crutcher' s underpass idea. The commission was 
instructed to complete its report in time for presentation at the highway 
department hearing in Salem on July 28.10 
On July 25, the planning commission published its findings in" Ash 
Street Ramp Report and Recommendations." The commission had concluded 
by a unanimous vote that neither the Ash Street overpass nor the alternate 
underpass should be built before further studies could be conducted. It also 
stated that the ramp would have only dealt with the immediate traffic 
problem but would not have been a long-range solution. The commission 
concluded that a future plan should not harm the waterfront area between the 
Morrison and Burnside bridges, should be more cost effective (the cost of the 
underpass was estimated at nearly $2 million compared to $500,000 for the 
overpass), and should successfully deal with long-term traffic problems. The 
report stated that only after the highway department's Origin and Destination 
9 "Beauty Be Damned," The Oregonian, 2 June 1961, 22. 
10 "Overpass Rule to Get Review," The Oregonian, 14 June 1961, 1. 
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study, dealing with traffic movement in Portland, was released in 1962 should 
possible consideration be given to expensive projects such as the Ash Street 
overpass or underpass. The commission also recommended the 
implementation of an interim plan, which called for minor changes in the 
Harbor Drive/Front Avenue highway system, to deal with the immediate 
problem of northbound traffic.11 
"Ash Street Ramp Report and Recommendations" was a clear victory 
for opponents of the overpass as it was an influential argument for 
abandoning the project. A few hours after the release of the commission's 
report, Commissioner Ormond Bean declared that he would seek a 
postponement of the project at the next city council meeting. "Some better 
way of handling the traffic will be found," insisted Bean. Commissioner 
Bowes was less enthusiastic, declaring that the commission had not taken a 
"realistic position" and that the traffic problem was so bad that the city could 
not afford to wait for more studies to be compiled. Meanwhile, Dan 
McGoodwin declared that the report represented "the best interests of the 
city." 12 
The Ash Street overpass debate concluded at the city council meeting 
on August 3, as the council unanimously voted to cancel the May 26 
agreement between the city and the highway commission, thus killing the 
project. Mayor Terry Schrunk now came to the aid of embattled 
11 Portland City Planning Commission, "Ash Street Ramp Report and Recommendations," 1-2. 
12 "Bean to Seek Harbor Drive Ramp Postponement," The Oregon Journal, 25July1961, 1; Dan 
& Mary Lou McGoodwin, interview by Michael Jenner, 20 October 2003. 
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Commissioner Bowes, arguing that contrary to widespread belief, it was he, 
and not Bowes, who had initiated the plan for the ramp. Furthermore, 
Schrunk added, " .. .I think Commissioner Bowes has been subjected 
unmercifully to the most unfair, unrealistic criticism." Even after the vote to 
cancel the project had been cast, an acrimonious exchange between Everett 
"Barney" Franks, the president of the Oregon chapter of the American 
Institute of Architects, and Mayor Schrunk ensued. Franks volunteered that he 
applauded the city's new emphasis on "human values." Schrunk responded, 
"Did you say something about safety? Are you concerned about that? 
... Beauty is nice, but it's pretty hard to enjoy it from a hospital bed." Plans for 
the Ash Street ramp were shelved pending further study.13 
On February 20, 1962, the planning commission released its staff report, 
"Comprehensive Downtown Study-Harbor Drive Access," a follow-up study 
to "Ash Street Ramp and Recommendations." The commission now declared 
that since the opening of I-5, contrary to Fred Fowler's predictions, there had 
been no significant increase in the volume of traffic utilizing the northbound 
Harbor Drive I Oak Street tum-off. The report, however, noted that there had 
been a significant 17 percent increase in the usage of the Clay Street ramp. The 
13 Portland City Council, Minutes, 3August1961, Portland City Archives, 463-64 (first, second, 
and third quotes); Dan & Mary Lou McGoodwin, interview by Michael Jenner, 20 October 
2003. In 1966, the partnership of "Barney" Franks and Richard Norman was awarded first 
place for property improvement by the Portland Chamber of Commerce and Portland 
Beautification Association. The Franks and Norman Building in old town had originally been 
built in 1878. "Portland Beautification Group Presents Awards," The Oregon Journal, 31 
October 1966, 8; "Norman & Stanich, AIA, Portland, Oregon," "Where the Architects Hang 
Their Hats," William Hawkins III, personal files. 
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planners concluded that there was no reason why the Ash Street ramp project 
should be re-examined.14 
The success of the protesters in stopping the construction of the 
planned overpass was significant because it was the first time beautification 
advocates had been able to influence the plans for development of the 
downtown waterfront. As the Oregonian noted in a May 1961 editorial, "Last 
Chance," construction of the Ash Street ramp would have closed off 
opportunities of creating a viable riverfront park on the west bank of the 
Willamette River. The opponents of the overpass project thus not only saved 
the last unobstructed section along the riverfront, but they also provided a 
chance for beautification advocates in the late 1960s to push for a major park 
to line the downtown waterfront. Both the Oregonian and the Oregon Journal, in 
the name of civic pride, had played a critical role in informing the public 
regarding the status of the city and state plans for the Ash Street ramp, and in 
helping organize the opposition to the project. 15 
Mayor Terry Schrunk had suggested in a 1961 letter to the planning 
commission that the entire area from Market Street to the Steel Bridge and 
from the esplanade to at least Fourth A venue be studied for possible 
rehabilitation or urban renewal. Schrunk had long championed the idea of 
urban renewal as a means of fighting off trends of downtown "obsolescence" 
by creating a "building boom." As urban historian Carl Abbott has explained 
14 Portland City Planning Commission, "Comprehensive Downtown Study-Harbor Drive 
Access," 20 February 1962, Ernest Bonner, personal files. 
15 "Last Chance," The Oregonian, 19 May 1961, 24. 
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in Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City (1983), 
much of the success of Portland's urban renewal was due to the influence of 
Shrunk's colleague, Ira Keller, who was president of the Western Kraft 
Corporation, which produced cardboard boxes and other paper packing 
material, and chair of the Portland Development Commission (PDC) from its 
organization in 1958 until 1972, an agency Shrunk created to deal with 
"redevelopment and civic promotion." Keller, who was born in Portland, 
Maine, had moved out west from Chicago in 1953 in order to be closer to the 
pulp supplies. Two years after the mayor's letter to the planning commission, 
the city council formally asked the agency to study the downtown waterfront 
as a possible urban renewal site. Yet little action was taken in dealing with the 
riverfront area.16 
Despite a reluctance to contemplate the creation of park space on the 
waterfront, Portland officials began to make plans to buy the old Journal 
Building in the mid-1960s to better utilize the downtown riverfront. The 
Oregon Journal had operated out of the 'white elephant' from 1948 until the 
newspaper was bought out by the Oregonian Publishing Co. in 1961. In the 
early to mid-1960s, the Oregonian had used the building to store newsprint 
and equipment and also made it available to charitable organizations. For a 
period, even the Oregon Historical Society had used the old Journal Building 
16 Carl Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 209-14 (first quote); Ibid. (second and 
third quotes); Terry Schrunk to Portland City Planning Commission, 11August1961, Bonner, 
personal files; Roger Shiels, interview by Michael Jenner, 22 January 2004; John Kenward, 
"Tomorrow's Portland Today," Greater Portland Commerce 52, September 1968, 36-39; Lansing, 
Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 376-78; Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park 
Master Plan, Portland, Oregon," 2003, Multnomah County Library, 15; idem, "Waterfront 
Park: An Assessment of Conditions and Issues," April 2001, 19. 
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as a storage site. Increasingly, however, it became clear that something had to 
be done with the building. Not only did the building cause traffic problems on 
Harbor Drive (it was so wide that it cut the highway down from six to four 
lanes) but it also restricted plans for redeveloping the riverfront area. By 1967, 
plans were in full swing for Portland to purchase the structure. One of the first 
plans that emerged in August 1967 involved Lewis and Clark College 
acquiring the building as a gift from the Newhouse interests, who owned the 
Oregonian, who would then sell it to the city for approximately $750,000 to 
have it tom down. The plan called for realigning and widening Harbor Drive 
to six lanes in that area while creating a park along the Willamette River.17 
In October 1967, the planning commission published "Downtown 
Waterfront," its study of possible uses for the downtown riverfront. The 
commission declared three major objectives in its strategy: removal of the old 
Journal Building to eliminate the traffic bottleneck, better vehicular access to 
the east section of downtown, and reclamation of the riverfront through the 
building of a pedestrian friendly waterfront park. The planners also 
recommended depressing Harbor Drive, moving it slightly away from the 
river, and building pedestrian ramps to the greenway area. Furthermore, they 
called for the building of four automobile ramps to improve vehicular access 
17 Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 19; Wolff Zimmer 
Gunsul Frasca Partnership, Portland, Oregon & Royston, Hanamoto, Beck & Abey, San 
Francisco, California, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park, City of Portland, Oregon," 
August 1975, Multnomah County Library, 40; Lloyd T. Keefe to Terry D. Schrunk, 16 August 
1967, Bonner, personal files; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 325, 379, 386. In the 
winter of 1964-65, the Willamette River crested at 32.45 feet in Portland, six inches shy of the 
all-time record of thirty-three feet set in 1894. The seawall, however, kept the water out of 
downtown. Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 386-87. 
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to downtown. For the riverfront park, the commission recommended utilizing 
the northern area, between the Morrison and Burnside bridges, for Rose 
Festival activities, including the annual visit by the navy fleet. For the 
southern section of the park, between the Morrison and Hawthorne bridges, 
the planning commission put forth the idea of developing a marina, 
restaurant, and nightclub area. The commission envisioned the waterfront 
park as a center of activity that, because of pedestrian accessibility to the 
downtown, could rejuvenate the area between Third and Front avenues.18 
In February 1968, Mayor Schrunk commissioned Frank Ivancie, the 
commissioner of public affairs, to explore plans for the old Journal Building 
and the surrounding area, and to report back to the city council. Ivancie, who 
had served as Schrunk' s executive assistant from 1959 to 1967, was considered 
the second most conservative person on the council, behind Bowes. He was 
also heavily reliant on the business community and on city employee unions, 
especially the firefighters, who funded his campaigns. In his letter to Glenn 
Jackson, chair of the highway commission, Schrunk suggested that long-range 
plans for the area should involve solving the bottleneck caused by the 
waterfront structure as well as extending the existing greenway along the 
riverfront.19 
18 Portland City Planning Commission, "Downtown Waterfront Study," October 1967, 
Multnomah County Library; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: 
Downtown Waterfront Park," 40; Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 215. 
19 In the Jetter, Mayor Schrunk stated that the city had explored possibilities for keeping the 
old Journal Building intact, including arcading the east side of the building facing Harbor 
Drive while cutting the building back to provide for more traffic lanes and utilizing the 
building as a jail facility. Both plans were deemed infeasible. Terry Schrunk to Glenn Jackson, 
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On April 11, Ivancie reported back to the city council suggesting that 
the best solution was the removal of the old Journal Building so as to provide 
for a mile-long riverfront park, ranging from eighty to one hundred feet wide, 
between the Steel and Hawthorne bridges and the widening of Harbor Drive 
from four to six lanes. "In my opinion," he stated, "the acquisition of the 
Oregon Journal Building in itself is the key to unlock the full potential of a 
beautiful riverfront development in Portland. At the same time, we will be 
able to resolve a critical traffic problem." Ivancie estimated that purchasing 
the white elephant would cost around $1.3 million but added that the 
highway commission was willing to share acquisition and demolition costs on 
a fifty-fifty basis.20 
On the same day that Ivancie detailed his findings to the city council, 
the Portland City Traffic Engineer's Office, which included Fred Fowler, met 
with representatives of the State Highway Department to discuss the possible 
relocation of Harbor Drive. After considerable preliminary discussion, the 
group determined that a relocated Harbor Drive should be as close to Front 
A venue as possible in order to ensure the maximum amount of greenway area 
between the highway and the Willamette River. They also determined, 
however, that not only would pedestrian movements across Harbor Drive be 
prohibited at all times, except during the week-long Rose Festival, but that 
any pedestrian ramps to serve the esplanade would be the city's 
7 February 1968, Bonner, personal files; Abbott, Portland: Planning, Poliiics, and Growth, 173; 
Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 383, 387, 416. 
20 Portland City Council, Minutes, 11April1968, Portland City Archives, 248-9. 
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responsibility. The group also discussed the possibility of converting Front 
Avenue into a one-way northbound street, with First Avenue becoming one-
way southbound in order to create more space for the riverfront greenway. 
City and state plans to purchase the old Journal Building were announced on 
April 9, 1968.21 
Prospects for the city and state's version of a riverfront greenway 
quickly came under fire from beautification advocates. On April 26, 1968, John 
Bolan, president of the Portland Beautification Association, challenged the 
greenway plan in a strongly worded letter to the city council. The 
beautification association, which had been created in 1960 by Mayor Schrunk 
to coordinate long-range plans for improving the city's aesthetic environment, 
included over fifty committee members representing over thirty clubs, 
organizations, and professional groups in the Portland area. Among the 
groups' initial tasks was the beautification of the waterfront. Bolan, an 
advertising and credit manager for the Charles H. Lilly Company, specializing 
in agricultural products, now insisted that for the riverfront park to have any 
meaning, it would need to be much wider than the proposed eighty to one 
hundred feet. He stated, furthermore, that because future traffic studies of the 
area showed diminished use, there was the potential for removing Harbor 
21 F.B. Klaboe to Memo to the File, 11April1968, Bonner, personal files; "Old Journal Site 
Optioned," The Oregonian, 9 April 1968, 1. 
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Drive entirely in order to ensure a great waterfront park. This was the first 
plan that called for the complete removal of Harbor Drive.22 
On May 23, the city council agreed to buy the old Journal Building for 
$1.3 million. The contract called for the city to make a $400,000 down payment 
and annual installments of $300,000 for three years. Commissioner lvancie, 
who negotiated the sale on behalf of the city, called the transaction" ... one of 
the most significant milestones in Portland's history." Fred Stickel, the 
general-manager of the Oregonian Publishing Company, noted that he had 
given the city first preference and price consideration in order to ensure the 
creation of a park space on the waterfront. Per an agreement with the highway 
commission, the state would pay half the cost for relocating Harbor Drive 
west next to Front A venue. Mayor Schrunk announced that the esplanade 
would be named the Francis J. Murnane Parkway in honor of the recently 
deceased president of the Longshoremen's Union.23 
With the purchase of the waterfront structure, plans for the future of 
the downtown riverfront accelerated. By June, city officials were considering 
three possibilities. In Plan "A," Front A venue would remain a two-way street 
with some minor changes. Harbor Drive would be relocated alongside Front 
22 Portland Beautification Association, "History and Goals of the Portland Beautification 
Association," May 1960, Portland Beautification Association file, Oregon Historical Society; 
John J. Bolan, President, Portland Beautification Association to Portland City Council, 26 April 
1968, Bonner, personal files; "Beautification Aim Of New Portland Body," The Oregon Journal, 
18August1960, 5; "Beauty Unit Elects Slate," The Oregonian, 30 January 1968, sec. 3, p. 5; 
"Lilly, Miller Firms Merge," The Oregonian, 4August1970, sec. 3, p. 5. 
23 "Old Journal Building sold," The Oregonian, 24 May 1968, 1; Abbott, Portland: Planning, 
Politics, and Growth, 215; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 325, 367-69, 372-74; 
Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park Master Plan," 15; idem, "Waterfront Park: 
An Assessment," 19; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown 
Waterfront Park," 40. 
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A venue, allowing for between eighty and one hundred feet in width between 
the highway and the Willamette River. Because the esplanade was twenty feet 
wide, however, there would be only sixty to eighty feet for landscape 
development; this is approximately the width of the south Park Blocks. In Plan 
"B," Harbor Drive would be relocated to the west and Front A venue would be 
narrowed to forty-four feet for four northbound lanes only. This would allow 
for an additional fifty-foot area for the entire length of the riverfront park. 
Both Plans" A" and "B" were each estimated to cost $500,000. Plan "C," or the 
cut-and-cover plan, would have followed the same general alignment as Plan 
"B," except that the grade would be lowered between S.W. Salmon Street and 
S.W. Stark Street to allow for a cut and fill tunnel section as well as a five-foot 
earth cover for future landscaping. This would allow for an area 235 feet wide 
by 1,360 feet long between Front Avenue and the Willamette River. Plan "C' 
was patterned after the proposed Delaware Expressway (Interstate 95) in 
Philadelphia and was projected to cost $4,725,000.24 
On July 1, the City Club of Portland engaged in the waterfront 
controversy by establishing the Committee on the Journal Building Site and 
Riverfront Development. The panel was chaired by power section chief for the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers David J. Lewis and included future 
commissioner and mayor Neil Goldschmidt. Goldschmidt, who in 1964 had 
assisted civil rights groups in Mississippi, was working as a legal aide for 
antipoverty and community groups in southeast Portland. The committee's 
24 Fred T. Fowler to Francis J. Ivancie, "Preliminary Report on the proposed West Side 
Waterfront Development," 28 June 1968, Bonner, personal files. 
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mission was to study the disposition of the old Journal Building, proposals and 
costs for utilization of the site, financing issues of each proposal, and make 
recommendations for best possible uses of the area. Soon after the committee 
was formed, however, it learned that the city had already decided to raze the 
waterfront structure. When they uncovered the secrecy of the city planning 
process, the committee moved to "more urgently" study the best possible uses 
of the area. 25 
In light of these developments, the City Club committee's study was 
broadened to include planning activities from the Ross Island to the Steel 
bridges, between the river and Front Avenue. Its task was to review all plans 
currently being considered and to evaluate the purposes to be served by 
potential development. From its earliest discussions with city officials, the 
committee believed that development of the downtown waterfront was being 
designed to accommodate automobiles while little was planned for 
pedestrians. As the City Club concluded, "inevitably there would be conflict 
between the insatiable need to move automobiles and the development of the 
waterfront in a manner which would enhance the quality of the downtown 
area and the entire city." On September 6, the panel invited Lloyd Keefe, the 
executive director of the planning commission, to discuss these problems. 
25 David J. Lewis had an influential role in negotiating the 1964 Columbia River Treaty with 
Canada. City Club of Portland, "Interim Report on Journal Building Site Use and Riverfront 
Development," Portland City Club Bulletin 50, 8 August 1969, 21 (first quote); Roger Shiels, 
interview by Michael Jenner, 22 January 2004; Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 
174; "River-basin planner dies," The Oregonian, 4October1985, p. E4. 
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Keefe presented a concept for the waterfront development that seemed to 
offer a solution to the committee's concerns.26 
Keefe's proposals coincided with the efforts of Oregon Governor Tom 
McCall. When the Republican McCall was elected as the state's thirtieth 
governor in 1966, few could have predicted the enormous impact he would 
exert on public affairs. Fewer still could have foreseen his influence in 
transforming the ten-lane Harbor Drive/Front Avenue highway into 
Waterfront Park. Although he was born in Massachusetts, McCall grew up on 
his family's ranch near Prineville. He attended the University of Oregon and 
in 1944 enlisted in the Navy and served as a war correspondent in the Pacific. 
Upon returning from the war, McCall turned his attention to politics. His first 
major political employment was in 1949 as Governor Douglas McKay's 
assistant. Yet McCall's early political career was marked by a series of defeats 
including an unsuccessful congressional campaign in 1954 and not being 
named state secretary of state by Governor Mark Hatfield in 1958.27 
26 City Club of Portland, "Interim Report on Journal Building Site Use and Riverfront 
Development," Portland City Club Bulletin 50, 8August1969, 21 (first quote); idem, "Meeting 
Memo: Meeting and edited front portion report," 7 July 1969, Bonner, personal files, 2-3. 
27 The position of state secretary of state was to be vacated in late 1958 by Mark Hatfield, who 
in November had defeated U.S. Senator Wayne Morse to become governor. Hatfield had 
shown interest in naming McC;:tll to the post and had interviewed him. After the interview, 
McCall was confident that he would be given the position. Hatfield, however, "wanted to 
have a secretary of state who wouldn't cross him as [McCall] might." When the governor-elect 
named Howell Appling, a transplanted Texas businessperson who had managed Hatfield's 
gubernatorial campaign in Multnomah County, McCall was offended. He felt that "Hatfield 
purposely led him on." The post of secretary of state had a reputation as a reliable means to 
become governor. McCall and Hatfield continued to have an acrimonious relationship 
throughout their political careers. Brent Walth, Fire at Eden's Gate: Tom McCall and the Oregon 
Story (Oregon Historical Society Press, 1994), 128-29 (first and second quotes); Tom McCall 
and Steve Neal, Tom McCall: Maverick (Binford & Mort, 1977), 1, 9, 20, 43, 56-8. 
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Tom McCall's name recognition in the state did not come through 
politics but rather through his work as a radio and television journalist. In 
1962 while working for Portland's KGW-TV, McCall made the award-winning 
documentary "Pollution in Paradise," a shocking expose on the pollution of 
the Willamette River and an environmental call to arms. In "Pollution in 
Paradise," McCall referred to the river as '"an open sewer"' and named the 
names of some of the worst polluters. Many people credited McCall's 
documentary with influencing a legislative bill in 1963 that, for the first time, 
gave the state the power to shut down polluting companies. The next year, 
Tom McCall reentered politics and scored his first victory by becoming 
Oregon's secretary of state. Just two years later, McCall defeated Democratic 
nominee Robert Straub to become govemor.28 
During his first term as governor, which began in 1967, Tom McCall 
emerged as a powerful advocate for environmental issues. For example, he 
provided unwavering support for a Willamette Greenway system. The idea 
for a state-owned greenway running the entire 255-mile length of the 
Willamette River had actually first been publicly proposed by Robert Straub 
during the 1966 election campaign. While the project was altered to fit more 
modest goals, McCall's support of the Greenway was critical to its success. 
28 Robert Straub served as governor from 1974 to 1978 but not before losing to McCall again in 
the 1970 gubernatorial election. Interestingly, McCall, a Republican, all but endorsed Straub in 
the 1974 gubernatorial race and refused to endorse the Republican nominee, State Senator 
Victor Atiyeh. McCall referred to Atiyeh as a member of the GOP "wrecking crew" that had 
often been in opposition to McCall's policies. Straub also served as state treasurer from 1964 to 
1972. Walth, Fire at Eden's Gate, 142-48, 158-61, 172-75, 282-83, 304-5, 409-10 (first quote, 409); 
McCall and Neal, Tom McCall: Maverick, 59-61, 69, 72, 143-44, 180; Lansing, Portland: People, 
Politics, and Power, 375. 
34 
Governor McCall also named himself to the State Sanitary Authority in order 
to approve tougher air and water regulations. This legislation had a profound 
effect on decreasing the pollution levels of the Willamette River.29 
One of Governor Tom McCall's greatest environmental 
accomplishments was the 1967 Beach Bill, which expanded public ownership 
of Oregon's more than 300-mile coastline up to the riparian line, thereby 
ending the threat of private development on the beaches. Some of McCall's 
other environmental accomplishments included the nation's first mandatory 
bottle-deposit law, a bill that required the removal of billboards, the building 
of bicycle paths using highway revenues, and creative energy conservation 
measures during the energy crisis of the 1970s. Even with his notoriety as an 
environmentalist, however, Tom McCall occasionally sided with economic 
growth and industry. Two such examples were his support of the 
development of nuclear power as well as his backing of high timber harvests.30 
McCall entered the fray over Portland's west side riverfront by 
convening a joint session of the Portland City Council and the Multnomah 
County Board of Commissioners in October 1968 to announce the creation of 
the Intergovernmental Task Force for Waterfront Development. The panel was 
to contain three representatives each from the State of Oregon, Multnomah 
County, and the City of Portland. Describing the meeting as one of the most 
important in state history, McCall enthused, "The focus is intergovernmental 
29 Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Pawer, 375; McCall and Neal, Tom McCall: Maverick, 68-
70, 77, 83, 97, 179-81, 183, 186-7; Walth, Fire at Eden's Gate, 174, 182, 183, 198-200, 221, 224, 402. 
30 Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 375; McCall and Neal, Tom McCall: Maverick, 81-
3, 204-16; Walth, Fire at Eden's Gate, 186-91, 260-62, 319-22, 331-34, 378-80. 
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coordination and cooperation at its zenith. The purpose is of transcendent 
importance to each of our levels of government and to all our citizens." 
McCall not only argued that Portland's riverfront area was the key to the 
success of the Willamette Greenway system, but he challenged the task force 
to find a way to beautify the downtown waterfront area. "We cannot afford to 
spawn, through inattention and inaction, a sort of Berlin Wall of layer upon 
layer of cement and high speed traffic which bar our citizens from what 
should and must be one of the most attractive, livable and useful sections of 
the core city," he declared. McCall pledged his personal support for the 
project and instructed the State Highway Commission to find a way to make 
the downtown riverfront area "highly accessible."31 
McCall chose "General" Glenn Jackson as chair of the task force. As the 
Oregon Labor Press noted, it was widely acknowledged that, "no major 
political, economic or governmental decisions are made in Oregon without 
consulting Glenn Jackson." Not only was he the chair of the highway 
commission, a position he held for seventeen years, he was also chair of the 
Board of Pacific Power and Light, Co., the largest private electric utility in the 
Northwest. Jackson also sat on the boards of numerous corporations and 
organizations including Standard Insurance and the U.S. National Bank of 
Oregon. Jackson had made his personal fortune by transforming Camp White, 
an Army training center near Medford, into the White City industrial 
31 City I County Coordinating Committee Meeting, "City I County Coordinating Committee 
Meeting Minutes," 7 October 1968, Portland City Archives, 1-4; Abbott, Portland: Planning, 
Politics, and Growth, 216; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 384; Portland Parks and 
Recreation, "Waterfront Park Master Plan," 15-16; idem, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 
19; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," 40. 
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complex. Ironically, one of his notable business failures was his inability to 
buy the Oregon Journal in 1961. State representatives on the task force also 
included John Mosser, chair of the State Sanitary Authority, and Dennis 
Lindsay, chair of the Port of Portland Commission.32 
Task force participants from Portland and Multnomah County also 
included powerful figures. Mayor Schrunk appointed Ira Keller; Herbert 
Clark, president of Holman Transfer Company and chair of the planning 
commission; and Commissioner Frank Ivancie. On the county level, task force 
members included Clifford Alterman, chair of the Multnomah County 
Planning Commission; C. Ralph Walstrom, president of Property Counselors, 
Inc.; and Dr. John Phillips, vice-president of Lewis and Clark College.33 
On November 8, Governor McCall presented a state sponsored plan for 
the redevelopment of the downtown riverfront. It included "an underground 
highway, a park-like setting, pedestrian access without difficulty, and an 
unobstructed view of the Willamette River." The plan proposed the 
elimination of both Harbor Drive and Front Avenue and in their place, the 
construction of a depressed six-lane highway. The road would be placed 
fourteen feet below ground level so as to provide an unobstructed view of the 
32 '"General' Glenn Jackson, Most influential man in Oregon," Willamette Week, 14 April 1975, 
1, 4, 8 (first quote, 1); "Power company head heads power structure," Oregon Labor Press, 5 
December 1969, Glenn Jackson file, Oregon Historical Society, 20 (second quote); City Club of 
Portland, "Interim Report on Journal Building Site Use and Riverfront Development," 23; 
Roger Shiels, interview by Michael Jenner, 22 January 2004; Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, 
and Growth, 216; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 384; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul 
Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," 40; Sam Galbreath to J. David 
Hunt, 5May1977, 2, Bonner, personal files. 
33 City Club of Portland, "Interim Report on Journal Building Site Use and Riverfront 
Development," 23; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 384; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul 
Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," 40. 
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river from downtown. The highway also would be realigned away from the 
Willamette River, which would require the demolition of a half block west of 
Front Avenue to provide for a 250-foot wide, thirty acre green space on the 
waterfront. In addition, at least four pedestrian bridges would be built to 
access the riverfront park. The project was to require six to seven years to 
complete with a cost of approximately $18 million. McCall argued that the 
state's depressed roadway plan would cost approximately $25 million less 
than the cut-and-cover plan.34 
Five days later, traffic engineer Fred Fowler sent a detailed report to 
Commissioner lvanice attacking the state's depressed highway proposal. 
Fowler argued that not only would valuable property west of S.W. Front 
Avenue be destroyed because it fronted the proposed park area, but a 
depressed and uncovered six-lane highway would cause enough noise and air 
pollution to devalue real estate in the area. Furthermore, the plan would cause 
serious local traffic problems. Fowler defended the cut-and-cover plan and 
argued that it would not cost $25 million more than the state's depressed 
highway plan; in fact, it might actually cost less.35 
Based on the traffic engineer's recommendations, the planning 
commission in December 1968 published the "Downtown Waterfront Plan," 
which advocated the cut-and-cover plan as the best means to develop the 
34 City Club of Portland, Minutes, 9 January 1969, Bonner, personal files (first quote); idem. 
"Meeting Memo: Meeting and edited front portion report," 7 July 1969, Bonner, personal files, 
4; City Club of Portland, "Interim Report on Journal Building Site Use and Riverfront 
Development," 21, 23; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 384. 
35 Fred Fowler to Frank lvancie, "West Side Water Front," 13 November 1968, Bonner, 
personal files. 
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downtown waterfront. The commission proposed to relocate Harbor Drive 
immediately east of Front Avenue and tunnel the highway between Taylor 
and Ash streets, a distance of 2,140 feet. This project, it argued, would allow 
for a 235-foot wide waterfront park area between Front Avenue and the 
Willamette River. Furthermore, the commission's plan permitted a future 
extension of the tunnel section as far south as S.W. Market Street. The cost of 
the project was placed at approximately $7 million, $11 million cheaper than 
the state's plan. In addition, the commission argued, the noise and air 
pollution caused by the tunneled highway would be greatly reduced. By 
creating a vibrant area along the waterfront, city officials argued, the eastern 
downtown area could be revived and strengthened. As the year 1968 came to 
a close, the Intergovernmental Task Force for Waterfront Development began 
looking into the costs and feasibility of the city sponsored cut-and-cover 
plan.36 
In the period between 1960-1968, proponents of a waterfront park won 
a series of victories. In the early 1960s, riverfront beautification advocates, led 
by the Oregon Chapter of the American Institute of Architects and supported 
by both the Oregonian and the Oregon Journal, successfully stopped the 
construction of the Ash Street ramp, which would not only have obstructed 
the last open area along the riverfront, but would have eliminated the 
opportunity to create a viable riverfront park in the foreseeable future. The 
idea for a waterfront park was resurrected in 1968 when the city bought the 
36 Portland City Planning Commission, "Downtown Waterfront Plan," December 1968, 
Multnomah County Library, 1-4; Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 215. 
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... 
old Journal building and planned to have it torn down. Sensing an opportunity 
to beautify the riverfront, Governor Tom McCall, a long-time proponent of 
environmental issues, created the Intergovernmental Task Force for 
Waterfront Development, chaired by Glenn Jackson, to examine the issue and 
make recommendations. By the end of 1968, it was clear that a park along the 
river's edge was going to be built. The shape and size of the park, however, 
along with the role automobiles would play in the area, was still to be 
decided. 
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CHAPTER III 
1969: THE DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT AND THE BATTLE OVER ITS 
USES 
While the Intergovernmental Task Force for Waterfront Development 
studied the conflicting state and city plans for the downtown west side 
waterfront in the beginning of 1969, Portland officials went forward with 
plans to demolish the old Journal Building. On April 9, the city council passed 
Ordinance 128842, which sold the clock complex of the building to the Oregon 
Museum of Science and Industry (OMSI). A few weeks later, the city 
contracted the Atlas Building Wreckers and Terminal Transfer Company for 
$155,400. While the original plan between the city and state was to evenly split 
the costs of the demolition, $64,575 each, Portland paid an extra $26,250 to 
have part of the rubble transported and used as landfill at Powers Marine 
Park, located on the Willamette River's west bank near the Sell wood Bridge. 
The city had originally budgeted $150,000 to pay its share of the costs. The 
demolition project was scheduled to begin on May 1 and was projected to take 
sixty days to complete.1 
1 Portland City Council, Minutes, 9 April 1969, Portland City Archives, 644; "Demolition to 
Begin on Journal Building," The Oregonian, 22 April 1969, 14; "Journal Building Rubble OKd 
for Landfill at Park," The Oregonian, 23 April 1969, 22; F.B. Klaboe to Francis J. lvancie, 11 
March 1969, Ernest Bonner, personal files. 
The city's plans were temporarily complicated in May when 
controversial businessperson Stan Terry informed the city council that he 
would seek a restraining order in circuit court if the demolition of the old 
Journal Building went forward. Terry argued that the building should be 
utilized to relieve the crowded traffic court and help solve the downtown 
parking problem. Specifically, he envisioned using the first floor of the 
waterfront structure for a traffic court and other municipal functions. The 
second and third floors, suggested Terry, would be utilized as a parking 
facility to return needed revenue to the city's coffers. In late June, Stan Terry's 
plan suffered a setback as his suit was thrown out of court on the grounds that 
it was a "sham and frivolous." On July l, the Atlas Building Wreckers began 
their work on the building.2 
The next day at the city council, Stan Terry declared that he wanted to 
enter into negotiations to purchase the old Journal Building. Terry argued that 
tearing down the building to expand Harbor Drive was a waste of money 
because the recently completed Stadium Freeway had alleviated much of the 
traffic on the riverfront highway. He also insisted that the soon-to-be 
completed Fremont Bridge would further make Harbor Drive obsolete. Mayor 
Terry Shrunk responded that not only was it impossible for the council to sell 
2 In 1970, the former pinball machine operator was indicted but not convicted on charges of 
extortion. Four years later, Terry was convicted of three gambling offenses, including selling 
"pull tabs" to an undercover police officer. "Demolition Crews Keep Chipping at Old 
Journal," The Oregonian, 1November1969, 11 (first quote); "Terry Convicted In Gaming," The 
Oregon Journal, 21December1974, p. 2 (second quote); "Demolition Plans Draw Attack by 
Stan Terry," The Oregonian, 15 May 1969, sec. 2, p. 22; "Court Refuses to Block Journal 
Building Razing," The Oregonian, 3 June 1969, 9; "After Thirty Years, an Era Ends," The 
Oregonian, 2 July 1969, sec. 3, p. 10; "Stan Terry Held For Extortion," The Oregon Journal, 11 
March 1970, 3; "Default Laid To Stan Terry," The Oregon Journal, 24August1964, l. 
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the building, because it was jointly owned by the city and the State Highway 
Department, but the demolition had already damaged the structure beyond 
repair. Commissioner Frank Ivancie not only questioned Terry's knowledge of 
traffic volume on Harbor Drive but cut off his statement by declaring, "your 
two minutes are up, Stan." "It's always nice to know," Terry responded, 
"every time you try to do something to benefit the community, some wiseacre 
always wants to make fun of you." Terry closed the debate by arguing that 
city officials had .been too secretive regarding plans to demolish the building 
and that proper community discussion had not taken place.3 
On May 28, the City Club's Committee on the Journal Building Site and 
Willamette Riverfront Development met to discuss the progress being made 
by the Intergovernmental Task Force for Waterfront Development. Committee 
member Morton Spence, who was a journalist for the Oregon Journal, notified 
the panel that on May 21, Governor Tom McCall had proposed to the task 
force and highway department that Harbor Drive be abandoned. McCall also 
suggested that rerouting the traffic from the riverfront highway could be done 
without much difficulty. The governor had argued that the elimination of 
Harbor Drive was the best plan not only to realize the full potential for the 
waterfront park, but also to avoid the high costs of the cut-and-cover and 
depressed highway plans. Spence reported that the highway department had 
"reluctantly" accepted the governor's proposal. "The fly in the ointment is 
City Hall," Spence declared, "The Traffic Bureau is adamant that Harbor 
3 Portland City Council, Minutes, 2 July 1969, Portland City Archives, 7-11. 
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Drive is essential to handle truck traffic. They turned thumbs down on the 
whole idea." Despite such objections, the committee agreed that the 
elimination of Harbor Drive constituted a viable plan and that it should be 
examined in their "interim report," which they planned to complete by that 
fall. "I believe we may still be able to wield some influence in the decision-
making process," Spence stated at the close of the meeting.4 
The City Club's belief that Portland officials were adamantly opposed 
to Governor McCall's plan to eliminate Harbor Drive is confirmed in a June 4 
letter to the City Bureau of Traffic Engineering from traffic engineer D.E. 
Bergstrom. Bergstrom argued that while existing Harbor Drive traffic could be 
accommodated with the elimination of the highway by rerouting vehicles via 
S.W. First and Second avenues, 1990 traffic projections showed that this would 
cause serious future congestion problems. "All of these problems will be 
created and the only resulting benefit is an additional 44' width in the 
greenway area between the river and Harbor Drive," Bergstrom insisted. "In 
my opinion the plan is not workable." The traffic engineer further 
recommended to Commissioner lvancie that he not consider McCall's plan as 
a viable solution.5 
On July 3, the City Club learned that Commissioner lvancie was 
planning to make a statement four days later regarding the adoption of a 
proposal to develop the downtown waterfront. lvancie's proposal called for 
4 City Club of Portland, Minutes, 28 May 1969, Bonner, personal files; Jewel Lansing, Portland: 
People, Politics, and Power 1851-2001 (Oregon State University Press, Corvallis: 2003), 384. 
5 D.E. Bergstrom to Bureau of Traffic Engineering, 4 June 1969, Bonner, personal files. 
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moving Harbor Drive west adjacent to Front Avenue and widening the 
highway to six lanes. This would have created a 150-foot wide highway with 
ten lanes of fast moving traffic, leaving 138-feet to be landscaped for a park, 
accessible only by two pedestrian bridges. Throughout his political career, 
lvancie placed great importance on the role automobiles played in society. 
"Next to one's home," he once stated, "an automobile is the most cherished 
possession because it is tangible proof of the freedom in a free society."6 
Members of the City Club's committee, most notably Chair David J. 
Lewis and Morton Spence, swung into action to try to stop the plan. Spence 
immediately contacted Glenn Jackson, chair of the task force and the State 
Highway Commission, to confirm the news. Jackson responded that in fact 
lvancie was preparing to announce the adoption of the ten-lane highway 
system but that such action did not destroy the possibility of the waterfront 
park being built in the next fifteen to twenty years. The committee then called 
Ed Westerdahl, the governor's administrative assistant, who declared that at 
the last task force meeting McCall had negotiated a compromise plan in which 
he accepted the cut-and-cover idea. Governor McCall, however, had not 
signed off on the "lvancie plan."7 
6 "Ivancie-isms," Willamette Week, 21 May 1984, 8 (first quote); City Club of Portland, Board of 
Governors meeting, Minutes, 7 July 1969, Bonner, personal files; idem, "Journal Building 
Committee Paper on Ivancie Proposal to Pave Over Everything," 7 July 1969, Bonner, personal 
files; idem, Meeting memo from Morton Spence to members of committee, 7 July 1969, 
Bonner, personal files; idem, "Interim Report on Journal Building Site Use and Riverfront 
Development," Portland City Club Bulletin 50, 8 August, 1969, 25; Lansing, Portland: People, 
Politics, and Power, 384. 
7 City Club of Portland, Board of Governors meeting, Minutes, 7 July 1969, Bonner, personal 
files; idem, "Journal Building Committee Paper on Ivancie Proposal to Pave Over 
Everything," 7 July 1969, Bonner, personal files; idem, Meeting memo from Morton Spence to 
members of committee, 7 July 1969, Bonner, personal files; idem, "Interim Report on Journal 
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The committee next telephoned John Fulton, the head of the recently 
created State Department of Transportation, and declared that it felt strongly 
that no decision on the issue should be made until public hearings were held. 
At the conclusion of the call, Fulton not only assured the panel that the 
proposed announcement would not be made on July 7, but urged the City 
Club to not "take precipitate action on this matter." Fulton refused, however, 
to commit to public hearings before a decision was made on developing the 
downtown waterfront. During the weekend of July 5 and 6, Lewis and Spence 
drafted a three-page statement, which they proposed to release to the press if 
Commissioner Ivancie in fact made the announcement on the seventh. Their 
statement declared the City Club's opposition to the "bilateral decision of 
Highway Commission Chairman Jackson and Commissioner Ivancie, with no 
effort being made to have public hearings." On Monday afternoon, the City 
Club Board of Governors voted five to three to adopt Lewis and Morton's 
statement. The committee also vowed to accelerate completion of their interim 
report for best possible uses of the riverfront as "an anti-Ivancie missile."8 
Later that afternoon, Commissioner Ivancie held a press conference and 
declared that a decision on the development of the downtown waterfront 
would be made in the near future. He emphasized that any decision made by 
local officials would also have to be approved by the highway commission. 
Ivancie stated that task force members were considering three alternatives for 
Building Site Use and Riverfront Development," Portland City Club Bulletin 50, 8 August, 1969, 
25; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 384. 
8 City Club of Portland, Board of Governors meeting, Minutes, 7 July 1969 (first and second 
quotes); Meeting memo from Morton Spence to members of committee, 7 July 1969 (third 
quote); Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 384. 
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f 
improving traffic conditions and scenery in the area; none of them included 
Governor McCall's call for the removal of Harbor Drive. These strategies 
included the cut-and-cover idea, the Ivancie plan, and the proposal to widen 
Harbor Drive. The City Club's committee now decided not to release its press 
statement to the news media.9 
In response to the uproar concerning Commissioner Ivancie's canceled 
announcement, Governor McCall sent a letter on July 15 to Glenn Jackson 
requesting "maximum clarification" of the goals for the task force. McCall 
stated that, assuming the cut-and-cover plan was too expensive, the minimum 
criteria for the waterfront area were creating a strip of highway no wider than 
100-feet to handle all traffic needs, moving the highway closer to Front 
Avenue to ensure a green space of at least 180-feet in width, depressing the 
roadway so as to eliminate automobile noise, and encouraging private 
industries to build over the roadway so as to integrate downtown with the 
park area. McCall insisted that his goals for the area went beyond simply 
moving traffic. Furthermore, he instructed Jackson to look into the 
redevelopment of the west side waterfront area between the Hawthorne and 
Ross Island bridges so as to "truly enhance" the entire riverfront. The 
governor also suggested that a decision on the development of the area be 
made "in an extremely timely fashion." "You have a tremendous amount of 
9 "Harbor Drive Verdict Near," The Oregonian, 8 July 1969, 8; City Club of Portland, Board of 
Governors meeting, Minutes, 14 July 1969, Bonner, personal files; Lansing, Portland: People, 
Politics, and Power, 384. 
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talent on your task force," McCall declared, "and I am sure that solutions can 
be achieved on each of these points in the early future." 10 
One month after David J. Lewis and Morton Spence had caused the 
cancellation of Commissioner Ivancie's announcement regarding the 
development of the riverfront, the City Club's Board of Governors voted 
overwhelmingly on August 8 in support of the Committee on the Journal 
Building Site and Willamette Riverfront Development's "Interim Report." The 
panel argued that there was an urgent need for the report, due to the secrecy 
of members of the task force, particularly Ivancie and Jackson. They also 
declared that one of their concerns was whether a decision for the downtown 
waterfront had already been made and the announcement of such a policy 
only awaited the arrival of supporting material. This concern, insisted the 
committee, was reinforced when it learned that an independent firm had been 
hired to develop a plan for a 135-foot wide green space along the riverfront as 
well as a widened Harbor Drive. Since the task force appeared to be 
considering only one plan, they stated, "other proposals which might be of 
more long range value to the community" were not receiving "equal 
consideration."11 
In its report, the City Club committee declared that the goal of 
waterfront development should be to improve the life of the city through the 
use of diverse features. To simply better facilitate traffic flows, they argued, 
10 Governor Tom McCall to Glenn Jackson, 15 July 1969, Bonner, personal files. 
11 City Club of Portland, "Interim Report on Journal Building Site Use and Riverfront 
Development," 25; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 384. 
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would not satisfy these goals. Utilizing Jane Jacobs' The Death and Life of Great 
American Cities, which argued that a good city required a "diversity" of uses to 
create a feeling of community, the panel outlined the basic criteria, which it 
believed essential to any waterfront plan. These included the varied use of 
land so as to encourage community activities throughout the year, an 
environment that was aesthetically pleasing, an area highly accessible to 
pedestrians, and easy and attractive access to the river. The City Club leaders 
further criticized the task force for not linking the development of the 
waterfront with that of the downtown area as a whole.12 
In its assessment of the task force, the City Club said that it had 
"serious doubts about the adequacy of present planning efforts." It declared 
that each of the five waterfront plans-the depressed highway idea 
announced by Governor McCall in November 1968, the planning 
commission's "Downtown Waterfront Plan" of December 1968, the Ivancie 
plan, the abandonment of Harbor Drive idea, and the interim plan to 
temporarily widen Harbor Drive and plan for the riverfront park-lacked 
"human values." Only the "Downtown Waterfront Plan," declared the 
committee, had treated the green space as anything more than "simply the 
space that is left over after the highway is taken care of, and even in the 
Planning Commission's proposal it is shown only as a concept and not as a 
plan." Furthermore, when the highway department deemed the cut-and-cover 
12 City Club of Portland, "Interim Report on Journal Building Site Use and Riverfront 
Development," 28-9, 31; Carl Abbott, Greater Portland: Urban Life and Landscape in the Pacific 
Northwest (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, 2001), 137-38. 
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and depressed highway plans too expensive, it argued, "there is no evidence 
that it has weighed that cost against the value to the downtown properties and 
shops, or against the pride and pleasure which a well-conceived plan could 
afford all Portlanders." The committee lambasted the secrecy of the task force, 
stating that, since its creation by the governor in November 1968, it had had 
only three meetings with no agendas and no minutes.13 
The City Club committee particularly criticized city officials for lack of 
leadership in the planning process. It argued that it was pivotal that city hall 
mobilize the people, with the cooperation of both public and private interests, 
to develop a grand plan not only for the development of the waterfront, but 
also for downtown as a whole. Without this dialogue, the committee insisted, 
Portlanders would not know the choices and alternatives involved. Time was 
running out, it declared, and very possibly a decision on the waterfront 
development would be made without public participation, leaving the people 
to pay the bill for a green space that would "be little used and contribute 
nothing to the central city's vitality." The committee warned Portlanders not 
to forget the lack of public discussion in the purchase of the old Journal 
Building and the decision to raze it. Its report concluded by recommending 
that no decision on the area be made "until adequate studies of alternatives 
have been completed and public hearings held." Furthermore, the committee 
13 City Club of Portland, "Interim Report on Journal Building Site Use and Riverfront 
Development," 29-31. 
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argued, the task force should utilize the expertise of the planning commission 
to come up with creative plans to satisfy the "city's needs and capabilities."14 
The next day, Commissioner Frank Ivancie responded to the City 
Club's "Interim Report" by describing it as "a complete falsehood." The 
commissioner denied reports that he had been set to announce on July 7 the 
task force's adoption of the plan to widen Harbor Drive and leave only 135-
feet of green space. "How can the City Club be of service to this community," 
insisted Ivancie, "when they don't want to stick with the facts?" Portland 
Planning Director Lloyd Keefe also objected to the committee's report. Keefe 
particularly objected to the City Club's critique of the city council and 
planning commission. He argued that the report contained numerous 
incorrect "inferences and statements." Keefe insisted, furthermore, that the 
planning commission had been working hard to develop the waterfront since 
the early 1960s.15 
14 Ibid., 31-3. The "Interim Report" was not the only time in the late 1960s that the City Club 
criticized Portland officials. In its June 1968 report "Problem of Racial Justice in Portland," the 
City Club lambasted city hall for its lack of minority hiring. Out of a workforce of 4,188, for 
example, the City of Portland employed only 136 African Americans. While Mayor Schrunk, 
who was in charge of the bureau of police, and Commissioner Earl of the fire bureau insisted 
they had aggressively recruited blacks, the City Club pointed out that in a firefighter force of 
about 690 people no African Americans were employed, while in a police force of 720, there 
were only eight blacks. The City Club's committee stated, " ... Portland's local government 
officials ... have been curiously and tragically insensitive." The report called on city hall to 
correct the racial imbalance and set an example for both the public and private sectors. In the 
1960 census, Portland's black population was estimated at 15,637 out of a total population of 
372,676, or 4.2%. City Club of Portland, "Report on Problems of Racial Justice in Portland," 
Portland City Club Bulletin 49, 14 June 1968 5-10, 15 (first quote, 7-8); "Only 1In30 City Of 
Portland Employees Negro," The Oregon Journal, 12 June 1968, 4; "Generalizations Hit In City 
Club Report," The Oregon Journal, 17 June 1968, 4. 
15 "Ivancie Denounces City Club Report," The Oregon Journal, 9 August 1969, 4 (first, second, 
third, and fourth quotes}. Another argument between Commissioner Ivancie and the City 
Club's committee revolved around a disputed meeting between the two on September 4, 1968. 
The City Club's committee argued that in fact they had interviewed Ivancie and discussed city 
and state plans for the old Journal Building. Ivancie claimed that this meeting never took 
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Two weeks later, on August 21, David J. Lewis and Neil Goldschmidt, 
while addressing the biweekly meeting of the Portland Art Commission, 
argued that the task force should not make any quick decisions regarding the 
development of the downtown waterfront. The two insisted that what was 
needed was a comprehensive study by "professionals" to create an overall 
plan for how the riverfront development related to the entire downtown area. 
The task force, argued Goldschmidt, was primarily concerned with traffic 
flows and not with creating a viable green space along the waterfront. Both 
Lewis and Goldschmidt emphasized that if not planned properly, a riverfront 
park would not be attractive to people.16 
Just as it had sided with opponents of the Ash Street ramp debate in 
1961, the Oregonian now supported efforts to beautify the riverfront. In its 
editorial "No Berlin Wall Here," the daily argued that the City Club's "Interim 
Report" had "performed a valuable service in focusing public attention on 
prospective development of the waterfront." Even though some local officials 
had challenged statements in the report, the editors insisted, the "official 
silence" of the task force seemed to confirm that a decision to build ten lanes 
of traffic had already been made. Without a statement from the task force, the 
Oregonian argued, the alarm caused by the City Club's report would quickly 
spread. Whatever decision was made to temporarily re-route traffic after the 
old Journal Building was razed, the newspaper argued, it should not bar long-
place. At the City Club's Board of Governors meeting on August 11, it was agreed that a letter 
be sent to Ivancie informing him of certain erroneous statements, including the 
commissioner's claim of never having "knowingly" met with the committee. City Club of 
Portland, Board of Governors meeting, Minutes, 11 August 1969, Bonner, personal files. 
16 "City Club Urges Brakes on Waterfront," The Oregonian, 21August1969, sec. 2, p. 21. 
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range plans for a "highly accessible" waterfront park. In its August 22 
editorial "Let's Not Be Hasty," the Oregonian reminded its readers that only 
the "loud disapproval" of a large number of Portlanders had halted the 
building of the proposed Ash Street ramp. The daily argued, furthermore, that 
the Fremont Bridge, when completed, might channel enough traffic off Harbor 
Drive to make its widening irrelevant. The Oregonian further insisted that only 
after a specific plan garnered public approval should steps be made to 
develop the waterfront.17 
Further criticism of task force members surfaced with staff writer 
William Sanderson's August 17 editorial, "Harbor Drive Holds Key to 
Waterfront Devel?pment." Sanderson declared that the moment had come for 
Portland to finally salvage "the city's richest aesthetic resource" after it had 
been forfeited in the name of commerce and traffic movement. He also wrote, 
however, that he doubted whether the city council or the highway department 
were willing to approve a plan to beautify the waterfront. Of the five 
proposals, Sanderson advocated the abandonment of Harbor Drive. He cited 
task force member John Mosser as stating that it "is the only plan that makes 
sense." Sanderson further quoted Mosser as arguing that the decision for the 
development was a political one and that "automobiles will go anywhere we 
17 "No Berlin Wall Here," The Oregonian, 6August1969, 20; "Let's Not Be Hasty," The 
Oregonian, 22August1969, 36. 
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make a place for them. I don't think the waterfront is the place for 
automobiles."18 
Sanderson explained, however, that the majority of task force members, 
most notably Frank Ivancie and Glenn Jackson, disagreed with Mosser's 
assessment. Mosser' s plan is "very noble," Sanderson quoted lvancie as 
stating, "but it doesn't face the practical problems of traffic problems." Both 
Jackson and lvancie argued that they had in fact not agreed to an "interim 
plan," which would have widened Harbor Drive, slightly depressed the 
highway, and included plans to build a park at a future date, but that at the 
moment it made the most sense and would be the first step in implementing 
the costly cut-and-cover tunnel. Sanderson concluded that the task force's 
interim plan went against Governor McCall's plea to not build a "Berlin Wall" 
around the waterfront.19 
The City Club's report, together with the Oregonian's editorials, caused 
a flood of letters to the newspaper, starting in mid-August, which supported 
the case against the task force. In a letter entitled "Let's Slow Down," one 
correspondent wrote that, "It saddens me to observe that we are so 
automobile-oriented we often forget the pedestrian." The writer urged the 
task force to take advantage of the beauty of the Willamette River in assessing 
future development plans. She insisted that some of the charm of European 
cities was the pedestrian focus as well as the utilization of its riverfronts. 
18 William Sanderson, "Harbor Drive Holds Key to Waterfront Development," The Oregonian, 
17 August 1969, forum section, p. 3. 
19 Jbid. 
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Portlanders needed to stop the task force from ruining the waterfront and 
selling out the city to "gas-eating monsters."20 
On August 18, Governor McCall met privately with Mayor Shrunk, 
Commissioner lvancie, Glenn Jackson, and Multnomah County and state 
planners and engineers to discuss the status of the plans to develop the 
downtown waterfront. McCall now announced that he had instructed the task 
force to hold public hearings at the earliest possible date. Three of the five 
development plans (the cut-and-cover idea, the lvancie Plan, and the interim 
plan) were "still in the ballpark." McCall declared, however, that the task 
force would welcome ideas from the public at the hearing. He also stated that 
those present at the meeting favored the cut-and-cover plan but recognized 
that it would be costly. Highway engineer Forrest Cooper stated that the task 
force had "virtually ruled out" the plan to abandon Harbor Drive because 
1990 traffic projections showed 90,000 vehicles utilizing the highway daily. 
The governor also announced that he would soon appoint a seven-member 
committee to study plans for a future public transportation system in the 
Portland metropolitan area in accordance with legislation passed in the 
Oregon legislature at the city's request.21 
Even though beautification advocates undoubtedly were relieved to 
hear that public hearings would take place, some were angered by the task 
force's refusal to consider the abandonment of Harbor Drive. In a letter to the 
20 Barbara J. Bell, "Let's Slow Down," The Oregonian, 13 August 1969, 26. 
21 "McCall Calls For Quick Hearings on Willamette Bank Beautification," The Oregonian, 19 
August 1969, sec. 2, p. 10 (first quote); "Greenway Hearing Date Due," The Oregon Journal, 19 
August 1969, 2. 
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editor in the Oregonian on August 28, one Portlander argued that to abandon 
the idea to eliminate Harbor Drive based on 1990 traffic projections was 
absurd. "Too often, and for too long," he insisted, "development in this 
community has been largely a response to a trend or to a one-sided projection 
of a trend." The correspondent also stated that the abandonment of Harbor 
Drive was the only logical choice if a significant waterfront park was to be 
built. At the very least, he argued, per the City Club's warnings, no decision 
should be made before full consideration of all alternatives had been 
discussed publicly. "Isn't it about time we start to decide the future of our 
city," the reader asked, "on the basis of what we want it to be like in 1990?"22 
On August 19, 250 adults and 100 children showed up for a picnic on 
the small grass area between the traffic lanes of Harbor Drive north of the old 
Journal Building. People held banners that read "Parks for People" and "Save 
Our Riverfront," while children between the ages of eighteen months and two 
years were tethered together with a rope so that they did not wander into the 
traffic. The picnic was a major media event. The Riverfront for People 
Committee, who had sponsored the picnic, demanded a viable waterfront 
park with easy pedestrian access and varied activities and development 
priorities that placed people ahead of cars and emphasized citizen 
participation through public hearings in the decision making process. 
Furthermore, the group vehemently opposed all efforts to widen Harbor 
Drive, which they believed the highway commission had already decided to 
22 Arnold N. Bodtker, "Listen to the Public," The Oregonian, 28 August 1969, 42. 
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do. "We want to show what a great opportunity Portland has in its 
riverfront," explained Robert Belcher, chair of the committee. "The whole city 
has been alienated from the riverfront," fellow committee member Victor 
Erickson added, "When I worked downtown, it would have been good to 
lunch along the river if there hadn't been the need to cross eight lanes of death 
and destruction."23 
Working together with fellow architect Jim Howell, Robert and Allison 
Belcher had formed the Riverfront for People Committee in response to the 
warnings outlined in the City Club's "Interim Report." The organization was 
made up mainly of young architects and city planners and their spouses. The 
Belchers had previously been involved in protests against the U.S. war in 
Vietnam and other "adventures fighting the establishment." They had 
traveled extensively in Europe and witnessed how beautiful cities utilized 
their waterfronts. In early August, Allison Belcher had been listening to a 
radio discussion of the recently published City Club report. "The state and 
local officials felt it was a splendid opportunity to expand the riverfront road 
system," she later explained. "I told my husband and Jim Howell: what are 
you big shot architects going to do about this?" Later in August, Allison 
Belcher attempted to speak to task force member Ira Keller about the plans to 
23 "'Brown-Baggers' Boost Willamette Seawall Park," The Oregon Journal, 20 August 1969, 2 
(first and second quotes); Allison Belcher, interview by Michael Jenner, typed transcript, 
Portland, Or., 10 March 2003; Robert Belcher, interview by Michael Jenner, typed transcript, 
Portland, Or., 24 March 2003; Jim Howell, interview by Michael Jenner, typed transcript, 
Portland, Or., 31 April 2003; '"Riverfront for People,"' The Oregon Journal, 18 August 1969, 3; 
Abbott, Greater Portland, 136; Ernest Bonner, "Portland: The Problems and Promise of 
Growth," in Persoanlity, Politics, and Planning, ed. Anthony James Catanese and W. Paul 
Farmer (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), 154-155; Lansing, Portland: People, 
Politics, and Power, 535n.156. 
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widen Harbor Drive. "He told me I was just a housewife," Mrs. Belcher said, 
"That's why I decided I had to do something."24 
Prior to the picnic at the old Journal Building, Robert and Allison 
Belcher had spent the month of August engaging in an aggressive organizing 
and letter-writing campaign demanding public hearings and better leadership 
from elected officials regarding plans for the development of the riverfront. 
Their campaign included letters to Governor McCall, State Treasurer Robert 
Straub, and Commissioner Ivancie as well as letters-to-the-editor in both the 
Oregonian and the Oregon Journal. In his letter to Straub, Robert Belcher argued 
that there was a crisis with regard to the waterfront "stemming from 
inadequate leadership, over zealous highway pressure, and unrealistic 
planning." Bob Belcher demanded public hearings as well as "public 
commitment" from the city, county, and state levels supporting "an exciting 
and pedestrian oriented riverfront development program." Responding to 
Allison Belcher' s letter, Governor McCall reiterated that, with regard to 
beautifying the downtown waterfront, "we are not going to miss this 
opportunity." The governor insisted that all the agencies working on the issue 
were committed "to work with the people in arriving at the best possible 
development plan."25 
24 Robert Belcher interview, (first quote); Allison Belcher interview, (second and third quotes); 
City Club of Portland, '"Riverfront for People' Committee Inspired By City Club Report," 
Portland City Club Bulletin 50, 22August1969, 60; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, 
Portland, Oregon & Royston, Hanamoto, Beck & Abey, San Francisco, California, "Final 
Report: Downtown Waterfront Park, City of Portland, Oregon," August 1975, Multnomah 
County Library, 40; Sam Galbreath to J. David Hunt, 5 May 1977, 1-2, Bonner, personal files. 
25 Robert Belcher to Robert Straub, 29August1969, Belcher's personal files (first, second, and 
third quotes); Governor Tom McCall to Allison Belcher, 22August1969, Bekher's personal 
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On Tuesday, September 17, the Riverfront for People Committee 
sponsored a second "bring your own bag" public picnic just north of the old 
Journal Building. Some 150 people attended despite fall showers. The picnic 
featured a fireboat water display by the Portland Fire Bureau and a calliope 
concert. Like the first picnic in August, the second protest was a media event. 
During his presentation to the crowd, Robert Belcher called for a 
comprehensive study of the riverfront development, along with regular public 
hearings before a final decision was made. Belcher declared that not only had 
many past city planning decisions been made by governmental officials who 
were isolated from citizens, but that the public needed to rally in favor of a 
significant waterfront park so as not to "stagnate the city with freeways on 
both sides of the river."26 
Using the picnic as an organizing tool, the Riverfront for People 
Committee solicited support for a petition for a downtown waterfront 
program. It proclaimed support for efforts "to reclaim the west bank of the 
Willamette River and to realize maximum beauty and growth for Portland 
through a farsighted riverfront program." The committee proposed a program 
that included creating a pedestrian friendly riverfront park to stimulate 
files (fourth and fifth quotes); Robert Belcher to Ray Smith, 6 August 1969, Robert and Allison 
Belcher, personal files; '"Riverfront' Group to Fight Planners," The Oregon Journal, 9 August 
1969, 4; '"Great Opportunity,"' The Oregonian, 11August1969, 18, Belcher's personal files; 
Robert Straub to Allison Belcher, 11August1969, Belcher's personal files; Auditor of the City 
of Portland to Robert Belcher, 14August1969, Belcher's personal files; Commissioner Francis 
Ivancie to Robert Belcher, 29 August 1969, Belcher's personal files; Allison Belcher interview; 
Robert Belcher interview ; Jim Howell interview. 
26 "Riverfront Picnic Dated," The Oregonian, 14 September 1969, 25 (first quote); "Second 
Protest Planned," The Oregon Journal, 3 September 1969, 5 (second quote); Allison Belcher 
interview; Robert Belcher interview; Jim Howell interview; "Tuesday's Showers," The 
Oregonian, 17September1969, 12. 
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downtown growth to "provide Portland with pride." Riverfront development 
should have the "priorities of people first, car traffic second," it suggested. 
Meanwhile, committee member Jim Howell unveiled his architectural plans 
for what the waterfront could become. Howell proposed to tunnel Harbor 
Drive and develop the riverfront with attractions including restaurants, water 
gardens, picnic areas, a festival park, a marine museum, offices, and 
apartment buildings. Howell warned that temporary measures "tended to 
become permanent." Although tunneling and developing the waterfront 
would be expensive, he concluded, in the long run such a proposal would 
prove to be the most economical approach.27 
The day following the second picnic, Robert Belcher's editorial "Let's 
Reclaim Our River," was published in the Clarke Press, a weekly Portland 
publication. "What we need is a riverfront for people," insisted Belcher, "and 
the establishment of a great city park." He not only labeled the Ivancie plan 
"disastrous," but seriously questioned the use of 1990 projected traffic trends 
as the sole evidence on which to base waterfront development decisions. 
"What is clear," argued Belcher, "is that there has been no imagination, no 
sensitivity to human and urban values and necessities, and no will power 
either at the city, the county, or the state level to bring citizens and consultants 
into the picture." He further declared that he was shocked that the cut-and-
cover tunnel plan, which he believed was a viable development idea, was 
27 "A Petition by the Riverfront for People Committee for a West Bank Riverfront Program," 
16 September 1969, Belcher's personal files (first, second, and third quotes); "Campaign Opens 
for Downtown Riverfront Park," The Oregon Journal, 17 September 1969, 2 (fourth quote); 
Robert Belcher interview; Jim Howell interview. 
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being met with "silence by City Hall." Belcher demanded public hearings, the 
creation of a Portland Citizens Task Force and a thorough professional study 
of the area to be completed by July 1970. "The will of the people is essential to 
significant improvement in Portland," Belcher declared.28 
While Allison Belcher rallied the "average person" with the petition 
drive, Robert Belcher successfully brought the "power echelon" of Portland to 
the cause. On September 17, the Portland Art Commission adopted a 
statement to Mayor Terry Schrunk and the city commissioners that declared 
its support of the goals of the Riverfront for People Committee. Specifically, 
the art commission argued against utilizing the downtown waterfront as a 
traffic expressway and instead proposed the building of a riverfront park that 
would include both "places for quiet reflection" and areas for "interesting and 
exciting activities throughout the year." The future growth of Portland, the 
commission declared, depended on how public and private developments 
were "oriented to people."29 
As it had done during the Ash Street ramp debate in 1961, the local 
chapter of the American Institute of Architects (AIA) defended the 
beautification of the waterfront area. In the days following the second picnic, 
AIA members contacted Oregon's garden clubs to induce them to join the 
28 Robert Belcher, "For the Multnomah County Democratic Central Committee," 16 September 
1969, Belcher's personal files (first, second, third, fourth, fifth quotes); "Let's Reclaim Our 
River," The Clarke Press, 17 September 1969, 2, Belcher's personal files; Robert Belcher 
interview. 
29 Robert Belcher interview (first and second quotes); Allison Belcher interview; "Proposed 
Statement by Portland Art Commission - September 17, 1969," Portland Art Commission, 17 
September 1969, Belcher's personal files (third, fourth and fifth quotes);" Art Group Hits 
Traffic," The Oregonian, 27 September 1969, 13, Belcher' s personal files; Jim Howell interview. 
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fight. "I recall that the help and backing of the Garden Clubs," stated AIA 
member Richard Norman, "helped to defeat the' Ash Street Overpass."' The 
AIA also brought renowned urban affairs analyst Alan Temko to speak in 
Portland on September 19. "What God gave Portland," Temko declared, 
"Mankind has done its best to destroy." The speaker charged the members of 
the AIA with taking the lead in protecting the beautiful resources of the 
Northwest, including the riverfront. "You cannot half-rape the Portland 
waterfront," Temko insisted. "You just can't let those fiends put in an 8-laner 
next to the river." Temko's statements were publicized in both the Oregonian 
and the Oregon Journal on September 20.30 
The AIA also initiated a letter-writing campaign to elected officials, 
which called for public hearings and the rejection of expedient solutions. In 
his response, Governor McCall assured the architects that, "I share your views 
completely." Task force member Ira Keller's reaction, however, was not as 
cordial. "It would be refreshing to see you go out and get something done," 
insisted Keller, "rather than simply to object to a plan offering considerable 
improvement within the funds which we have available." The AIA responded 
that it did not know what "plan" Keller was referring to. Since there had been 
no public hearings, it argued, "how can we object to a plan we have not seen?" 
30 Richard Norman to Mrs. Paul Ellis, 23 September 1969, Belcher's personal files (first quote); 
"Architect Lambastes Portland," The Oregon journal, 20 September 1969, 4 (second and third 
quotes). 
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The institute reiterated that it would "settle for nothing less" than the 
beautification of the riverfront.31 
While the Oregon Journal had supported the opponents of the Ash Street 
ramp in 1961, the daily newspaper had a lukewarm response to advocates of 
waterfront beautification in 1969. In its September 19 editorial entitled "Good 
Ideas Cost Money," the Journal argued that while the Riverfront for People 
Committee's proposals were noble, the cut-and-cover project was too costly 
and the elimination of Harbor Drive was unrealistic. Instead, citizens groups 
needed to figure out a way to put the city on "better financial footing." On 
September 20, the Journal's Jack Ostergren published a column advocating the 
Ivancie plan. Ostergren argued that not only was the cost of the project 
realistic, but traffic needs could still be met while allowing the creation of a 
waterfront park. Ostergren' s piece received several angry responses, including 
one from AIA member and city preservationist Alfred Staehli, who argued 
that it was merely "a shameless attempt to build support for the State 
Highway Commission plan for another highway widening project."32 
On October 3, eleven days before the announced task force public 
hearing, Ira Keller declared that Portland voters might be asked to approve a 
31 Governor Tom McCall to Fred Rudat, 6 October 1969, Belcher's personal files (first quote); 
Ira Keller to Fred Rudat, 25 September 1969, Belcher's personal files (second quote); A. 
DiBenedetto to Ira Keller, 9 October 1969, Belcher's personal files (second, third, fourth, fifth 
quotes); Fred Rudat to Governor Tom McCall, 19 September 1969, Belcher's personal files; 
Portland Chapter of the American Institute of Architects, "Proposed Redevelopment of the 
West Bank of the Willamette River," 18 September 1969, Belcher's personal files. 
32 "Good Ideas Cost Money," The Oregon Journal, 19 September 1969, 12 (first quote); "Study 
Urged," The Oregon Journal, 13October1969, 16 (second quote); "Moses Study 25 Years Old, 
Still Valid for Portland," The Oregon Journal, 20 September 20 1969, 12; "Architect seeks 
preservation site suggestions," The Oregonian, 11September1974, sec. 11, p. 9; "Architect 
Hunts Landmarks," The Oregon Journal, 13November1975, 13. 
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$10-12 million bond issue in the May 1970 primary election to finance the 
redevelopment of the downtown waterfront. Keller estimated the cost of the 
cut-and-cover tunnel plan to be close to $15 million. While state and federal 
aid would provide $3 to $5 million, Portlanders would have to come up with 
the remainder of the funds. Keller's announcement was a surprise, as it 
appeared likely that the task force was close to approving the interim plan. 
The members of the Riverfront for People Committee immediately criticized 
Keller. His announcement, Robert Belcher argued, was "a politically inspired 
move to keep the reins in his own hands." Keller's "premature" statements, 
said the committee, were designed to scare taxpaying voters into allowing the 
task force to choose the cheaper interim or Ivancie plans. His announcement, 
charged Belcher, typified "a serious lack of communication between the 
community and officialdom."33 
On October 8, Multnomah County Commissioner David Eccles, 
speaking at a joint city-county coordinating committee meeting, argued that a 
proposal to build a downtown Portland civic center should have priority over 
the development of the riverfront. Eccles stated that because of the costs of 
both projects (the civic center plan was estimated to cost $35 million), both 
could not be built. In its editorial "Let's Look to Priorities" published the next 
day, the Oregon Journal insisted that Portlanders needed to determine what 
projects were the most needed for the area. The daily newspaper argued that 
33 "Architects Rap Riverfront Funds Statement," The Oregonian, 5 October 1969, 32 (first, 
second, third quotes); "Bonds Posed For Redesign of Riverfront," The Oregonian, 4 October 
1969, 1; "Riverfront Plan Due Debate," The Oregon Journal, 6 October 1969, 3; Robert Belcher 
interview. 
64 
while all pending civic projects were justifiable, given the present tax load, all 
could not be paid for. The Journal warned against taking a "piecemeal look at 
local needs" and acting on projects being pushed by a particular group, such 
as the Riverfront for People Committee.34 
In the weeks prior to the task force's public hearing, Riverfront for 
People not only increased pressure on elected officials to support the 
beautification of the downtown waterfront, but also utilized the two daily 
newspapers to get their message out. In late September, City Club member 
Neil Goldschmidt set up an appointment for Robert Belcher to meet with State 
Treasurer Robert Straub. As a result, Straub supported the committee's 
riverfront plans and set up an appointment for Belcher to meet with Glenn 
Jackson. Jackson now "gave a sympathetic ear" to the Riverfront Committee's 
cause and recommended that they should use the coming hearing to 
emphasize relevant environmental factors, which he described as "a strong 
argument." If the money were available, Jackson promised, he would not 
hesitate to support the cut-and-cover tunnel plan.35 
On October 8, Neil Goldschmidt and Robert Belcher spoke at Portland 
State University and argued that a decision on the waterfront should be 
delayed until a comprehensive study of the entire downtown could be 
completed. Goldschmidt criticized the city council for not considering the 
downtown area as a whole when studying solutions for riverfront 
34 "Let's Look to Priorities," The Oregon Journal, 9 October 1969, 12 (first quote); "Eccles Cites 
Civic Center Need," The Oregonian, 8 October 1969, 5. 
35 Robert Belcher to Robert Straub, 3 October 1969, Belcher's personal files (first and second 
quotes); Robert Belcher interview; Jim Howell interview. 
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development. The future city commissioner and mayor argued in favor of 
planning for mass transit, development of the downtown business section, 
and abatement of water and air pollution. Robert Belcher declared that the 
cost estimates of the various development proposals were "highly unreliable." 
Belcher also advocated the abandonment of Harbor Drive as a means to 
develop a viable waterfront park while avoiding the high costs of the cut-and-
cover tunnel plan. On October 13, the day before the task force's public 
hearing, Riverfront for People member Earl Johnson published an illustration 
in the Oregon Journal sponsored by the fictitious "Riverfront for Cars 
Committee." Johnson's parody showed the downtown waterfront packed 
with twelve-lanes of grid-locked traffic with no green space lining the harbor 
wall. The illustration was combined with an appeal for people to show up at 
the public hearing.36 
H! 4M. 111E~JCIV!N&~V. oer.a1tt~ 
HERE IT IS - P""ihle view of Portland ill luture w11h ;, a Je>der of "Riverfront for People" F.CJUP. Prclll«ll ~ 
12 tr•flic Ian~• alone Wlllameue ril'rrs~. This one i• what m do with west ~nll rtwrfr'Ollt - fnlll ,..,_ 
•ll'tledly the p1'0p(l&a] of a mythical "RiYNlnmt for C.r." ~trr.: nnrth wiU be dl5COS5t<I Tueoday duriJI& ~
commillce. T'l'Port• Earl Johnson. Port'and architect who r'""~"c.t•I Task For~e Hearing a! Clty~ll. 
36 "Planning Held Key to 'New' Riverfront," The Oregonian, 9 October 1969, 4, (first quote); 
"Riverfront for Cars Committee," The Oregon Journal, 13 October 1969, 14; "Architect, Attorney 
Rap on People's Riverfront," The Vanguard, 7October1969, 1, Belcher's personal files; "Debate 
Slated on Riverfront," The Oregonian, 6 October 1969, 3; Robert Belcher interview. 
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On the morning of October 14, with the task force's hearing just hours 
away, waterfront beautification advocates received the good news that U. S. 
Senator Robert Packwood publicly supported their cause. "I am in full 
support of the efforts and concepts of the 'Riverfront for People' Committee," 
insisted Packwood, "for the beautification of the Harbor Drive area." The 
senator agreed with the activists that a comprehensive study of the riverfront 
should be initiated. The waterfront, declared Packwood, should be a place 
"where all may enjoy it." Earlier, on September 6, Oregon's junior senator had 
championed the cause to save the state's natural environment from further 
erosion and pollution by indicating that he would break ranks with past 
Oregon members of Congress and vote for conservation measures even if they 
impeded economic growth.37 
At the public hearing at Portland's City Hall on October 14, attended by 
over 500 people including fifty-two organizations brought in by the Riverfront 
for People Committee, the task force received a "rather loud and clear 
message": move slowly and include more people. Throughout the hearing, 
task force members insisted that they did not favor one plan over another. The 
prior week, however, one member had leaked to the press that the committee 
was prepared to propose the cut-and-cover plan over the interim plan. To 
counteract the proposed action, Robert Belcher submitted petitions with about 
37 Senator Robert Packwood, "From the Office of Senator Bob Packwood," 14October1969, 
Belcher's personal files (first and second quotes); "Packwood Chooses 'Natural Environment' 
As Cause," The Oregonian, 7 September 1969, 28; Richard Norman to Senator Robert 
Packwood, 12September1969, Belcher's personal files; Senator Robert Packwood to Richard 
Norman, 23September1969, Belcher's personal files; Allison Belcher interview; Robert 
Belcher interview. 
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2,500 signatures and argued that riverfront planning should be extended to 
include the Skidmore District, located near the Burnside Bridge. Architect 
John Broome reminded the task force of the "multimillion-dollar blunder" that 
was the proposed Ash Street ramp and argued "another such blunder may be 
in the making." AIA President Richard Norman, meanwhile, repeated the 
position that to dismiss the idea to eliminate Harbor Drive based on 1990 
traffic estimates was absurd. Norman said that the projections did not 
consider new traffic signalization systems due to be implemented in 1970 nor 
the advent of a mass transit system.38 
On October 23, Governor Tom McCall, responding to the public 
hearing, sent a letter to Glenn Jackson detailing the future plans of the task 
force. McCall recommended implementing many of the points the Riverfront 
for People Committee had proposed. The governor argued that a 
comprehensive plan for the waterfront area that looked not only at traffic 
flows but at the entire environment would be undertaken. McCall stated that 
the standards for the study were expressed in the goals of the Portland 
Planning Commission's "Downtown Waterfront Plan," including the need "to 
create an inviting, human space" that capitalized "on the natural asset we 
have in the Willamette River," using the green space to renew the area around 
38 "Interim Project Hinted on Riverfront," The Oregon Journal, 15 October 1969, 4 (first quote); 
"Speakers Criticize Proposals of Waterfront Development Task Force," The Oregonian, 15 
October 1969, 27 (second quote); Allison Belcher interview; Robert Belcher interview; Barnes 
Ellis, "Remarks Before Governor McCall's Task Force Committee on Development of Portland 
West River Front," 14October1969, Belcher's personal files; John Broome to the Members of 
the Harbor Drive Task Force, 14 October 1969, Belcher's personal files; Jim Howell interview; 
Abbott, Greater Portland, 138; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: 
Downtown Waterfront Park," 40. 
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Front A venue, strengthening the downtown against "continuing 
decentralization forces," improving Portland's image, and providing an 
adequate space for the annual Rose Festival. McCall urged the creation of a 
citizen advisory committee and the hiring of independent professional 
planners to develop "the most appropriate program for the core area."39 
Governor McCall also requested that Glenn Jackson pledge $20,000 or 
40 percent of the total costs, whichever was greater, from the highway 
commission to assist in financing the planning for the waterfront. He then 
argued that due to the testimony given at the public hearing, the stretch of 
land being considered for redevelopment should be expanded to include the 
entire area between the Steel and Ross Island bridges and at least up to First 
A venue. The governor insisted that the state take the lead in providing 
financial assistance to the project. Accordingly, McCall asked Jackson to 
pledge $7 million in highway funds towards the completion of the project. He 
argued that any financial investment in the development of the waterfront 
would be "totally self-supporting under a program which would reflect 
sharply increased land values." "Please regard this letter," McCall insisted, 
"as further evidence of my commitment to the consummation of a project that 
is without rival in its potential favorable impact on the image of all of 
Oregon."40 
39 Governor Tom McCall to Glenn Jackson, 23 October 1969, Belcher's personal files (first, 
second, third, and fourth quotes); Governor Tom McCall to John Broome, 28 October 1969, 
Belcher' s personal files. 
40 Ibid. 
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On November 4, Glenn Jackson publicly announced Governor Tom 
McCall's changes. Jackson added that the waterfront park would "bring the 
activities of the city down to the water" and include commercial and 
recreational uses. McCall's plan was, however, not without controversy. As 
the Oregon Journal pointed out in its November 5 editorial, "As Others See the 
Waterfront," some Oregonians outside of Portland resented the waterfront 
being given such a high priority. For example, while N.W. Barmeir, chair of 
the Columbia County Board of Commissioners, believed that the 
improvement of the Lower Columbia River Highway should have priority 
over Portland's riverfront park, Andy Nasburg, chair of the Coos Bay 
Planning Commission, argued that widening Ocean Boulevard in Coos Bay 
should be considered first. Glenn Jackson defended the state's decision by 
insisting that most of the development of the downtown waterfront would 
have to be paid for by private businesses and local taxpayers. On the other 
hand, in its November 5 editorial "Riverfront Sights Rise," the Oregonian 
argued that a world-class riverfront park in Portland would "serve the city 
and state as a system of Oregon's natural endowments."41 
On December 19, the Harbor Drive Parkway Task Force met for the first 
time at city hall with the newly created eighteen-member citizens advisory 
committee. The task force and advisory committee now voted to hire the firm 
of DeLeuw, Cather & Company of San Francisco to study the best uses of the 
41 "West Side Project Expanded," The Oregon Journal, 4 November 1969, 1 (first quote); 
"Riverfront Sights Rise," The Oregonian, 5 November 1969, 30 (second quote);" As Others See 
the Waterfront," The Oregon Journal, 5 November 1969, 10. 
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downtown waterfront. Cost of the study was expected to be $75,000. The 
decision to hire DeLeuw, Cather was made by task force member John Mosser 
who was seeking to ensure the firm looked beyond traffic considerations in 
developing a plan. DeLeuw, Cather had previously been hired by the 
Columbia Region Association of Governments to conduct a metropolitan mass 
transit study. It was also announced that the wider project could include 
staffing and administrative fees of as much as $200,000 for the first year, with 
part of the cost being paid for with federal funds.42 
As the year 1969 came to a close, the old Journal Building had still not 
been completely demolished. On December 9, Walter Lowe, the owner of 
Atlas Building Wreckers, stated that the city had denied his request that 
Harbor Drive be closed from 6 a.m. to 3 p.m. so that demolition of the 
building's east wall could be completed. City officials had said that holiday 
traffic was too heavy to close the highway. Traffic engineers estimated that a 
thousand vehicles per hour utilized the highway during those times. Starting 
December 10, Atlas had to pay a $100 per day penalty for not having 
completed the demolition in the agreed number of days. The city finally 
agreed to close Harbor Drive between 7 p.m. and 11 p.m., when 500 vehicles 
used the highway hourly, but only after January l.43 
42 "Harbor Drive Traffic Cut Study Slated," The Oregon Journal, 18 December 1969, 6; "Group 
Takes New Approach to Harbor Drive Parkway," The Oregonian, 19December1969, 44. 
43 "Old Journal Building Resists Efforts of Wreckers' Hammers to End Existence," The 
Oregonian, 10December1969, 39; "Old Journal Razing Expected by December 10," The Oregon 
Journal, 8November1969, 4; "Demolition Crews Keep Chipping at Old Journal," The 
Oregonian, 1November1969, 11; "Demolition Work Slow," The Oregonian, 1October1969, 14. 
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1969 was a critical year in planning for the development of the 
downtown waterfront. In July, the City Club's Committee on the Journal 
Building Site and Willamette Riverfront Development criticized the unilateral 
decision making process of the task force, most notably Commissioner Frank 
Ivancie and State Highway Commission Chair Glenn Jackson, and 
successfully blocked the implementation of the Ivancie Plan. In its "Interim 
Report" published the following month, the City Club argued not only should 
waterfront development be linked to the downtown area, but that public 
hearings should be held so that more voices could influence the plan for the 
area. Inspired by the report, Robert and Allison Belcher, along with Jim 
Howell, formed the Riverfront for People Committee. Their efforts, which 
included two highly publicized picnics at the old Journal Building, galvanized 
waterfront beautification advocates. Governor Tom McCall, responding to the 
October 14 public hearing in which the task force was lambasted for its 
secrecy, instructed Glenn Jackson to implement many of the Riverfront for 
People Committee's recommendations. As the 1960s ended, proponents of a 
viable riverfront park had made enormous strides but a definitive plan for the 
area had not yet been chosen. 
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CHAPTERN 
PLANNING THE CLOSURE OF HARBOR DRNE 
On February 3, 1970, the State Highway Commission approved an 
earlier agreement by the Intergovernmental Task Force for Waterfront 
Development and its own advisory committee to hire DeLeuw, Cather, a San 
Francisco traffic engineering firm, to study the possibility of removing Harbor 
Drive. Commission Chair Glenn Jackson indicated that the study would 
determine the amount of land available for possible riverfront development 
and would provide "for a more realistic approach to the river frontage 
planning problem."1 
Five months later, on July 9, the highway commission, the Portland 
City Council, and a group of downtown businesspeople held a joint meeting 
to announce the proposed closure of Harbor Drive once the Fremont Bridge 
was completed at the end of 1971. Jackson declared that the nearly completed 
Stadium Freeway, along with the Fremont Bridge, had altered downtown 
traffic, making the waterfront highway unnecessary. "We finally decided on 
elimination," he stated at the meeting, "because it would be impossible to 
keep it and satisfy everyone on a riverfront land bank for people." Most of the 
1 "Traffic Study Planned in Harbor Drive Area," The Oregonian, 4 February 1970, 6 (first 
quote); Glenn L. Jackson to Task Force and Advisory Council, 20February1970, Allison and 
Robert Belcher, personal files (second quote); "Harbor Drive Study," DeLeuw, Cather & 
Company, 14 December 1970, City of Portland Archives, 1-2; Cornell, Howland, Hayes & 
Merryfield memorandum, 14 January 1970, Ernest Bonner, personal files. 
existing traffic of 40,000 cars a day on Harbor Drive, Jackson explained, would 
be routed not only to the Stadium Freeway, but also to Front, First, and 
Second avenues. "The Marquam Bridge is now at capacity during certain 
hours," he emphasized, "and traffic volume on and off the Stadium Freeway 
is expected to push the flow on the Fremont Bridge to its capacity from the 
day it is opened." Therefore, by 1978, Jackson declared, another bridge across 
the Willamette, most likely between the Marquam and Ross Island bridges, 
would be needed to link Interstate 5 with the future Mt. Hood Freeway. 
Federal highway funds, however, would be available for construction of the 
bridge.2 
Commissioner Frank Ivancie and Portland business leader Paul 
Murphy announced that a long-range comprehensive development plan for 
the downtown area, from Burnside to Market streets and from the Stadium 
Freeway to the Willamette River, would be developed jointly by city, county, 
and state agencies. The Portland Improvement Corporation (PIC), which was 
organized in 1968 by downtown property owners and business interests and 
included powerful civic leaders Glenn Jackson and Ira Keller, offered $100,000 
to the cash-strapped city towards the over-all planning effort, estimated at 
2 "West Side Waterfront Plans Keep Cover on 'Can of Worms'," The Oregonian, 10July1970, 19 
(first quote); "Front, First, Second A venues Slated to Carry Heavier Share of Vehicles," The 
Oregon Journal, 9 July 1970, 4 (second quote); "Harbor Drive Study," DeLeuw, Cather & 
Company, 7-11; "State Dooms Harbor Drive," The Oregon Journal, 9 July 1970, 1; "Major 
Facelift Proposed For Portland Riverfront," The Oregonian, 10 July 1970, l; Wolff Zimmer 
Gunsul Frasca Partnership, Portland, Oregon & Royston, Hanamoto, Beck & Abey, San 
Francisco, California, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park, City of Portland, Oregon," 
August 1975, Multnomah County Library, 40; Roger Shiels, interview by Michael Jenner, 
typed transcript, Portland, Or., 22 January 2004; Sam Galbreath to J. David Hunt, 5 May 1977, 
Bonner, personal files, 2. 
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$500,000. The PIC hired the consulting engineering firm Cornell, Howland, 
Hayes & Merryfield (CH2M-Hill) to develop a plan for the waterfront area as 
well as the downtown core. Ivancie cautioned that the plan would be based 
primarily on "economic realities" and would not be "a Sunday supplement 
program with a lot of pretty pictures that can never come true." Citizen 
groups, the commissioner declared, would be directly involved in all stages of 
the planning process through public hearings. "Any ultimate plan would not 
be worth a dam," Herbert M. Clark, Jr., chair of the Portland Planning 
Commission, argued, "unless it had the backing and approval of our citizens. 
What we do now will determine the land use in the downtown area for the 
next 100 years." It was estimated that the downtown plan would be completed 
in 1971.3 
In its editorial "Promising Plan," the Oregonian argued that the joint 
highway commission and city council plans were encouraging. It appeared, 
the daily newspaper's editors declared, that the long held goal of many 
Portlanders to take advantage of one of the city's greatest assets-the 
3 "Major Facelift Proposed for Portland Riverfront," The Oregonian, 10 July 1970, 1 (first and 
second quotes); Carl Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City 
(University of Nebraska Press: Lincoln and London, 1983), 217-218; City Club of Portland, 
"Report on a Vision of Portland's Future," Portland City Club Bulletin 60, 19 May, 1980, 289; 
Jewel Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power 1851-2001 (Oregon State University Press, 
Corvallis: 2003), 430; Ibid. CH2M-Hill, in a memorandum from January 14, 1970, disagreed 
with the highway commission's plan to eliminate Harbor Drive. The firm believed that 
removing a highway that must be rebuilt by 1976-80 in order to deal with the increase in 
traffic was a waste of money. Cornell, Howland, Hayes & Merryfield memorandum, 14 
January 1970, Bonner, personal files. The city's plan to conduct a comprehensive study of the 
downtown area had been in the works since at least February 1970. Glenn Jackson had held 
up task force activities in mid-February to avoid an "overlap" in planning pending guidelines 
to be supplied by the city and county planning commissions on March 30. Jackson to Task 
Force and Advisory Council, 20 February 1970 (first quote). 
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Willamette River-was finally at hand. The Oregonian pointed out that the 
decline in traffic along Harbor Drive, a critical fact in the decision to eliminate 
the riverfront highway, had been foreseen nine years prior in 1961 by those 
who argued against the construction of the Ash Street ramp. Equally 
significant to clearing the waterfront area to create a park, the daily 
newspaper's editors insisted, was the decision to draw up a comprehensive 
plan for the downtown area. Even though a plan satisfactory to both private 
and public interests had not yet been achieved, the Oregonian argued, the joint 
planning effort provided the promise of not only creating a world-class 
waterfront park, but also increasing livability and convenience in the entire 
downtown area.4 
Contrary to the Oregonian's optimism, the Oregon Journal, in its editorial 
"Who's in Charge Here?" expressed embarrassment in the fact that the city 
had been forced to delegate major responsibility for downtown planning to 
the PIC. Citing a 1968 dispute between certain downtown business interests 
and the planning commission over a proposed twelve-story parking garage on 
the site of the old Portland Hotel, the Journal's editors argued that there was 
potential for conflict between the PIC and the city government. Adding 
confusion to the muddled situation, they declared, was the fact that other 
studies, including the DeLeuw, Cather plan, were still in the works. The paper 
quoted Herbert M. Clark, Jr. as stating, "If you were to ask me, 'Who's in 
charge here?' I'd have to answer, I'll be damned if I know." Even though the 
4 "Promising Plan," The Oregonian, 11July1970, 14. 
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Oregon Journal was enthusiastic about the highway department's 
"willingness" to close Harbor Drive to open up the waterfront, it warned that 
any study regarding the downtown area would need "adequate" input from 
citizens groups. 5 
At the end of July, the Oregon Journal followed up "Who's in Charge 
Here?" with another editorial, "Plan Born Under a Cloud," in which the 
editors expressed skepticism towards the PIC's decision to hire CH2M-Hill 
instead of turning over the project to the planning commission. The Journal 
printed portions of an open letter from Roger Shiels, president of the 
American Institute of Architects' Portland chapter, and member of the City 
Club's Committee on Journal Building Site and Willamette Riverfront 
Development, to Mayor Terry Schrunk. Shiels insisted that the planning 
commission was the "logical arm of the city to represent the people of 
Portland" in the project. He furthermore argued that unless there was 
"genuine input from professionals who will be its natural critics," as well as 
from interested citizens groups, the plan, regardless of how sound, would be 
viewed as nothing more than "the self-serving proposal of large downtown 
business interests." In his response to Shiels' criticisms, Shrunk argued that 
ultimately the city council was in charge because only they could adopt a plan. 
The mayor reiterated that ample "opportunity for participation by all of the 
various groups and interests" would be provided before any scheme was 
adopted. Ultimately, the Oregon Journal argued, the success of the plan would 
5 Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 217; "Who's in Charge Here?" The Oregon 
Journal, 11 July 1970, 10. 
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depend "heavily" on how well the mayor and city council stuck to their 
promise.6 
A month and a half later, on September 10, the city council passed 
Ordinance #131483, which authorized an agreement with the highway 
commission to landscape the area of the former Journal Building, S.W. Harbor 
Drive between Morrison and Salmon streets. Glenn Jackson stated that the 
area was to be "appropriately landscaped for public use for the interim period 
of approximately two years before the discontinuance of Harbor Drive." While 
the state was chiefly responsible for the project, including all grading, seeding, 
and installation of irrigation equipment, the city was to provide shrubbery 
and approximately thirty trees. The site was to be developed into a large lawn 
area with pedestrian walkways and park benches. The project was to begin 
that winter. 7 
On September 9, the day prior to the council's action, Glenn Jackson 
sent a letter to Mayor Schrunk officially notifying him of the highway 
commission's plan to close Harbor Drive in the spring of 1972. Jackson also 
stated that the commission was "contemplating" a one-way couplet in which 
Front A venue would be a northbound street while First A venue would be 
southbound. Specifically, the plan called for connecting Front and First 
6 Shiels, a frequent project management consultant for the city, oversaw the construction of 
both the downtown transit mall and Pioneer Courthouse Square as well as the renovation of 
Civic Stadium. "Plan Born Under a Cloud," The Oregon Journal, 31July1970, 12; Roger Shiels, 
interview by Michael Jenner, 22 January 2004 ; "Project consultant takes behind-scenes 
approach," The Oregonian, 27 February 1984, p. B2. 
7 "Journal Site Due to Bloom," The Oregon Journal, 11September1970, 2 (first quote); "Plans 
Revealed For Journal Site," The Oregonian, 6August1970, sec. III, p. 21; "Journal Site to be 
Landscaped," The Oregonian, 12 September 1970, 19. 
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avenues to the Steel Bridge in the vicinity of N.W. Couch and Davis streets, 
while connecting the southern section of Harbor Drive to Front and First in 
the vicinity of S.W. Market and Harrison streets. It was estimated that the 
couplet plan would cost around $2.5 million. Jackson stated that a public 
hearing regarding the street proposals would be scheduled in the near future. 
The city traffic engineer and planning commission were instructed to study 
the plan and assess its compatibility with long-range planning for the 
downtown area and the riverfront.8 
Three months later, in mid-December, the highway commission 
announced it was scheduling a public hearing for January 14, 1971 at the 
Portland Civic Auditorium. Plans called for the proceedings to commence at 2 
p.m., continue throughout the afternoon, and then reconvene at 7:30 p.m. after 
a recess for dinner. To notify all "interested persons" of the sessions, the 
commission published public notices in the local papers on December 14 and 
January 8. The commission stated that oral and/ or written statements would 
be accepted at the formal hearing and within ten days afterwards.9 
Opposing the meeting as "premature," the planning commission 
unanimously voted on December 21 to recommend to the city council that the 
meeting be postponed. The PPC insisted that the hearings be delayed "at 
least" until the comprehensive downtown plan was completed. Lloyd Keefe, 
8 Glenn L. Jackson to Terry D. Schrunk, 9 September 1970, Bonner, personal files (first quote); 
"Closure of Harbor Drive Set," The Oregon Journal, 15 September 1970, l; Glenn Jackson to 
Members of the Task Force and Advisory Committee, 24September1970, Bonner, personal 
files; "Harbor Drive Study," DeLeuw, Cather & Company, p. A. 
9 Floyd Query to Mayor Terry D. Schrunk, 10 December 1970, Bonner, personal files (first 
quote); "Harbor Drive Hearing Set," The Oregonian, 15 December 1970, sec. II, p. 8; "Street 
Closure Meet Set," The Oregon Journal, 18 December 1970, 8. 
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director of the planning commission, argued that changes made by the state 
would not only determine the shape of the waterfront but would eliminate 
several planning options for the downtown area. "There is no need to be hasty 
in making a decision about the future status of Harbor Drive," Keefe insisted, 
"as no difficulties will result if it remains open after the Fremont Bridge is 
completed and in use." To make a decision on the riverfront highway now, he 
explained, would defeat the "orderly approach" of preparing the downtown 
comprehensive plan.10 
In letters to Glenn Jackson, both Herbert M. Clark, Jr. and Roger Shiels 
concurred with Keefe. Clark declared that the planning commission did not 
want "preliminary alternative plans being studied to be implanted or carried 
to a degree of commitment or of 'no return.'" Meanwhile, Shiels argued that 
the public hearing should not take place until both the DeLeuw, Cather study 
and the downtown plan were completed. "An intelligent decision cannot be 
made on how or whether to close Harbor Drive," Shiels insisted, "until all the 
alternatives have been explored and a consensus developed." Nevertheless, on 
December 23, the city council declined to heed the planning commission's 
advice and instead voted to go forward with the public hearing. 
Commissioner lvancie stated that the session would simply consist of a 
discussion of preliminary plans for the benefit of the highway department and 
downtown planners. "The die is not cast at the hearing," he stated. Six days 
later, in a letter to the task force and advisory council, Glenn Jackson declared 
10 Lloyd T. Keefe to Portland City Council, 22December1970, Bonner, personal files. 
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that the decision on alternative routes from the closure of Harbor Drive "could 
possibly be delayed if necessary."11 
At the end of 1970, DeLeuw, Cather released its "Harbor Drive Study," 
which concluded that the closure of the roadway would cause "tolerable" 
short-term traffic conditions but in the long-term necessitate expanding the 
capacity of the area highway system, especially Interstate 5. The consultants 
examined five plans for alternative routings for auto traffic if Harbor Drive 
were removed. The consultants declared that alternative five, which called for 
the building of a north-south expressway in the vicinity of East 201h Avenue, 
was infeasible as the highway would not provide sufficient relief to Portland's 
freeways to prevent over loadings. In addition, significant community 
opposition, based on environmental considerations, had "deferred indefinitely 
the construction of the facility." The consultants further stated that alternative 
one, the cut-and-cover plan, was unsatisfactory, as it would enable only 15.8 
acres to be developed for a waterfront park and would entail "numerous 
hidden costs" as well as sound and air pollution problems.12 
11 H.M. Clark, Jr. to Glenn Jackson, 29 December 1970, Bonner, personal files (first quote); 
Roger Shiels to Glenn Jackson, 23 December 1970, Bonner, personal files (second quote); 
"Council OKs Hearing on Harbor Drive Plan," The Oregonian, 24 December 1970, 8 (third 
quote); Glenn L. Jackson to Task Force and Advisory Council, 29 December 1970, Bonner, 
gersonal files (fourth quote); Roger Shiels, interview by Michael Jenner, 22 January 2004. 
2 DeLeuw, Cather noted that Harbor Drive was utilized primarily as a downtown bypass 
route for trips between the south of downtown area to areas north and east of the Steel Bridge. 
They explained that the riverfront highway's function for access to downtown was "less 
significant." With regard to 1990 traffic patterns in the downtown area, the consultants found 
that even by keeping Harbor Drive, serious "capacity deficiencies" would exist. They pointed 
out that the Portland freeway system was designed to accommodate 1975 traffic demand. 
"Harbor Drive Study," DeLeuw, Cather & Company, pp. A, 1-2, 7, 10-11, 17, 21-26, 37-40 (first 
quote, p. A, second quote, 37, third quote, 7, fourth quote, 17); "Report Offers Traffic Plans," 
The Oregonian, 1January1971, 24. 
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The consultants stated that alternative three-Front Avenue as a high-
capacity six-lane, two-way surface street-was unsatisfactory because it 
would provide for only a 160-foot strip for public development while creating 
a barrier between downtown and the waterfront that would offset the benefits 
of removing Harbor Drive. Alternative two, the Front and First avenues 
couplet scheme, the report concluded, was satisfactory given that 28.6 acres 
would be available for development and the costs of the plan would be low. 
They viewed alternative four-the long-term plan to build another Willamette 
River bridge in the corridor between the Marquam and Ross Island bridges 
while upgrading Interstate 5 and the Stadium Freeway-as the most desirable 
plan because it would create a viable riverfront park connected to downtown 
while solving future traffic problems.13 
On January 8, 1971, the task force and advisory committee voted to 
proceed with steps to close Harbor Drive when the Fremont Bridge was 
completed, instead of waiting until all alternatives were considered and 
adopted. "You have to make a start," Glenn Jackson explained, "If you just 
wait for an over-all program, you might never get it off the ground." Members 
of the task force argued that to leave Harbor Drive open after the completion 
of the freeway loop was to invite traffic to establish itself on the riverfront 
highway as well as the Stadium Freeway and Fremont Bridge, making 
relocation more difficult. Richard Ivey, director of planning for CH2M-Hill, 
agreed that there was nothing objectionable to the closure. The task force and 
13 Ibid., "Harbor Drive Study," DeLeuw, Cather & Company, 7, 17, 26-35, 38-40 (first quote, 
34). 
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highway commission declared that it was prudent to allow ninety to 120 days 
for agencies such as the Multnomah County Planning Commission, the 
Portland Planning Commission, and the PIC to review and comment on 
DeLeuw, Cather's "Harbor Drive Study."14 
Six days later, however, at the highway commission's public hearings, 
attended by a total of 146 people, the majority of testimony from both public 
officials and private individuals concurred with the elimination of Harbor 
Drive but demanded that the removal of the riverfront highway be postponed 
at least twelve to fifteen months. Significantly, Glenn Jackson did not attend 
the hearing. Lloyd Keefe argued that not only was 120 days too short a time to 
consider the "Harbor Drive Study," which would have ended on May 7, but 
that a conceptual plan for the downtown area would not be ready until May 1. 
"The development [of the riverfront and downtown] should be determined 
first," Keefe insisted, "and then the traffic rearrangements can be decided 
accordingly rather than the other way around." Meanwhile, some downtown 
real estate developers advised that the Front and First avenues couplet would 
adversely affect both the area south of the Hawthorne Bridge as well as the 
Skidmore Fountain neighborhood.15 
14 "Harbor Drive Closure Proposal Due for Presentation to Public Hearing," The Oregonian, 13 
January 1971, 16 (first quote). The task force voted unanimously in favor of the plan to close 
Harbor Drive as quickly as possible while the advisory committee had one dissenting vote. 
Transcript, Public Hearing on January 14, 1971 in Portland, Oregon State Highway Division, 
Bonner, personal files, 8. . 
15 Transcript, Public Hearing on January 14, 1971 in Portland, Oregon State Highway Division 
(first quote, 13); "Drive Closure Held 'Opening Move'," The Oregon Journal, 14 January 1971, 7; 
"Harbor Drive Talks Heated," The Oregon Journal, 15January1971, 7; "Highway Department 
Urged to Take it Slow," The Oregonian, 15 January 1971, 27. 
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The strongest objections at the hearings were raised by Robert Belcher, 
of the Riverfront for People Committee, AIA members Richard Norman and 
Roger Shiels, and City Club member David J. Lewis. Expressing frustration at 
their inability to be heard in the decision-making process, the dissidents 
argued that the couplet plan would simply replace the riverfront highway 
" ... with a new Harbor Drive made up of Front and First." Meanwhile, Alex 
Pierce, an AIA architect and board member of the Portland Beautification 
Association, objected that since a decision had already been made by the 
commission, the hearing was a "sham." "I suggest that we go home," he 
declared. On the other hand, Albert E. Owen, representing Local No. 8 of the 
International Longshoreman's Union, argued against the proposed closure of 
Harbor Drive by asserting that it would adversely affect not only the 35,000 to 
40,000 workers who relied on the riverfront highway, but also would hurt the 
Port of Portland's ability to keep costs low and compete with other harbors. 
Owen denounced the couplet idea because it would funnel "100-footlong, 3-
tandem rigs" onto downtown streets, causing enormous safety problems. The 
couplet would create such a barrier between downtown and the park, he 
claimed, that few people other than "winos" would actually venture to the 
waterfront.16 
16 Of the fourteen comment cards that were received at the meeting, two people rejected the 
idea to eliminate Harbor Drive. "We don't need this change," one card read, "It is a waste of 
tax payer's money." Transcript, Public Hearing on January 14, 1971 in Portland, Oregon State 
Highway Division (first quote, 22; second and third quotes, 38-9, fourth quote, 27, fifth quote, 
28, sixth quote, 50); Roger Shiels, interview by Michael Jenner, 22 January 2004' "Dear Mayor 
Goldschmidt," Portland Beautification Association, 1 August 1975, Oregon Historical Society; 
"Portland architect charges city planning has become a capricious political mess," The 
Oregonian, 6 October 1968, Forum section, p. 8; Ibid. 
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In response to the public hearing, both the Oregonian and the Oregon 
Journal argued that more studies were needed before Harbor Drive was 
closed. In its editorial "No Rush on Closing Harbor Drive," the Journal's 
editors joined those who preferred that plans for the riverfront wait until the 
completion of the downtown plan. "It is far more important," they argued, 
"that the West Side waterfront be redeveloped right than that it be done fast." 
Meanwhile, despite Albert Owen's objection, the Port of Portland Commission 
voted on February 10 in support of the highway department plan on the 
condition that interchanges be built to funnel truck traffic from the northwest 
industrial area onto the Fremont Bridge and Stadium Freeway. Edward G. 
Westerdahl II, executive director of the port, declared that he had received 
"personal assurance" from Glenn Jackson that Harbor Drive would not be 
closed until adequate means for moving traffic to and from the industrial area 
had been worked out.17 
Glenn Jackson now asked the city council to evaluate the highway 
commission's plan with respect to whether Harbor Drive should be vacated 
and what steps should be taken to handle traffic, given the closure. The 
council requested that Commissioner of Pubic Works Lloyd Anderson 
examine the recommendation and ask various agencies to comment on the 
matter. As urban historian Carl Abbott has explained in Portland: Planning, 
Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City (1983), the council was 
17 "SW Harbor Closing Supported," The Oregof!ian, 11February1971, 1 (first quote); "No Rush 
on Closing Harbor Drive," The Oregon Journal, 13 February 1971, 10 (second quote); "Harbor 
Drive Closure Now or Later?" The Oregonian, 21January1971, 30; "Harbor Drive: Close it 
Now or Wait for Downtown Plan," The Oregonian, 26January1971, 17. 
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undergoing dramatic changes in the late 1960s that signaled the end of the 
reigns of the politicians who had run the city for over a decade. This process, 
which began in October 1969 when Anderson was appointed to the city 
council after the death of William Bowes, continued in March 1970, as Connie 
McCready replaced Stanley Earl, becoming only the second woman to serve 
on the council. Both Anderson, who had previously been chief planner at 
CH2M-Hill, and McCready, who had been a strong supporter of civil rights 
and environmental legislation during her two terms as a Republican state 
legislator, were in their forties and were newcomers to city politics. In 
November 1970, twenty-nine year-old Neil Goldschmidt was elected to fill the 
seat vacated by Buck Grayson and young businessperson Tom Walsh barely 
lost to the established Frank lvancie. The new members on the council 
represented an altered political landscape based on demographic changes, 
wherein the percentage of people aged fifteen to thirty-four in Portland had 
increased from 22 percent to 29.5 percent between 1960 and 1970.18 
Three months later, on May 5, Commissioner Anderson submitted his 
report recommending that the city council, Multnomah County, and the 
highway commission pass a resolution agreeing that Harbor Drive be closed. 
18 In the race for city commissioner, some conservative supporters of Frank Ivancie 
derogatorily referred to Tom Walsh as "King of the Hippies." Meanwhile, many young people 
were angered by Ivanice's tough stand against anti-war demonstrators utilizing the South 
Park Blocks to protest President Richard Nixon's invasion of Cambodia. Abbott, Portland: 
Planning, Politics, and Growth, 174-176 (first quote, 174; Roger Shiels, interview by Michael 
Jenner, 22 January 2004; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 389-91, 477, 483; 
"'Radical' pushed for model city," The Arizona Republic, 23 February 2003, 
www.azcentral.com/ arizonarepublic [accessed September 13, 2003]; "Seizure Takes Life of 
William Bowes," The Oregonian, 19October1969; l; "Wm. Bowes Dies At Home," The 
Oregonian, 19 October 1969, 31; "City Council To Appoint Successor To Fill Out Term Of 
William Bowes," The Oregonian, 19 October 1969, 31; "Ex-Mayor Connie Mccready dies," The 
Oregonian, 23 December 2000, l. 
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Before the closure could take place, however, Anderson argued that the 
council must adopt a detailed development plan for the riverfront area, 
approve a plan for a revised Front Avenue, and make an agreement with Tri-
Met for better bus circulation for the downtown area. The Tri-County 
Metropolitan Transportation District had been created in October 1969 by the 
Oregon legislature to take over the troubled Rose City Transit Company. The 
commissioner, in addition, insisted that the highway commission ensure an 
access route between the Fremont Bridge and the northwest industrial area, as 
well as construct two park-and-ride facilities adjacent to Interstate 205, which 
bisected eastern Multnomah County. Anderson said it would be possible to 
close Harbor Drive once the council completed its obligations by July 1973 and 
once the state fulfilled its commitments. Even though many Portland officials 
were opposed to the elimination of Harbor Drive, Anderson argued, their 
opinions should be balanced against the long-term advantages to be gained 
from such a policy.19 
19 Of those opposed to the State Highway Commission's plan, which included the city 
engineer, the fire bureau, and the bureau of police, traffic engineer D.E. Bergstrom offered the 
most adamant rejection. He argued that the closure would result in "serious" traffic 
congestion and delays resulting in "severe" criticism of both the city and the state. Bergstrom 
declared the benefits from a redeveloped waterfront area would be "overshadowed and 
outweighed by the liabilities" caused by the closure. In his argument against the highway 
commission's plan, Benjamin Bullwinkle, businessperson and frequent user of Harbor Drive, 
insisted not only would the closure cause traffic delays, but, that a riverfront park would only 
benefit the "itinerant alcoholics, drifters, and hippies." Instead of the closure, Bullwinkle 
explained, additional pedestrian overpass bridges should be built to "'get the girls to the 
sailors.'" Traffic Engineer to Public Works, 19 March 1971, City of Portland Archives (first, 
second, and third quotes); Benjamin B. Bullwinkle to Mayor Terry Schrunk, 21February1971, 
City of Portland Archives (fourth and fifth quotes); Richard Wise to Mayor Terry Schrunk, 18 
March 1971, City of Portland Archives; James H. Riopelle, Chief, Bureau of Fire to · 
Commissioner Lloyd E. Anderson, 19 March 1971, City of Portland Archives; Donald I. 
McNamera, Chief of Police to City Engineer, 17 March 1971, City of Portland Archives; R.E. 
Hatchard, Program Director, Columbia-Willamette Air Pollution Authority to Commissioner 
Lloyd E. Anderson, 19 March 1971, City of Portland Archives; H. Kenneth Anderson, Chief 
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Eight days later, on May 13, the city council unanimously accepted 
Anderson's report. It also scheduled a joint public hearing with the highway 
commission for June 18 to discuss the proposal. The following Wednesday, the 
council passed an ordinance authorizing expenditure of $500,000 in federal 
grant money to purchase right-of-way land along Harbor Drive from the state. 
In return for the federal aid, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) garnered a lien on the property, committing the land for 
park purposes only. In its editorial "Future of the Waterfront," the Oregon 
Journal again argued that the city council was moving too quickly in deciding 
the fate of the riverfront. The newspaper's editors insisted that no decision be 
made without the guidelines from the comprehensive downtown study due to 
be completed in 1972.20 
Two days before its second scheduled public hearing, the highway 
commission cited "public opposition" to the couplet plan and announced a 
new proposal that called for the closure of Harbor Drive by 1973 and the use 
of Front A venue to handle both southbound and northbound traffic. The 
Engineer to Commissioner Lloyd E. Anderson, 15 March 1971, City of Portland Archives; 
Lloyd E. Anderson to City Council (draft), 29 April 1971, City of Portland Archives; Lloyd E. 
Anderson to City Council, 5 May 1971, City of Portland Archives; Roger Shiels, interview by 
Michael Jenner, 22 January 2004; Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 216-217, 253; 
Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 378-79, 384; "Closure of Harbor Drive Considered 
by City Council," The Oregonian, 8 May 1971, sec. II, p. 7; "Waterfront Program Proposed," The 
Oregon Journal, 8May1971, 2. 
20 "Harbor Drive Report Given City Council," The Oregonian, 14 May 1971, 46; "Council 
'Accepts' Harbor Drive Plan," The Oregon Journal, 14 May 1971, 3; "Harbor Drive Project 
Aided," The Oregonian, 20May1971, 35; "City Asks Financing For Waterfront Job," The Oregon 
Journal, 20 May 1971, 27; "Future of the Waterfront," The Oregon Journal, 29 May 1971, 10. In 
May, three inches of sawdust was placed on the site of the old Journal Building in preparation 
for the Rose Festival. After the festival, the sawdust was plowed into the dirt expanse and 
grass was planted. "Desolate Expanse Will Bloom Next Month," The Oregon Journal, 8 May 
1971, 3. 
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commission now proposed to make Front A venue more pedestrian-friendly 
by adding traffic lights at busy intersections, providing walkway crossings to 
the waterfront, and by mandating reduced vehicular speeds. The cost of the 
new plan, mainly consisting of the construction of off-ramps to the north and 
south of the closure area, was estimated to be $750,000, $1.75 million less than 
the couplet idea.21 
The public hearing on June 18 produced generous support for the new 
plan. Roger Shiels, reading a statement representing the City Club, suggested 
that the proposal was "consistent with the goals outlined in the City Club's 
interim report" and urged the city council to adopt it. Meanwhile, Robert 
Belcher, of the Riverfront for People Committee, insisted that, while he 
approved of the plan, he wanted a "definite date" for the closure of Harbor 
Drive. Businessperson and public transportation advocate Ray Polani argued 
it was "encouraging" that the highway commission had listened to the 
overwhelming testimony against the couplet idea and responded with new 
plans. "I feel that we have definitely moved in the right direction," Polani 
stated, "I feel that this should be very heartwarming for the younger people in 
our society."22 
21 "Closure of Street to Wait Until '73," The Oregonian, 19 June 1971, 9 (first quote); "Summary 
of Draft Environmental Impact Statement: Closure of Harbor Drive Pacific Hwy. West (US 
99W) Portland," Oregon State Highway Division: Program & Planning Section, 2 June 1971, 
City of Portland Archives; "New Proposal on Closure of Harbor Drive Offered," The Oregon 
Journal, 16June1971, 3; "Hearing on Harbor Plan Set," The Oregon Journal, 17 June 1971, 4. 
22 Born in Trieste, Italy, Ray Polani, chair of the Citizens for Better Transit, believed that 
Europe's excellent public transportation system could be replicated in Portland. Transcript, 
Public Hearing on June 18, 1971 in Portland, Oregon State Highway Division, Bonner, 
personal files (first quote, 28, third quote, 34); Transcript, Public Hearing on January 14, 1971 
in Portland, Oregon State Highway Division (second quote, 38); Robert Belcher, interview by 
Michael Jenner, typed transcript, Portland, Or., 24 March 2003; Roger Shiels, interview by 
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Of those opposed to the highway commission's proposal, some 
supported the removal of Harbor Drive but demanded more radical plans in 
dealing with automobile traffic. Portland State University Professor Sam 
Oakland of the Bicycle Lobby, for example, argued that automobiles, with the 
exception of delivery trucks, should be removed from the downtown area 
entirely. "I'm tired of seeing the same old tired designs coming from the same 
old tired designers," he declared. Alex Pierce, who had referred to the January 
public hearing as a "sham," objected that traffic on Front Avenue separated 
the waterfront from downtown and prevented pedestrian access to the 
riverfront. He added that attending meetings of the highway department was 
like "buying a cheap suit."23 
In its editorial "The Waterfront and People," the Oregon Journal argued 
that although the removal of Harbor Drive was going to be "painful" and 
"costly," Portlanders were "paying for our past sins in locking up the 
waterfront with highway and industrial development." The editors supported 
any and all moves to reclaim the riverfront for "beauty and recreation." 
Reversing past policy, the Journal commended the inclusive decision-making 
process of the highway commission and city council, which it described as a 
"fascinating study in democracy at work."24 
Michael Jenner, 22 January 2004; "Accord Seen on Harbor Drive Closure," The Oregon Journal, 
19 June 1971, 7; "Mass transit advocate to keep 'riding' Tri-Met board," The Oregonian, 12 
September 1983, p. Bl. 
23 Transcript, Public Hearing on June 18, 1971 in Portland, Oregon State Highway Division 
(first quote, 28-29, third quote, 34 and fourth quote, 35); Transcript, Public Hearing on January 
14, 1971 in Portland, Oregon State Highway Division (second quote, 38). 
24 "The Waterfront and People," The Oregon Journal, 23 June 1971, 18. 
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On September 23, the city council unanimously adopted Commissioner 
Anderson's resolution declaring its "desire and intent" to close Harbor Drive 
no later than July 1973. Earlier in the month, however, Glenn Jackson had 
attempted to persuade the council to adopt a plan to close the riverfront 
highway in November 1972, to coincide with the scheduled completion of the 
Fremont Bridge, instead of awaiting detailed industrial freeway plans and 
commitments from Tri-Met. "This Harbor Drive idea has been around for a 
long time," Jackson stated, "and I'd like to live to see it finished." In late 
November, nonetheless, the highway commission adopted Commissioner 
Anderson's resolution.25 
In an interview with former city planning director Ernie Bonner, Lloyd 
Anderson explained that his far-reaching ordinance would not have been 
possible without Governor Tom McCall's support. "If the governor had 
opposed [the closure]," he insisted, "then introducing an ordinance and 
having the city council close a state highway right through the middle of the 
city that carried 40,000 cars a day was not at all possible." In addition, both 
Richard Ivey and Richard Brainard, members of the CH2M-Hill team that 
helped develop the "Downtown Plan," stated that McCall was the major 
impetus behind the highway commission's decision to close the riverfront 
25 "Harbor Drive Closure Sought By July 1973," The Oregon Journal, 24September1971, 6 (first 
quote); "City May Close Harbor Drive Early," The Oregon Journal, 1 September 1971, 3 (second 
quote); "Council OKs SW Harbor Closure Date," The Oregonian, 24 September 1971, 1; 
"Freeway to Decide," The Oregonian, 27September1971, 18; "Construction Stipulations: Steel 
Bridge - Sheridan St Sec. (Harbor Drive), Pacific. Highway West, No. lW," Oregon State 
Highway Division, 4October1972, Bonner, personal files; "Closure OKd for Street," The 
Oregon Journal, 3 November 1971, 1; "State OKs Harbor Drive Plan," The Oregon Journal, 24 
November 1971, 1. 
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__________________ I 
highway. "[Jackson] was basically closing it for his boss," Ivey declared, "He 
threw up his hands and he said, 'I'm just trying to help the govemor."'26 
A week after it adopted Anderson's resolution, the city council hired 
the consulting team of Portland architectural firm Wolff Zimmer Gunsul 
Frasca (WZGF); San Francisco landscape architectural firm Royston, 
Hanamoto, Beck & Abbey; and San Francisco economic consultants Larry 
Smith and Co. to develop a comprehensive plan for the waterfront area before 
Harbor Drive was closed. The study was projected at $120,000, with the city 
paying $72,000 and the state the remainder, and was set to begin in early 1972 
to coincide with the basic concepts of the downtown plan. "What's exciting," 
architect Robert J. Frasca stated, "is there is some resemblance of reality to it. 
With a little bit of luck, we could pull off something no one else in the country 
has done." The council instructed the consultants to develop a plan that was 
"as economically self-sufficient as possible." Financing for the area, they 
stated, was to be generated from private development on the riverfront rather 
than from city coffers. Larry Smith & Co. were directed to use "extensive 
market studies" to explore the "amount and type" of private development 
that might be encouraged on the waterfront property.27 
26 "Waterfront Park Video Script," Ernest Bonner, 7 July 2002, Bonner, personal files, 78-9 (first 
quote); Richard Ivey, interview by Ernest Bonner, typed transcript, Portland, Or., 13 January 
1995, www.pdxplan.org [accessed October 30, 2002] (second quote); Richard Brainard, 
interview by Ernest Bonner, typed transcript, Portland, Or., www.pdxplan.org [accessed 
October 30, 2002]. 
27 "Private Consultants, City Officials Meet to Lay Waterfront Plans," The Oregonian, 2 
November 1971, 4 (first quote); Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: 
Downtown Waterfront Park," 41 (second, third. and fourth quotes); "City Names Design 
Firm," The Oregonian, 1October1971, 38; "City OKs Riverfront Study Plan," The Oregon 
Journal, 23 December 1971, 11; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca & Ritter to Harbor Drive Parkway 
Task Force, 19 August 1971, Bonner, personal files. 
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Seven months later, in April 1972, the Portland Development 
Commission (PDC) submitted Phase I of the Waterfront Study, which 
established the basic design and financing strategies for the creation of the 
park. They stated that preliminary estimates indicated that "substantial" 
private development on the riverfront would be needed in order for the park 
to be self-sufficient. This, however, the PDC concluded, was contrary to 
community goals and to the guidelines of the downtown plan. They advised, 
therefore, that the waterfront area and downtown core be designated for 
urban renewal, making tax increment financing available for public 
improvements. The PDC further recommended that the City Charter be 
amended by a vote of the electorate to eliminate existing limits on permissible 
amounts of tax increment financing. This, they stated, was "essential" in 
maximizing the potential for revitalization of the waterfront area.28 
While the work for the Phase II Study was suspended by the city in 
order to study and implement the urban renewal plan, the political climate at 
city hall continued to change. In May 1972, Neil Goldschmidt defeated retired 
industrialist Bill DeWeese to become the youngest mayor in Portland's 
history. Even though DeWeese outspent Goldschmidt two-to-one in the most 
expensive primary in city history, the younger candidate won 460 of 500 
precincts as well as over 57% of the total vote. Goldschmidt had not only 
28 Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," 41; 
Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment of Conditions and Issues," 
April 2001, 20; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, Portland, Oregon & Royston, 
Hanamoto, Beck & Abey, San Francisco, California, "Appendix to Final Report: Downtown 
Waterfront Park, City of Portland, Oregon," August 1975, Multnomah County Library, 
Appendixes L, M. 
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become the council's president in 1971, but had been serving as acting mayor 
since Terry Schrunk's heart attack a month prior to the election. Goldschmidt's 
political allies, commissioners Anderson and McCready, also won decisive 
victories in the May primary. For proponents of a viable park on the 
waterfront, the victories of Goldschmidt, Anderson, and McCready 
represented a significant step forward. 29 
Two months later, in early July, the State Highway Commission 
released its environmental impact study for the closure of Harbor Drive. 
George Baldwin, state highway administrator, argued that the closure of the 
riverfront highway would not solve all of the anticipated city-wide traffic 
problems but that both short-term and long-term inconveniences "must be 
accepted" in the name of progress. Two projected problems, the report stated, 
were a downgrade in the overall air quality in the downtown area and an 
increase in the noise level, due to slowed traffic on Front A venue. Baldwin 
emphasized that the closure could be reversed or modified anytime the public 
wanted but that development of the area would make this more difficult. 
Contrary to the highway commission's report, however, the Portland 
29 After Neil Goldschmidt resigned in 1979 to become secretary of transportation in the Carter 
administration, Commissioner Connie McCready was appointed mayor, becoming only the 
second woman to have held the position. McCready, however, lost the 1980 mayoral election 
to Commissioner Frank Ivancie. Ivancie lost his 1984 re-election bid to newcomer "Bud" 
Clark. As the Willamette Week noted, "History belongs to those who adapt. The times changed. 
Ivancie did not." Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 395-96, 411-16, 428-30, 475, 477, 
479, 483 (first quote, 430); Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 174-176, 180-81; 
Roger Shiels, interview by Michael Jenner, 22 January 2004; "Goldschmidt Takes Mayor Race 
Easily," The Oregon Journal, 24 May 1972, 1; "Mayor, Council Members Chosen," The Oregon 
Journal, 8November1972, 5. Stan Terry, the Portland businessman who had argued in 1969 to 
keep the old Journal building open to be utilized as a municipal office and parking structure, 
finished second to Anderson in the primary election garnering 13.8% of the vote. 
"Goldschmidt Takes Top City Post," The Oregonian, 24 May 1972, 1. 
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Chamber of Commerce publicly urged the city council not to close Harbor 
Drive. In October 1972, the chamber requested that the cut-and-cover plan be 
further investigated as a means of creating a waterfront park while keeping 
carbon monoxide levels down.30 
Four days before Neil Goldschmidt was sworn in as mayor, the city 
council in December 1972 adopted the "remarkable" "Portland Downtown 
Plan," which outlined its previously stated goals and policies for land use, 
transportation, and the general environment in the downtown area. The 
report was significantly influenced by a Citizens' Advisory Committee (CAC), 
which had been created in May 1971. The CAC, which was chaired by lawyer 
and Irvington neighborhood worker Dean Gisvold, not only established its 
independence from both the PIC and CH2M-Hill, but also created a list of 
fundamental downtown goals, including making the area pedestrian friendly. 
The committee had met once a week from June 1971 through February 1972 
and its members gathered input from more than a thousand Portlanders. In 
February 1972, the CAC presented its set of "moral principles" to the city 
council. City planners and CH2M-Hill then worked together to develop the 
30 "Impact Study Made on Drive Closure," The Oregon Journal, 11 July 1972, 11 (first quote); 
"Chamber Criticizes Harbor Drive Plan," The Oregonian, 6October1972, 22. On October 31, 
1972, the state approved Ordinance No. 135362, which authorized an agreement between 
Portland and the highway commission to close Harbor Drive and reroute Pacific Highway 
West along Front A venue. "Maintenance Stipulations, Steel Bridge - Sheridan Street Section 
(Front Avenue), Pacific Highway West, No. lW," Oregon State Highway Division, 31 October 
1972, Bonner, personal files. 
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ideas into specific proposals. The "Downtown Plan" contained "a dear 
strategy [and] a new vision of downtown" as a "people place." 31 
The plan described downtown as a "multifunctional district" that 
emphasized a variety of activities. It organized the area into twenty-one 
overlapping districts in an attempt to give downtown "a sense of order and 
identity." San Francisco's exciting and unique downtown was a major 
influence on the report. The key to the plan was the Transit Mall, which 
allowed buses to be the dominant form of transportation along the office 
corridor-Fifth and Sixth Streets-in order to speed-up bus service as well as 
encourage the use of public transportation. Between September 1971 and 
January 1972, the concepts of the Transit Mall were approved by Tri-Met, the 
planning commission, and the city council. The plan also called for the 
building of two parking garages with room for 1,300 cars near the retail core.32 
With regard to the riverfront, the "Downtown Plan" contained specific 
goals, including the creation of a park with "unique activities through which 
31 Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 208-209, 215, 217-223, 253 (first quote 215, 
second quote, 219, third quote, 220, fourth quote, 208); Carl Abbott, "Five Strategies for 
Downtown: Policy Discourse and Downtown Planning since 1943," Journal of Policy History, 
Vol. 5, No. 1, 1993, in Planning the Twentieth-Century American City, ed. Mary Corbin Sies and 
Christopher Silver (The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London, 1996), 7, 14-
15; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 393-95, 401; Portland Parks and Recreation, 
"Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 20; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final 
Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," 40; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, 
"Appendix to Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," Appendixes J, K; "Planning 
Guidelines: Portland Downtown Plan," Portland City Planning Commission, 9 February 1972, 
Multnomah County Library; "Planning Guidelines/ Portland Downtown Plan," Portland 
Citizens' Advisory Committee, December 1972, Multnomah County Library; "Waterfront for 
People," Portland Planning Bureau, 16 August 1974, City of Portland Archives; Ernest Bonner, 
interview by Michael Jenner, typed transcript, Portland, Or., 28 April 2003; Ernest Bonner, 
"Portland: The Problems and Promise of Growth," in Personality, Politics, and Planning, ed. 
Anthony James Catanese and W. Paul Farmer (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), 
157; Roger Shiels, interview by Michael Jenner, 22 January 2004. 
32 lbid; Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 209 (first quote), 222 (second quote); 
Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 394-95, 401, 408. 
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city life can be enhanced." The waterfront, the scheme detailed, was to 
provide an open space, fully integrated with adjoining areas, that would offer 
a contrast to the "formal character of downtown" and act as a "magnet" to 
create a "community focus." In its immediate goals for the riverfront, the 
report declared not only should public use of the area be encouraged as soon 
as Harbor Drive was closed, but that citizen involvement be emphasized in 
the planning process. In order to "recapture the beauty and drama of the 
Willamette," the plan emphasized activities that would take advantage of the 
river as well as reducing its pollution. In its long-range goals for the area, the 
plan stated that ample open space should be maintained, and "good physical 
and visual access" should be developed in the park itself as well as in the 
downtown area near the waterfront. To accomplish these goals, the report 
insisted that the area be "pedestrian-oriented," for "mingling and 
communicating," and be served by public mass transit.33 
Along with the dramatic changes in city hall and citizen involvement in 
the "downtown revolution," the growth of neighborhood associations in every 
section of Portland in the late 1960s and early 1970s greatly altered the 
planning process. As Carl Abbott has detailed, during the 1950s and 1960s, 
professional planners made critical decisions affecting neighborhoods with 
little regard to the opinions of the residents living there. The prevailing belief 
33 lbid., "Planning Guidelines/ Portland Downtown Plan," Portland Citizens' Advisory 
Committee, 9-11 (first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seven, and eighth quotes); Lansing, 
Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 394; Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park 
Master Plan, Portland, Oregon," 2003, Multnomah County Library, 17; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul 
Frasca Partnership, "Appendix to Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," Appendixes J, 
K; Galbreath to Hunt, 5 May 1977, Bonner, personal files, 2. 
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among city officials was that the inner ring of residential neighborhoods was 
in an inevitable process of decline and hence, could not be saved. By the late 
1960s, however, angry local residents created neighborhood associations that 
not only demanded a voice in the decision making process but also argued 
their areas could be revitalized. By the early 1970s, the neighborhood 
movement had a powerful influence on the city.34 
Arguably, the greatest victory for neighborhood associations was the 
cancellation of the Mt. Hood Freeway. Since the early 1960s, the construction 
of a freeway parallel to southeast Division and Powell streets had been 
planned to link downtown with Interstate-205 in eastern Multnomah County." 
Increasingly, however, neighborhood associations in the late 1960s, especially 
in southeast Portland, began questioning the logic of building a highway that 
would displace 1,750 households as well as numerous schools. By the early 
1970s, a grassroots movement opposed to the freeway was barraging city hall 
with complaints. In 1974, the city council, with Commissioner Frank Ivancie in 
opposition, voted four-to-one to cancel plans for the freeway. Led by Mayor 
Goldschmidt, a staunch supporter of the neighborhood movement, the council 
diverted funds from the freeway to develop Portland's light-rail system 
(MAX). The following year, Governor Bob Straub formally withdrew the Mt. 
Hood Freeway from the interstate highway system.35 
34 Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 182-206 (first quote, 208); Lansing, Portland: 
People, Politics, and Power, 393. 
35 Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 196-197, 255-257; Lansing, Portland: People, 
Politics, and Power, 383, 385, 405-06; "Freeway Foes Ask 2"d Meet," The Oregon Journal, 21 
August 1969, 6. 
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Like Portland, other major cities in the United States were shifting 
away from exclusivity in planning in the late 1960s and 1970s and moving 
towards a more representative process. In Twentieth-Century Richmond: 
Planning, Politics, and Race (1984), urban historian Christopher Silver examined 
the rise to power of the long-neglected African American community in 
Richmond, Virginia during this period. In the 1950s and 1960s, city officials 
had engaged in a strategy of downtown growth and city expansion as a means 
of fending off Richmond's decline. The "progressives," who sought to 
promote the city's progress through planning and economic development, 
initiated urban renewal projects. Their goal was to make the downtown area 
more attractive but the result was to destroy the inner city, predominately 
black, neighborhoods. Ironically, as Silver detailed, projects such as the 
construction of the Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike actually furthered the 
decentralization process it was seeking to combat. Dislocated African 
Americans moved into predominately white neighborhoods, which in turn 
increased white flight to the suburbs. By the 1960s, white city officials 
desperately sought to annex adjacent counties as a means of increasing the 
white population and stemming the rising tide of black influence.36 
During the 1970s, Richmond dismantled its federal urban renewal 
program and witnessed increasing influence by ordinary citizens in city 
planning decisions, most notably in the battles over the Fulton neighborhood 
36 Christopher Silver, Twentieth-Century Richmond: Planning, Politics, and Race (University of 
Tennessee Press/Knoxville, 1984), 13-14, 210-255; Abbott, "Five Strategies for Downtown," 5, 
10, 11, 18. 
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and Washington Park. Richmond's leaders began to emphasize neighborhood 
conservation as a means of curbing suburban flight. In 1977, Richmonders 
elected their first African American majority to the city council. Even though 
these changes in city hall did not bring about a radical shift in planning policy, 
they resulted in more sensitivity to the needs of low-income neighborhoods. 
For example, the new council invested nearly $3 million in the Jackson Ward 
area, the historic center of the black population. Richmond also planned in the 
late 1970s to make improvements to its riverfront as well as to improve 
pedestrian circulation in the downtown area.37 
Another American city that shifted towards a more inclusive planning 
process and emphasized a functional downtown was Omaha, Nebraska. In 
The Changing Image of the City: Planning for Downtown Omaha, 1945.:.1973 (1992), 
urban historian Janet Daly-Bednarek suggested that Omaha's officials 
reevaluated their city planning based on economic changes that had been 
taking place since the 1950s. Nebraska's largest city had shifted from being 
predominately blue-collar-" the livestock and meatpacking center of the 
nation"-to emphasizing white-collar sectors, including the insurance and 
service industries. Daly-Bednarek utilized the two major city plans of the 
1950s and 1960s, the "Omaha Plan" of 1956 and the Central Omaha Plan (1966), 
to explain that not only had civic leaders ignored the already changing 
economy, but they also had relied almost entirely on the private sector to 
initiate proposed changes. Both plans emphasized the continued reliance on 
37 lbid., 311-320 
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traditional industries and infrastructure improvements to combat the trend of 
the declining downtown. City officials believed that if the downtown area was 
accessible and cleaned up it would once again perform the dominant role it 
had played in the past. 38 
The collapse of the meatpacking industry in the late 1960s, however, 
led city leaders to emphasize beautification and quality of life factors in city 
planning to address the new dominance of white-collar industries in Omaha's 
economy. Like Portland, Omaha's City Hall was undergoing dramatic 
changes in the late 1960s and early 1970s, ushering in a new generation of 
politicians who had fresh ideas regarding city planning. Eugene Leahy, 
Omaha's mayor from 1969 to 1973, not only increased the role of the public 
sector in city planning decisions, but championed a scheme to restructure the 
downtown area as a business and cultural center. The Central Business 
District Plan of 1973 differed from previous post-war strategies in that it 
emphasized input from a citizens advisory committee as well as from 
professional planners. The key element of the plan was the Central Park Mall, 
a "massive" area of greenery and water in the downtown area.39 
In May 1974, Portland moved forward with its own downtown 
revitalization plan. That month, the highway commission officially closed 
Harbor Drive between the Hawthorne and Steel bridges. Southbound lanes 
were closed on May 23 and northbound lanes were closed the day after. In its 
38 Janet Daly-Bednarek, The Changing Image of the City: Planning for Downtown Omaha, 1945-
1973 (University of Nebraska Press: Lincoln & London, 1992), 1-40, 127-148, 164-173, 185-186, 
227-230; Abbott, "Five Strategies for Downtown," 14. 
39 Daly-Bednarek, The Changing Image of the City, 231 (first quote), 187-225, 227, 230-231; 
Abbott, "Five Strategies for Downtown," 14. 
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editorial "Blacktop to Green," the Oregonian celebrated the end of the forty-
one year-old highway, arguing that the vision of a waterfront park 
overshadowed the short-term traffic problems produced by the closure. 
Harbor Drive had served its purpose well, the newspaper's editors insisted, 
"but this is a new era in which greenery and open space are valued over the 
exhaust-filled lanes of macadam and concrete." The Oregonian argued that 
easy pedestrian access from the downtown core and riverfront attractions 
needed to be provided to make the park viable. "The people have recaptured 
the river in downtown Portland after more than a century," the editors 
declared, "Let's never let it go." In June, while the section between S.W. 
Columbia and Clay streets was being tom up to allow the city a head start on 
the development of a waterfront park, tents were placed along the route for 
the annual Rose Festival.40 
That November, Portlanders voted to remove the City Charter debt 
limit on tax increment financing, opening the way to greatly enhance the 
ability to build an open green space on the waterfront without "substantial 
private development." A year-and-a-half prior, in April 1973, the city council 
40 City historian Jewel Lansing has noted it was ironic that Harbor Drive (1942-1974) kept the 
valuable downtown waterfront property in the public domain enabling the creation of 
Waterfront Park in the 1970s. "Harbor Drive Closing Set," The Oregon Journal, 9May1974, 11 
(first quote); "Blacktop to Green," The Oregonian, 24 May 1974, 38 (second and third quotes); 
"Urban Renewal Plan for the Downtown Waterfront Urban Renewal Project," City of Portland 
Development Commission, 25 April 1974, Multnomah County Library; R.N. Bothman to 
Connie McCready, 30 May 1975, Bonner, personal files; Galbreath to Hunt, 5 May 1977, 2, 
Bonner, personal files; Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 224; Lansing, Portland: 
People, Politics, and Power, 405-07; Portland Parks and Recreation; "Waterfront Park Master 
Plan," 17; "Asphalt Strip to Disappear From Portland Riverfront," The Oregonian, 23 May 1974, 
sec. II, p. 29; "For You a Park in Portland Grows," The Oregon Journal, 9 May 1974, 11; 
"Reclaimed Waterfront in Sight," The Oregon Journal, 21May1974, 12; "Old Freeway Torn 
Up," The Oregon Journal, 6June1974, 1. 
102 
' 
had followed the recommendations of the "Phase One" report by instructing 
the Portland Development Commission to prepare the necessary documents 
for a Waterfront Urban Renewal Area and retained the prestigious planning 
firm of Skidmore, Owings, & Merrill to help develop the plan. A year later, in 
April 197 4, the city council approved an urban renewal designation for the 
area adjacent to the riverfront. The vote ended the two-year delay on planning 
for the area as the Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership and Royston, 
Hanamoto, Beck, & Abey resumed their studies.41 
As the year 1974 came to a close, city traffic engineer D. E. Bergstrom 
submitted the "Harbor Drive-'Before' and' After' Traffic Study." Bergstrom 
stated that with regard to volume and travel time in the downtown area, only 
Front Avenue exhibited any noticeable change. While the traffic volume on 
the avenue had nearly doubled, an increase in automobile speed had caused a 
decrease in travel time. Prior to the riverfront highway closure there had been 
approximately 1,400 trucks on Harbor Drive and 600 trucks on Front Avenue 
per twenty-four hour period. This level, however, had been decreased to 1,500 
in the combined corridor following the closure. As traffic engineer Richard 
Brainard recounted, the closure of the riverfront highway did not cause the 
traffic chaos some had predicted. "Once Harbor Drive was closed, the next 
41 Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," 4, 
40-41 (first quote, 41); "Urban Renewal Plan for the Downtown Waterfront Urban Renewal 
Project," City of Portland Development Commission; Portland Parks and Recreation, 
"Waterfront Park Master Plan," 17; idem, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 20; Abbott, 
Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 224; Galbreath to Hunt, 5 May 1977, 2, Bonner, 
personal files. 
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day the traffic disappeared," he stated, "There was no traffic jam. Nobody 
could figure out where the traffic went."42 
Between 1970 and 1974, proponents of a waterfront park won a series of 
important victories. The radical decision in 1970 to remove Harbor Drive not 
only opened up the possibility of redeveloping the land as a park, but also 
provided an opportunity to reorganize the downtown area. Importantly, the 
highway commission listened to the negative testimony at the public hearing 
on January 14, 1971 and responded with both a new plan that rejected the 
Front and First avenues couplet and accepted Commissioner Anderson's 
proposal to delay the closure of Harbor Drive until planning for the area could 
be completed. Facilitated by the ascension to power of a younger generation of 
city officials, Portland moved dramatically toward approval of the 
"Downtown Plan" and an increase in tax increment financing. By 1974, the 
question was not whether there should be a park along the riverfront, but 
what the park was to look like. 
42 Richard Brainard, interview by Ernest Bonner (first quote); "Harbor Drive-'Before' and 
'After' Traffic Study," D. E. Bergstrom, Traffic Engineer, 9 December 1974, Bonner, personal 
files. 
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CHAPTERV 
THE CREATION AND UTILIZATION OF TOM McCALL WATERFRONT 
PARK 
As 1975 began, the consulting firms Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca 
Partnership of Portland and Royston, Hanamoto, Beck & Abey of San 
Francisco completed their public reviews of the waterfront park plan 
alternatives, which had begun the prior September, and moved closer to 
submitting their recommendations to the city. A year prior, in February 1974, 
the firms had resumed work on Phase II of the Waterfront Study, which 
focused on design options and an implementation strategy, after a two-year 
delay. When the Portland City Council approved the urban renewal 
designation for the riverfront area in April 1974, it ensured sufficient funding 
for the creation of a viable park. The firms were given seven guidelines by the 
city to consider as they developed their plan: create places to "observe river 
activities," establish a "pedestrian promenade," supply places for "large 
public gatherings," develop "waterfront oriented shops and restaurants" in 
the adjoining areas of the park, encourage activities on the river such as 
"public boat tours," design "visual and physical ties" linking the park with 
downtown, and produce "attractive pedestrian spaces."1 
1 Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment of Conditions and Issues," 
April 2001, 21 (first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth quotes); Wolff 
With these guidelines, the consultants prepared three separate 
development schemes for the park, intending to draw out ideas to help 
finalize the ultimate plan. In scheme one, the park would consist primarily of 
open space, with areas of commercial activity located at the bridgeheads. In 
scheme two, the riverfront would include community facilities such as a 
theater and/ or an exhibition hall, surrounded by some large open areas. In 
scheme three, the park would become a commercial activity center based on 
Ghiardelli Square in San Francisco and Tivoli Garden in Copenhagen, with 
open areas as well. After presentations to the city council, planning agencies, 
and citizens groups, including the Citizens' Advisory Committee, the 
consultants concluded that the "majority sentiment" favored the scheme 
having the most open space, scheme one.2 
From June 1974 through January 1975, city officials and the consultants 
engaged in a review process to encourage community input regarding 
preliminary concepts for Waterfront Park. This process of citizen participation 
originated with and was carried forward by the "Downtown Plan" of 1972, 
which detailed the organization and uses of the downtown area and the 
riverfront. According to the consultants, the process of citizen involvement 
was not only "experimental" but was a "pioneering effort at including direct 
public participation in the planning of a major public facility." The 
Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, Portland, Oregon & Royston, Hanamoto, Beck & Abey, 
San Francisco, California, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park, City of Portland, 
Oregon," August 1975, Multnomah County Library, 5, 40, 42. 
2 Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," 42-
44 (first quote, 42). 
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"aggressive" strategy of citizen input, which produced several thousand 
individual responses, was pursued through a variety of techniques, including 
public meetings, extensive questionnaires, a booth at the annual Rose Festival, 
and two all-day fairs and workshops (Waterfront Sunday in September and 
Son of Waterfront Sunday in October). Input from groups, individuals, public 
agencies, and each member of the city council was also gathered. According to 
the consultants, the responses produced a coherent vision of a park with 
activity areas within open natural spaces.3 
The seven-month review process produced six conclusions for 
Waterfront Park and formed the basis on which the consultants designed their 
final report. While there was almost unanimous agreement that the riverfront 
should indeed be utilized as a park, some respondents favored the commercial 
activity plan over the open space scheme as a means of drawing people to the 
riverfront. Secondly, the consultants had originally recommended landscaping 
that included "extensive mounds, beams and dense plantings," but this was 
rejected for several reasons. For one, the police bureau noted that such 
extensive growth, while lessoning traffic noise, would have increased the 
incidences of concealed violence and would have made surveillance difficult. 
Furthermore, it was noted that such landscaping would have been too 
expensive to maintain and would have limited the uses to which the park 
could be put. The consultants explained that the third conclusion-a partial 
3 Ibid., 45 (first, second, and third quotes); Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, 
Portland, Oregon & Royston, Hanamoto, Beck & Abey, San Francisco, California, "Appendix 
to Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park, City of Portland, Oregon," August 1975, 
Multnomah County Library, Appendixes F, G, H, L 
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removal of the seawall-was quite controversial. While many felt the removal 
was essential to achieve "visual access" to the river, an equal number felt that 
it would not be worth the risk in the case of flooding.4 
A fourth conclusion gleaned by the consultants was that while the 
majority of responses favored some sort of park activities, including some 
commercial use, leaving the area flexible was essential as well. Fifthly, the area 
south of the Hawthorne Bridge was a much-discussed issue among 
respondents. The consultants had originally proposed the creation of an 
amphitheater but this plan received some negative feedback. Several people 
questioned the scheme for a variety of reasons: Portland already had similar 
facilities, traffic noise would limit the optimum use of the area, and the plan 
would require some modifications to street patterns. The majority of 
responses, however, favored upgrading the existing marina. Finally, the 
consultants noted additional concerns that were raised: fire protection, 
construction and maintenance costs, water safety, and impact on the skid road 
population. They recommended further study of these issues.5 
On August 28, 1975, the city council adopted Resolution No. 31595, 
which provided detailed guidelines for the design and development of 
Waterfront Park. The consultants had completed and submitted their findings 
to the city two months prior. During July and early August, city officials had 
held public reviews and hearings to consider the consultants' 
4 Ibid., Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront 
Park," 46 (first and second quotes, 46). 
5 Ibid., Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront 
Park," 46-47. 
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recommendations. Five days after the Portland Development Commission 
(PDC) had passed a motion endorsing the findings, the Portland Planning 
Commission had determined on August 5 that the recommendations were 
consistent with the previously stated goals of the "Downtown Plan" and it 
endorsed the council's adoption. 6 
Resolution No. 31595 detailed six policies for the creation of the park. 
The riverfront was to be designed for both "activity centers" as well as 
"generous, unstructured ... open grass 'meadows'." Secondly, the park was to 
be fully integrated with the downtown area by converting Front Avenue into 
a "tree-lined boulevard." Thirdly, the consultants' recommendations 
emphasized physical and visual water contact through removal of the solid 
balustrade on the seawall, addition of fountains and pools, and creation of 
water-related development opportunities at the north and south ends of the 
park. Fourthly, the resolution specified that while the Rose Festival was to be 
accommodated, open grass areas would be emphasized. The fifth policy said 
the park should be a place for pedestrians and bicyclists-not for cars-and 
that public transportation would be provided to and from the riverfront. The 
city council, not the consultants, added the sixth policy to the resolution, 
which specified that "low or easy maintenance and operation of 
improvements shall be the primary consideration" to park planning. In 
addition, no improvements would be made without assurance that the funds 
6 Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," 7-12; 
Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 21; Carl Abbott, Portland: 
Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City (University of Nebraska Press: 
Lincoln and London, 1983), 224-225. 
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would be available. The resolution also contained a section on procedures for 
future plans for the park. In the first procedure, the plan stated that any 
changes or additions to the park would have to fit within the six adopted 
policies. The second procedure directed the development commission to 
implement plans for the creation of Waterfront Park as soon as possible.7 
In late August, the consultants released "Final Report: Downtown 
Waterfront Park, City of Portland, Oregon," which was the guiding document 
for the park until 2003. The fifty-eight page report chronicled the history of the 
riverfront, some of the events that led to the creation of the park, as well as 
immediate, three-year, and long-term development schemes for the area. Of 
great importance, emphasized the consultants, was that a "significant portion" 
of the park be reserved for later use. For its immediate plan, the consultants 
recommended initiating both the second policy from Resolution No. 
31595-Front A venue development-and a portion of the third policy 
involving removal of the balustrade. Interestingly, with regard to the 
balustrade, the scheme involved utilizing new concrete panels as the 
foundation for the esplanade along the river's edge, which could also be 
quickly lifted vertically into place on top of the seawall in case of a flood. 8 
In its three-year plan for Waterfront Park, the consultants explained 
that their scheme was but one means of interpreting the various policies 
7 Ibid., Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront 
Park," 7-11 (first, second and third quotes, 7, fourth quote, 11). 
8 Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," 16-
21, 38, 50-58 (first quote, 38); Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park Master Plan, 
Portland, Oregon," 2003, Multnomah County Library, 17; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca 
Partnership, "Appendix to Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park" Appendixes A, B, C, D, 
E; Sam Galbreath to J. David Hunt, 5 May 1977, Ernest Bonner, personal files, 2-3. 
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contained in the city's resolution. In its plan, they divided the linear urban 
park into five distinct areas. For the South Auditorium District, area one, the 
consultants envisioned upgrading the existing boat moorage for recreational 
activities and creating a small commercial center. The two blocks east of Front 
A venue, furthermore, an area purchased by the city from the Multnomah 
Plywood Company in July, was to be utilized for the building of a hotel and 
for providing "people-oriented activities." For the Hawthorne Bridge District, 
area two, the consultants recommended remodeling the old Visitors 
Information Center into a restaurant to attract people to the riverfront and 
creating a Main Street pedestrian area between the park and Third A venue as 
a means of developing a major residential complex.9 
For area three, the Yamhill District, the consultants recommended the 
creation of a linear lagoon of approximately two feet in depth, stretching from 
Salmon Street to the Morrison Bridge, as a safe alternative to physical contact 
with the river. The Morrison Bridge District, area four, would be built-up as a 
concentration of shops and restaurants of approximately 30,000 to 40,000 
square feet to provide both an all-weather activity center as well as a source of 
revenue for offsetting park maintenance costs. Meanwhile, virtually all of the 
area between the Morrison and Burnside bridges was recommended as open 
flexible space for uses such as the annual Rose Festival, play and recreation, 
and a resource for future generations. For area five, the Skidmore 
Fountain/Old Town District, the consultants recommended extending the 
9 Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," 14-
15, 27-31 (first quote, 28); Galbreath to Hunt, 5 May 1977, Bonner, personal files, 2. 
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Skidmore Fountain Plaza to the river's edge through the creation of a large 
hard-surfaced area to accommodate gatherings and provide a passive area to 
counter the activities to the west of Front A venue. Finally, the area between 
the Burnside and Steel bridges was to be left undeveloped and set aside for 
future development.10 
The consultants noted that several park elements received strong 
support and should therefore by considered for long-term development plans. 
While they noted that the improvements to Front A venue would better 
connect the Waterfront Park to the downtown area, the consultants added that 
only the closure of the boulevard would completely unite the two areas. 
Secondly, much support emerged for a Tivoli Garden type entertainment 
center in the park, with the area between the Burnside and Steel bridges 
suggested as a possible location. Also, the consultants noted that part of the 
South Auditorium District could be utilized for the building of a medium-
sized theater to compliment the Civic Auditorium. Finally, there was support 
for adding sporting activities (tennis courts, softball fields) and community 
facilities (indoor tennis courts, indoor swimming pools). 11 
Starting in 1976, the development commission began the construction 
of Waterfront Park, which occurred in five phases over seventeen years at the 
10 Ibid., 14-15, 32-37. In its assessment of the "Final Report," the Portland Beautification 
Association approved of the plan "in principle" with "certain reservations." Specifically, the 
PBA "quarrel[led] philosophically" with the creation of the lagoon when the Willamette River 
was "but a stone's throw away." The organization, furthermore, stated its principle criticism 
of the report was the lack of physical connection between the park and the river. "Dear Mayor 
Goldschmidt," Portland Beautification Association, 1August1975, Oregon Historical Society. 
11 Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," 38-
39. 
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cost of approximately $20 million. The first project, Phase 1, involved 
redesigning Front A venue as a boulevard. This project included reducing the 
traffic lanes from six to four, widening and adding trees to the west sidewalk, 
and adding ornamental lighting. Certain elements of the plan were not 
implemented, however. Some of the pedestrian sidewalks were not aligned 
and the planting buffer on the park side of the avenue was not added due to 
high costs. The next year, the Phase 2 project, from the Morrison to Burnside 
bridges, was initiated. The construction included open meadows bordered by 
trees, a wide esplanade walkway, and the removal of the solid balustrade. 12 
The aim of city planners was to provide a public gathering place for 
each section of the park. In this case, the Phase 2 project included the 
construction of the Ankeny plaza, which contained a stage area as well as wall 
seating. Also, the Battleship Oregon Memorial, located between S.W. Oak and 
Pine streets, was upgraded with new paving and a raised planter. The 
Battleship Oregon, which had served in both the Spanish-American War and 
World War I, had been utilized as a floating military museum between 1925 
and 1942. In 1944, the mast of the ship was dedicated as the Battleship Oregon 
Mast and Park at its current location. Thirty-two years later, at the 
12 Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 9, 14, 21-22, 26, 37; 
James D. McClure to John Lang, 10 May 1978, Bonner, personal files; J. David Hunt to the 
Mayor and City Council, 28 March 1977, Portland City Archives; H.S. Coulter to Jack L. Sollis, 
11April1977, Bonner, personal files; Galbreath to Hunt, 5 May 1977, Bonner, personal files, 3. 
In 1996, Front Avenue was renamed Naito Parkway after businessperson and "local 
visionary" Bill Naito. Jewel Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power 1851-2001 (Oregon 
State University Press, Corvallis: 2003), 457 (first quote). 
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bicentennial celebration on July 4, 1976, the mast was rededicated and a time 
capsule with artifacts was buried at the site, to be sealed until 2076.13 
On Sunday July 16, almost nine years after Robert and Allison Belcher, 
along with Jim Howell, had formed the Riverfront for People Committee to 
fight for the creation of a viable park along the riverfront, Waterfront Park 
officially opened. The dedication ceremony at the Battleship Oregon 
Memorial, which coincided with the beginning of the Neighborfair festival, 
included speeches by Governor Bob Straub and Mayor Neil Goldschmidt 
along with a performance by gospel singer Willa Dorsey. The Oregonian 
declared that, "Portland historically has returned to the place of its birth .... " 
The opening of the park was another success for Mayor Goldschmidt (1973-79) 
in converting the ideas of the "Downtown Plan" into reality. Ernie Bonner, the 
planning director in the 1970s, declared that Goldschmidt was "the perfect 
person to come into the mix. He was charismatic ... and radical." Along with 
the creation of Waterfront Park, Goldschmidt was also responsible for 
overseeing the completion of the Transit Mall in 1977, as well as ensuring the 
creation of Portland's light rail system (MAX) and Pioneer Courthouse 
Square.14 
13 Ibid., 22, 33-34; Jewel Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 408; "Historic Flag," The 
Oregonian, 5 July 1976, 1; "Time Capsule," The Oregonian, 5 July 1976, 1; "Park officially named 
after old battleship," The Oregonian, 5 July 1976, p. B13; "Old Glory," The Oregon Journal, 5 July 
1976, 1. 
14 "'On the waterfront' takes on new sense with park," The Oregonian, 14 July 1978, p. T28 (first 
quote); "'Radical' pushed for model city," The Arizona Republic, 23 February 2003, 
www.azcentral.com/ arizonarepublic [accessed September 13, 2003] (second quote); Lansing, 
Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 401, 407-08, 423, 439; Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and 
Growth, 177-180, 209, 222-227; Allison Belcher, interview by Michael Jenner, typed transcript, 
Portland, Or., 10 March 2003; Robert Belcher, interview by Michael Jenner, typed transcript, 
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In 1984, Phase 3, the South Waterfront "Bowl" section of the park, was 
completed. The area was designed with a large bowl shaped lawn, located just 
south of the Hawthorne Bridge, to be used for large-scale concerts during the 
summer, such as the Blues Festival and Oregon Symphony concerts, as well as 
a pedestrian path running along the river's edge. The area just south of the 
bowl area, RiverPlace, was being developed by the PDC as a residential, 
commercial, and marina complex. The ten-acre area had been purchased by 
the city council in 1978 as an urban renewal project. One year prior, in 1983, 
Waterfront Park was renamed Tom McCall Waterfront Park in honor of 
Oregon's former governor whose leadership in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
was instrumental in the decision to dose Harbor Drive and build a viable 
riverfront park.15 
Two years later, the area between the Hawthorne and Morrison 
bridges, Phase 4, was completed. Whereas the first three phases of park 
development closely mirrored the consultants' recommendations, the central 
waterfront differed significantly from the "Final Report." City officials chose 
to build neither the lagoon nor the proposed commercial development near 
Portland, Or., 24 March 2003; Ernest Bonner, interview by Michael Jenner, typed transcript, 
Portland, Or., 28 April 2003; Roger Shiels, interview by Michael Jenner, typed transcript, 
Portland, Or., 22 January 2004; "Portland's Waterfront Park," 3 July 1978, Bonner, personal 
files; Joan Biggs to Allison Logan Belcher, 10 July 1978, Robert and Allison Belcher, personal 
files; "Wine, food, music, crafts, dance," The Oregonian, 14 July 1978, p. Dl; "Ship memorial 
ftets new look," The Oregonian, 14 July 1978, p. T13. 
5 Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 9, 12, 22-23, 26, 36; 
Benkendorf & Associates, "South Downtown Waterfront Study Workshop I," 29June1978, 
Bonner, personal files; Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 225; Lansing, Portland: 
People, Politics, and Power, 407. Tom McCall died on January 8, 1983 at the age of sixty-nine. 
Audrey McCall said of her late-husband, "I had him for forty-three years. It wasn't enough." 
Brent Walth, Fire at Eden's Gate: Tom McCall and the Oregon Story (Oregon Historical Society 
Press, 1994), 467 (first quote). 
115 
the Morrison Bridge. According to Bonner, not only was there a lack of funds 
in the city's coffers due to an economic recession, but officials feared that the 
proposed developments would not have produced large enough profits. It 
was decided, therefore, to develop the area as open grass meadows. Phase 4, 
however, did entail the creation of the Salmon Street plaza and the Salmon 
Springs fountain, which is the most popular element in the park. The plaza 
extends to the river's edge where the seawall was reconstructed with a 
terraced area. In 1988, the city finished converting the old Visitor's 
Information Center, located directly south of the Salmon Street entry, into 
McCall's Restaurant. The building, originally built in 1949 for the Chamber of 
Commerce, was later utilized to house the City Archives and City Mapping 
Services.16 
In 1988, ten years after the opening of the park, the Portland Bureau of 
Parks and Recreation initiated the "Waterfront Park Management Study" to 
deal with the high volume of summer events in the park that was causing 
"significant" turf damage. Six years prior, the "Waterfront Park Study 1982" 
had examined the status and future developments of the four-year old park 
but had not addressed the issue of festivals. As the "Management Study" 
detailed, two major public events were held in the park during the late 1970s: 
the Rose Festival and Neighborfair. Within a few years, however, nonprofit 
organizations discovered that Waterfront Park was an ideal site for 
16 Ernest Bonner, interview by Michael Jenner, typed transcript, Portland, Or., 28 April 2003; 
Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 444; Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront 
Park: An Assessment," 9, 13, 23, 26, 33-34, 37. 
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fundraising through large-scale community events. By 1988, seven major 
public festivals, including the Cinco de Mayo Festival, the Blues Festival, and 
the Bite, along with numerous minor events, were being held. If the situation 
were to continue, the study warned, turf damage would become so great as to 
degrade the park's "visual character and beauty." The study offered four 
options for dealing with the problem: relocate events out of the park, prohibit 
festivals for a six to eight week period in the middle of summer to allow for 
turf regeneration, restrict the maximum attendance and duration of events, or 
redesign sections of the park with a surface other than grass. The study 
resulted in some restrictions being placed on events, an increase in permit 
fees, a prohibition on festivals from October through mid-March, as well as 
annual turf revitalization.17 
The next year, in 1989, the fifth phase, from the Burnside to Steel 
bridges, was completed. The design for the northernmost section of the park 
was inspired by the donation of one hundred Japanese cherry trees by the 
Grain Importers Association to commemorate forty years of trade relations 
between Portland and Japan. This section, which narrows considerably north 
of the Burnside Bridge, also contains the Japanese American Historical Plaza: 
Bill of Rights Memorial built in 1990. The Oregon Nikkei organization 
17 The results of the "Waterfront Park Study 1982" led to the city council's passage of 
Resolution 33358 in March 1983, which contained slight revisions to Resolution 31595. 
Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 24 (first quote); Bureau of 
Parks & Recreation, "A Management Study for Waterfront Park," 14September14, 1988, 
Portland City Archives (second quote, 5); Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park 
Master Plan," 17-18; idem, "Waterfront Park Study 1982," Portland City Archives; Waterfront 
Park Task Force, "Report on Waterfront Park Task Force," 30October1991, Portland City 
Archives, 2. 
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provided an endowment to cover all construction and maintenance costs. The 
plaza features two bronze statues along with boulders that tell the story of the 
110,000 people of Japanese ancestry who were interned during World War II. 
The memorial stresses the importance of civil liberties. The plaza is located 
near the original "Nihonmachi" or Japanese American community in 
Portland. Before 1941, there were over eighty Japanese owned businesses 
along N.W. Couch Street. The north waterfront park section also contains the 
"Tomodachi" or "Friendship Circle." Sapporo, Japan, Portland's sister city, 
recently donated $30,000 for an artwork display to be located at the site.18 
As the 1990s began, the increased popularity of events in the park 
during the summer months continued to raise concerns regarding overuse. In 
July 1991, Director of Parks Charles Jordan appointed the Waterfront Park 
Task Force to research the issue and make recommendations. The task force 
held weekly meetings from August through October and gathered 
information from diverse sources. As their report detailed, the numerous 
events caused tension with both the concept of the park as a place for quiet 
recreation and reflection as well as the city's ability to restore and maintain the 
grass turf. Furthermore, many of the events utilized fencing to control 
admissions, which resulted in large sections of the park excluding the public. 
In late October, the task force made twenty-one recommendations to the city. 
18 In all, approximately 4,500 Japanese and Americans of Japanese descent from Oregon and 
Washington were interned during World War II. Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 
340, 447; Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 10, 15, 24, 26, 32, 
35, 37; idem, "Japanese American Historical Garden Review," 27 April 1989, Portland City 
Archives; Charles Jordan to Henry Sakamoto, 30 April 1991, Portland City Archives. 
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In effect, it called for restrictions to be placed on events as well as increased 
fees for park use. In addition, the panel recommended that capital 
improvement options should be explored as a means of better accommodating 
passive public use of the park.19 
Even though the task force's report resulted in minor improvements, 
the pressure from events continued to overwhelm the park during the 1990s 
as other additions were made. For example, in 1991, the Portland Police 
Memorial was created directly adjacent to the northern slope of the South 
Bowl. The Police Memorial Association had raised private funds in the late 
1980s to pay for construction costs. The memorial contains a garden, plaza, 
and a three-foot high semi-circular wall with plaques that commemorate 
officers killed in the line of duty. It is located near the sites of the first 
territorial prison and the original harbor patrol. The memorial is also visible 
from the Justice Center and Police Headquarters. In 1994, the city added two 
features to the park: the Oregon Maritime Museum and the Spirit of Portland. 
The museum is located in the Steamer Portland, which is docked along the 
seawall between the Morrison and Burnside bridges. The vessel is the last 
operational wheel tug boat in the United States. In 1986, the Port of Portland 
had planned to dock the steamer at Salmon Springs and convert it into a 
restaurant. When the funds did not materialize, however, the steamer was 
donated to the city. The Spirit of Portland, which is privately owned, is docked 
19 Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park Master Plan," 18; idem, "Waterfront Park: 
An Assessment," 24-25; Waterfront Park Task Force, "Report on Waterfront Park Task Force," 
30 October 1991. 
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along the seawall at Salmon Street and takes cruises up the Willamette River 
to the Milwaukee Basin and back. This popular cruise averages approximately 
90,000 passengers per year.20 
Between 1975 and 1989, the long-held dream of beautification 
advocates to create a viable riverfront park became a reality. Extensive 
planning, including significant citizen participation, was completed by the 
consultants in 1975 and led to the city council's passage of Resolution No. 
31595, which detailed the design and development scheme for Waterfront 
Park. The consultants' "Final Report" illustrated the plan for the area, which 
consisted of large open areas with activity centers located near the bridges. 
While city planners closely followed the consultants' recommendations in the 
first three phases of park development, in the fourth phase, the area between 
the Hawthorne and Morrison bridges, they opted for open grass spaces 
instead of commercial development. In the late 1980s and 1990s, city officials 
struggled to effectively handle the numerous large-scale summer events that 
were overwhelming the park. The function of the park as either a place for 
passive recreation or as the center of festivals was becoming increasingly 
problematic. 
20 Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 12, 31, 33-34; idem, 
"Police Memorial Review," 25 April 1989, Portland City Archives. The first police officer 
killed in Portland in the line of duty was Thomas G. O'Connor, who died on August 30, 1867 
after suffering gunshot wounds a week prior in front of Oro Fino Saloon. Jewel Lansing, 
Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 124. 
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CONCLUSION 
The City of Portland began preparing an updated master plan for Tom 
McCall Waterfront Park in 2001. The original "Final Report: Downtown 
Waterfront Park" of 1975 had provided the blueprint for the greenway's 
development but since that time unforeseen problems had arisen. While the 
park was heavily utilized from March to October, visitation dropped-off 
dramatically during the wet winter months. City planners hoped to 
adequately address the competing functions of the greenway as a place for 
large-scale festivals and as a space for quiet recreation. During 2000, there 
were eleven events held in Waterfront Park, each attracting over 10,000 
visitors. Of these, five drew over 50,000 people. In all, Portland Parks and 
Recreation estimated festival attendance at over one million. During the 
summer and fall, festivals, which often required fencing, took up much of the 
park and caused significant turf damage that required restoration. The long 
duration of some of the events exacerbated the situation. While most events 
lasted a single weekend-Friday to Sunday-the Rose Festival lasted the 
entire month of June.1 
1 In 2000, the heaviest use of the park during non-festival summer months occurred during 
the lunch hour from 11am to lpm and also from 3pm to 5pm on weekdays. By far, the largest 
event was the Rose Festival, which drew 350,000 people to the park. Portland Parks and 
Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment of Conditions and Issues," April 2001, 2, 4, 5, 38; 
idem, "Waterfront Park Master Plan, Portland, Oregon," 2003, Multnomah County Library, 
10-12. 
Another problem city officials described was that S.W. Naito Parkway 
"visually and functionally" separated the park from downtown. In 1976, the 
city had redeveloped the avenue as Phase One of the park's construction. 
Some key components of the plan, however, were not implemented-the 
sidewalk buffer on the park edge of the boulevard and some of the pedestrian 
crosswalks were not aligned-resulting in inadequate pedestrian circulation. 
The lack of sufficient entry points into the park, furthermore, resulted in 
jaywalking, which became dangerous during popular events. As part of the 
renovation of S.W. Naito Parkway scheduled for 2005, the city proposed the 
construction of additional pedestrian crossings into the park and a bicycle 
lane. Another concern with the park was the presence of transients and drug 
dealing activity around the Ankeny Pump Station. City officials acknowledged 
part of the problem was the lack of attractions in that section that could draw 
other visitors.2 
As with the "Final Report" of 1975, significant citizen participation was 
emphasized in the development of the new "Master Plan." Planning was 
guided by a Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC), which met from July 2001 
through December 2002. The CAC represented a balance of interests including 
those of downtown businesses and open space advocates. Harriet Cormack, a 
developer who helped create RiverPlace, chaired the CAC. The process of 
"citizen involvement" included a community survey, three rounds of 
discussion with focus groups, and four public meetings. By January 2002, 
2 Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 5-6, 21-22; idem, 
"Waterfront Park Master Plan," 5-6, 32, 82. 
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planners had developed three park options: 1) an urban grid, 2) a river 
landscape, and 3) a meandering promenade with open spaces and activity 
areas. At the public forum on January 16, 256 people out of an attendance of 
over 650 chose to fill out comment cards. While a majority preferred the third 
option, many recommended "combining" and "simplifying" elements from all 
three schemes. With this information, city planners began designing a new 
plan.3 
On May 30, city officials held another public forum to gamer feedback 
on the new draft concept for the park. One-third of the 129 people who 
attended completed comment cards. The scheme was also displayed at the 
Rose Festival Waterfront Village from May 31 through June 9. While over 
2,000 people spent time in the booth, only fifty-nine completed comment 
cards. Among respondents, there was "widespread" support for the plan. City 
planners then proceeded to finalize the scheme. At the last open house on 
November 19, a total of ninety people attended the afternoon and evening 
meetings to review the final plan. Even though the scheme was generally 
3 On January 14, 2002, a panel discussion on the history of Waterfront Park was held. The 
panel included Riverfront for People Committee co-founder Robert Belcher and former 
planning director during the 1970s Ernie Bonner. Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront 
Park Master Plan," 19-30; idem, "Newsletter No. 4," February-March 2002 (first and second 
quotes); idem, "Newsletter No. 1," August-September 2001; idem, "Waterfront Park Master 
Plan: Public Forum - Summary of Public Input," October 24, 2001; idem, "Waterfront Park 
Master Plan: Focus Groups - Round 1 Summary," August-November 2001; idem, "Waterfront 
Park Master Plan: Survey #1 Results Summary," November 2001; idem, "Newsletter No. 2," 
December 2001-January 2002; idem, "Newsletter No. 3," January 2002; idem, "Waterfront Park 
Master Plan: Public Meeting #2 Results Summary," April 2002; idem, "Newsletter No. 5," July 
2002; idem, "Waterfront Park Master Plan: Public Meeting #3 Results Summary," July 2002; 
idem, "Creating a Great Portland Waterfront," November 2002. 
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supported, some people expressed concerns that Naito Parkway would 
continue to be a significant barrier between the park and downtown.4 
In late 2003, Portland Parks and Recreation released the "Waterfront 
Park Master Plan," which detailed the long-term development plan for the 
greenway. The scheme divided the mile-long, thirty-seven acre linear park 
into five distinct areas. The Bowl area, the southernmost section of the park, 
was designated to remain a grassy open space serving as a venue for concerts 
and performances. At the western edge of the Bowl, a series of terraces were 
to be added for enhanced event seating. The plan for this area also called for 
the creation of a level path at the eastern edge of the Bowl linking the 
greenway with RiverPlace and for the addition to the beach area of riparian 
plantings and a rock facing. 5 
The Salmon Springs Fountain area was designated to serve as one of 
two major activity centers in the park. In order to accomplish this, some type 
of facility near the fountain was to be used to attract people throughout the 
year and act as an "anchor" for the southern section of the park. City planners 
were unsure, however, whether the Yeon Building, now functioning as 
McCall's Restaurant, could serve for this purpose. The fountain area was to be 
enhanced for both summer and winter use through the addition of a "buffer" 
area to include seating and shaded areas as well as an activity center 
accommodating vendor carts. A set of terraces to offer views of the river and 
4 Ibid., Portland Parks and Recreation, "Public Meeting #3 Results Summary" (first quote, 1). 
5 The Master Plan was approved with minor changes by the city council in May 2003. 
Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park Master Plan," 9, 47, 65-66. 
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provide a multi-use performance space was designed for the grassy area in 
between the Hawthorne Bridge and the fountain. The Maritime Museum 
Sternwheeler Portland and Battleship Oregon Memorial were to be relocated 
from in between the Morrison and Burnside bridges to the seawall just north 
of the Hawthorne Bridge.6 
The area between Salmon Springs and the Morrison Bridge was 
designated "Waterfront Plaza," an all-weather "destination space" for hosting 
events and producing winter programs. The plaza was also designed to 
include the addition of two entry points at S.W. Morrison and Yamhill streets 
and a new curved pathway to extend over the river. The area between the 
Morrison Bridge and Ankeny Pump Station was designated "The Meadow." 
This open grassy area was designed to provide a site both for overflow from 
events and for quiet recreation. The scheme for this area also included 
lowering a 900-foot length of the seawall an estimated eight feet to provide 
more direct views of the river. City planners acknowledged that this area 
could be flooded during a 100-year flood event, as had occurred in 1996.7 
The Ankeny Pump Station Area was selected as the second activity 
center for the park through the additions of an interactive water feature, a 
visitor services building, a new dock, and an intimate seating area for 
lunchtime visitors. The area around the water feature was to be "versatile and 
6 Ibid., 9, 45, 66-70 (first quote, 67, second quote, 69). 
7 The long-term plan for this area also included the creation of residential developments 
immediately west of the park. Ibid., 9-10, 45, 70-75 (first and second quotes, 70, third quote, 
72); Jewel Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power 1851-2001 (Oregon State University 
Press, Corvallis: 2003), 456. 
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flexible" to allow for a variety of year-round activities. A curved pathway 
through the activity area was designed to reach out over the seawall for better 
river views. For the northernmost area of the park-the Burnside to Steel 
bridges-the Master Plan detailed the addition of a new floating walkway to 
connect the park to the Willamette Greenway Trail and the McCormick Pier 
apartments, with two additional entry points to the park from Old 
Town/ Chinatown.8 
Because of Portland's economic downturn in 2002, funding for the new 
Master Plan project did not materialize. Since the total cost of the scheme was 
estimated at $45 million, the city hoped to implement the plan gradually over 
the next fifteen to twenty years. Expensive additions, such as Waterfront Plaza 
and the development of the area between the Burnside and Steel bridges 
including the floating walkway, were included in phases beyond 2015. 
Between 2003 and 2010, the city recommended initiating the improvements to 
the Bowl, Salmon Springs Fountain, and Ankeny Pump Station areas. City 
planners acknowledged that in the long-term development of the park, some 
changes to the scheme were possible, if they were consistent with the 
recommendations of the report.9 
This thesis has chronicled the history of Portland's downtown west side 
riverfront during the twentieth century. Between 1900 and 1943, numerous 
outside planners called for the creation of a park along the waterfront to 
enhance the area. Despite this advice, city officials instead initiated 
8 Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park Master Plan," 10, 46, 75-9 (first quote, 75). 
9 Ibid., 83-91. 
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infrastructure improvement projects, including the construction of the seawall 
in 1929 and Harbor Drive in 1942. The creation in 1933 of the Public Market 
Building on the riverfront just north of the Hawthorne Bridge turned out to be 
one of the city's biggest boondoggles. By the 1950s, it was apparent that the 
sixteen-foot wide esplanade along the river's edge was an inadequate space 
for the popular annual Rose Festival. 
The possibility of a viable waterfront park appeared remote when the 
city council, in the spring of 1961, approved the construction of the Ash Street 
overpass, which would have obstructed the last open area along the 
riverfront. A groundswell of opposition led by architects Dan McGoodwin 
and Lewis Crutcher along with the Oregonian and the Oregon Journal, however, 
challenged the project. The cancellation of the overpass project in August 1961 
marked the first time in Portland's history that waterfront beautification 
advocates had influenced plans for the area. Seven years later, City 
Commissioner Frank Ivancie arranged for Portland to buy the old Journal 
building and have it tom down. Governor Tom McCall, seeing an opportunity 
to create a riverfront park, created the Intergovernmental Task Force for 
Waterfront Development, chaired by Glenn Jackson, to examine the issue and 
make recommendations. 
The year 1969 marked the paradigm shift for the development of the 
riverfront area from exclusivity to a more inclusive process. In July, the 
Portland City Club's Committee on the Journal Building Site and Willamette 
Riverfront Development, which included future city commissioner and mayor 
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Neil Goldschmidt, initiated the cancellation of the Ivancie-Jackson unilateral 
plan to widen Harbor Drive. The Committee's "Interim Report" in August 
lambasted the secrecy of the task force and argued that no decision for the 
area be made until adequate studies were completed. Inspired by the 
document, Robert and Allison Belcher, along with Jim Howell, formed the 
Riverfront for People Committee and held two high profile picnics in August 
and September at the old Journal building. The group not only demanded 
public hearings on the issue but also recommended the removal of Harbor 
Drive. At the public hearing at Portland City Hall in October, attended by 
over 500 people, including numerous organizations brought in by the 
Riverfront for People Committee, the task force received a clear message to 
move more slowly and allow for public participation. Accordingly, Governor 
McCall instructed Jackson to implement many of the public's 
recommendations, including the creation of a citizens advisory committee. 
In July 1970, Glenn Jackson announced both plans for the removal of 
Harbor Drive, which was eventually closed in 1974, and plans for the building 
of a viable waterfront park. A year later, a group of open-space advocates 
fought against and succeeded in canceling the task force's First and Front 
avenues couplet plan. The beautification of the riverfront coincided with the 
adoption of the "Downtown Plan" of 1972, which was a radical scheme to 
make downtown pedestrian friendly and enhance both citizen livability and 
Portland's attraction as a business and retail center. The early 1970s also 
marked a transition in city hall from conservative white males to progressive 
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politicians, who, as a group, were more diverse in age, gender, and race. 
Thirty-two year old Mayor Goldschmidt, along with commissioners Lloyd 
Anderson and Connie McCready, won a series of victories in the 1970s, 
including turning the ideas of the "Downtown Plan" into reality and creating 
Waterfront Park. 
The process of citizen participation, which had been carried forward by 
the "Downtown Plan," played an important role in defining the type of park 
that was to be built along the riverfront. In August 1975, the city council 
adopted Resolution No. 31595, providing detailed guidelines for the design 
and development of Waterfront Park. Even though the consultants in their 
"Final Report" recommended some commercial development in the park, city 
officials instead chose an open space scheme. In 1978, nearly nine years after 
the Riverfront for People Committee had formed, Waterfront Park officially 
opened. By the turn of the twenty-first century, however, the role of the park 
as a place either for large events or quiet recreation was becoming increasingly 
problematic. 
This thesis has explored the manner in which beautification advocates 
initiated a paradigm shift in city planning with regard to the development of 
Portland, Oregon's downtown waterfront area. The period from 1965to1975 
saw a change in attitude towards the downtown area in many U.S. cities. A 
philosophy that emphasized livability and rejuvenation emerged as a reaction 
against the destructive aspects of urban renewal. Portland in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, with the removal of Harbor Drive and the creation of Waterfront 
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Park, provides an excellent example of the battle against the ascendancy of the 
automobile and the ability of citizen groups to effect city planning decisions. 
Even with this paradigm shift it remains critical that city leaders and experts 
continue to seek public participation instead of imposing their will on the 
citizenry. Substantial input from broader segments of the public is essential 
for decision making to be truly inclusive rather than representing only the 
interests of the professional elite. 
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